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This thesis examines China’s leadership behavior in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after the global financial crisis. 
Notwithstanding the Chinese government’s rhetoric, the question of leadership in the 
two regional institutions was pivotal to the rising power’s renegotiation of the 
geopolitical definition of East and Central Asia. Adopting an interdisciplinary and 
eclectic approach, this thesis dissects institutional leadership as the ability to promote 
an institution’s identity by guiding its adaptation to a changing environment. Based on 
a conception of leadership behavior as the combination of relationship and task, I 
develop an analytical framework of six types of leadership behavior – delegating, 
supporting, brokering, soft selling, hard selling and directing – to explain how a leader 
responds to external challenges.  
 
This thesis finds that although China demonstrated increasing capacity to 
provide public goods, it remained unable to unite member states behind its purpose. 
Under Hu Jintao, the precedence of relationship over task led Beijing to promote APT 
and the SCO’s identities through supporting and soft selling, employing its capabilities 
to advance capacity building while proposing institution-building initiatives. The 
combination of external and internal pressure, however, led task to precede 
relationship under Xi Jinping. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative and other 
parallel initiatives constituted China’s attempt at hard selling in economic cooperation 
by redefining collective purposes and initiating structures of cooperation on its own 
terms. Nevertheless, the problem of trust, together with structural and institutional 
constraints, confined Chinese institutional leadership in both APT and the SCO largely 
to functional tasks in the economic domain, and consequently prevented the two 
regional institutions from fully adapting to a changing environment. China’s 
behavioral shift represented a change in its approach toward the geopolitical 
reconstruction of East and Central Asia, from anchoring them to APT and the SCO 
under Hu Jintao to (re)integrating them into an expanding, Sino-centric geopolitical 





Although power transition has always been one of the leitmotifs in the study of 
international relations, the “rise of China” has assumed increasing importance since 
the global financial crisis. The widely-perceived decline of the United States and the 
shifting balance of power have given rise to a view among scholars, policy elites and 
the public that a systemic change, if it has not already occurred, is approaching.1 While 
China’s comprehensive national power (综合国力) is a subject of ongoing debate, it 
is important to not just define and measure Chinese power but also examine its use. 
The question of leadership is the key to explaining the dynamics between China’s rise, 
order and change in world politics. 
 
This thesis investigates China’s leadership behavior in ASEAN Plus Three 
(APT) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the first decade after the 
global financial crisis (2007-2017). While the systemic event ushered in an 
increasingly influential China in global and regional governance, opinions on the 
rising power’s capacity and readiness to lead have become more divided than ever. 
The discrepancy between representation and reality and between efforts and outcomes 
was arguably the starkest in China’s periphery (周边), where the successes and failures 
in its quest for leadership found the greatest embodiments in APT and the SCO. While 
China played a central role in their establishment and has since remained their most 
ardent champion, the ineffectiveness of the two regional institutions seemed to be the 
antithesis of the importance Beijing attached to them. 
 
The discrepancy raises questions about Chinese international leadership. This 
thesis argues that although the rising power was increasingly capable of providing the 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global 
Power to the East, (New York: Public Affairs, 2008); Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008); Christopher Layne, “This Time It’s Real: The End of 
Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 1 (March 2012), 
1-11; Charles Kupchan, No One’s World: the West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order, 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014); Jonathan Kirshner, American Power After the Financial Crisis, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). For global public opinion, see, for example, “World’s 
Leading Superpower: Will China Eventually Replace the U.S. as the World’s Leading Superpower?” 
Pew Research Center, (Spring 2017), http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/33/survey/all/  
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public goods that other member states needed, it remained unable to unite them as a 
group behind its purpose. To illustrate my argument, I will address three questions in 
the following chapters: 
1. How did China exercise leadership in APT and the SCO? 
2. How did China’s leadership behavior change from the Hu Jintao to the Xi 
Jinping era? 
3. Why wasn’t China able to exercise effective leadership in the two regional 
institutions? 
 
Drawing upon leadership research from International Relations (IR), 
Sociology and Social Psychology, I examine institutional leadership as the ability to 
maintain and promote an institution’s identity by guiding its adaptation to a changing 
external environment. How a leader acts in response to external challenges, however, 
depends on how it weighs the need to consider followers’ interests against the need to 
accomplish collective purposes on its own terms. Based on a two-dimensional view of 
leadership behavior as the combination of relationship and task, I develop an analytical 
framework of six types of leadership behavior: delegating, supporting, brokering, soft 
selling, hard selling and directing. 
 
China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO represented its 
ongoing struggle to renegotiate the geopolitical definition of East and Central Asia. 
Under Hu Jintao, China sought to promote the two regional institutions’ identities and 
their adaptation to a changing international environment through supporting and soft 
selling. As relationship took precedence over task, Beijing promoted collectively 
agreed purposes by providing public goods and proposing initiatives in institution and 
capacity building. Increasing time pressure for change, however, led to the precedence 
of task over relationship under Xi Jinping. Notwithstanding its rhetoric, China’s 
launch of the BRI and other initiatives represented an attempt at hard selling in 
economic cooperation by redefining collective purposes and initiating structures of 
cooperation on Chinese terms. 
 
Structural, political and institutional constraints, however, restricted Chinese 
institutional leadership in both the economically-oriented APT and the security-
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oriented SCO largely to the economic domain. Although the growth of Chinese power 
enabled Beijing to expand its diplomatic and material investment in economic 
cooperation, low level of trust among member states prevented China from uniting 
them behind its preferences in the “critical decisions” concerning membership, 
institution building and external relations of the two regional institutions. As a result, 
Chinese institutional leadership in the first decade after the global financial crisis was 
confined to functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. Rather than 
changing APT and the SCO’s leadership deficit, China’s leadership behavior 
expedited their fragmentation.  
 
The shift in China’s leadership behavior represented an important change in its 
approach toward the geopolitical reconstruction of East and Central Asia. Under Hu 
Jintao, China’s efforts to promote APT and the SCO’s identities constituted an attempt 
to anchor the two regions to the two institutions. The launch of the BRI and other 
parallel initiatives under Xi Jinping, however, marked the beginning of an attempt to 
reintegrate East and Central Asia into an expanding, Sino-centric geopolitical 
construct of periphery. 
 
Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the study of Chinese foreign policy in four ways. First, it 
provides an alternative interpretation of the rising power’s international behavior. 
Multilateralism and regionalism have become key pillars of Chinese foreign policy 
since the mid-nineties. After the global financial crisis, China not only strove to play 
a greater role in the existing institutional architecture, but also launched a variety of 
institutional initiatives. This thesis shows that China’s leadership behavior was driven 
by the need to weigh relationship against task. In this regard, Beijing’s ambiguity over 
the question of leadership was a manifestation of the contradictions in its grand 
strategy of “peaceful development.” The analytical framework of leadership behavior 
presented here can be applied to the study of China’s behavior in other institutions 
such as BRICS – how contextual factors influence the way it engages other member 
states, the type(s) of tasks it accomplishes and its ability to promote institutional 
adaptation to a changing international environment. This will enable us to better 
understand the similarities and differences in outcomes across institutions.  
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Second, the comparative study of APT and the SCO contributes to a more 
comprehensive understanding of China’s activities in regional institutions that remain 
relatively understudied.2 The existing scholarship has for a long time tended to see 
China as a reactive actor either to be socialized or preoccupied with balancing against 
the United States. Nevertheless, if legitimacy and followership are central to 
leadership, order and change in world politics, it is equally important to study how the 
rising power engages other states. This thesis demonstrates the need for further 
research on China’s behavior in international institutions situated at the margins of 
American power and the liberal international order. 
 
Third, by analyzing the BRI in the context of Chinese diplomacy in APT and 
the SCO, this thesis provides a more nuanced understanding of the Xi Jinping 
administration’s foreign policy. While the BRI and other grand schemes have captured 
the attention of academic and policy communities both inside and outside China, one 
cannot understand why they assume their current form, what purposes they serve, and 
how Beijing promotes their development without understanding the successes and 
failures of the country’s peripheral diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. Last but 
not least, the in-depth analysis of Chinese-language sources contributes to better 
understanding in the academic and policy communities outside China of how the 
country’s foreign policy elites view international politics, where their perceptual gap 
with the world lies, and why it matters. 
 
ASEAN Plus Three, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 
the Question of Leadership 
While I employ the concept of leadership to explain China’s behavior, Beijing has 
shunned the term since Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation at the turn of the nineties that the 
country should “bide its time and hide its capabilities” (韬光养晦) and “neither bear 
the standard nor take the lead” (不扛大旗不当头).3 The interplay of external and 
                                                          
2 For an earlier attempt to compare ASEAN and the SCO, see Stephen Aris, “A New Model of Asian 
Regionalism: does the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have more potential than ASEAN?” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 3, (2009), 451-67. 
3 Qian Qichen [钱其琛], “Learn Deng Xiaoping’s Thought on Diplomacy in Depth, Improve Our 
Diplomatic Work further in the New Period – Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the Ministry of 




internal developments, however, provided the incentives for the rising power to pursue 
international leadership. As chapters one and two will show, China’s quest for 
leadership is integral to its ongoing struggle to renegotiate the international order and 
its role in it. International institutions are the locus of the renegotiation over what the 
rising power’s legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities should be.  
 
APT and the SCO embody the successes and failures in China’s struggle to 
renegotiate order in its peripheral regions.4 Although the former is formally led by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China has played a central role in 
both regional institutions since the very beginning. APT and the SCO are similar not 
only in their membership composition, institutional design and geostrategic potential, 
but also in their ineffectiveness. As a result of their perceived insignificance and 
opaque decision-making structures, both regional institutions remain understudied. 
APT and its affiliated Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) received considerable attention in 
the first decade after their establishment.5 However, attention declined as the process 
of East Asian regionalism relapsed into stalemate. Meanwhile, as the first 
intergovernmental organization named after a Chinese city, the SCO is the subject of 
a large and still growing Chinese-language literature. Yet, notwithstanding some 
major contributions, the organization has been represented in diametrically opposed 
ways outside China, from the “NATO in the East” and the “most dangerous 
organization that Americans have never heard of” to a “geopolitical bluff” and a 
“useless talk shop.”6 
                                                          
Daily [人民日报], (12th December 1995), 
http://zg.people.com.cn/GB/33839/34943/34983/2642135.html 
4 For a major contribution to the study of the renegotiation on East Asian order after the end of the 
Cold War, see Evelyn Goh,The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, & Transition in Post-Cold 
War East Asia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
5 See, for instance, Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian Regionalism?” Asian 
Survey, Vol. 42, No. 3, (May/June 2002), 440-455; Mark Beeson, “ASEAN Plus Three and the Rise 
of Reactionary Regionalism,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic 
Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2, (August 2003), 251-68; Markus Hund, “ASEAN Plus Three: Towards a New 
Age of Pan-East Asian Regionalism? A Skeptic’s Appraisal,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, 
(2003), 282-417; William W. Grimes, Currency and Contest in East Asia: The Great Power Politics 
of Financial Regionalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
6 Kinming Liu, “The Most Dangerous Unknown Pact,” The New York Sun, (13th June 2006), 
https://www.nysun.com/opinion/most-dangerous-unknown-pact/34366/; Murat Laumulin, “The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization as ‘Geopolitical Bluff?’ A View from Astana,” Institut Français 
des Relations Internationales, (2006), 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/laumullinenglish.pdf; Parag Khanna, “Waving 
Goodbye to Hegemony,” The New York Times Magazine, (27th January 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html; Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm 
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Ineffectiveness, however, does not negate the need for further study. Indeed, 
their continued ineffectiveness has important implications for China’s leadership 
behavior and the geopolitical reconstruction of its peripheral regions. As chapters four 
to seven will show, leadership deficit in both APT and the SCO was all the more 
significant after the global financial crisis, a potential “critical juncture” wherein the 
shifting balance of power and time pressure for change provided China with an 
opportunity to shape the trajectory of institutional change. Although the launch of the 
BRI, the AIIB and other initiatives under Xi Jinping has further diverted the already 
scant attention away from APT and the SCO, we could neither understand Beijing’s 
grand schemes nor evaluate their prospect without understanding the leadership 
challenge China faced in the two regional institutions. 
 
APT and the SCO are not the only successful cases of Chinese institutional 
leadership. For instance, the Six-Party Talks, which were launched in 2003 to address 
the North Korean nuclear issue, epitomized the multilateral turn of China’s regional 
security diplomacy.7 However, notwithstanding discussions about transforming the 
dialogue into some form of permanent mechanism, the Six-Party Talks had an even 
lower degree of institutionalization than APT and the SCO. The early success of the 
negotiations, moreover, did not last. North Korea’s resumption of missile and nuclear 
tests ended Pyongyang’s participation and hence the Six-Party Talks in 2009. 
 
The New Development Bank (NDB) and the AIIB are arguably China’s most 
“successful” institution-building initiatives under Xi Jinping. In particular, with a 
broad-based membership and an institutional design comparable to that of other 
multilateral development banks, the AIIB has become the focus of research on China’s 
“institutional statecraft.” 8  Nevertheless, given that the NDB and the AIIB were 
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established only five and four years ago respectively, it is still too early to assess 
Chinese institutional leadership in the two multilateral development banks. 
 
The choice of two regional institutions that exclude the United States also 
raises the question about whether China and the United States’ interests are 
“fundamentally incompatible.”9 As chapters one and two will show, while the two 
great powers have for the most part tried to accommodate each other to a certain degree, 
they have continued to disagree on the terms of the international order and Beijing’s 
role in it. This explains, on the one hand, why many in the West perceive China’s 
noncompliance with liberal international rules and norms as a sign of irresponsibility 
and unpreparedness to lead, and, on the other hand, why China’s foreign policy elites 
consider ideas like “responsible stakeholder” or “G2” nothing but the hegemon’s 
attempts to subjugate a peacefully rising power. Thus even though the two great 
powers have occasionally been able to exercise joint leadership on individual issues 
such as climate change, they have not been able to do so consistently through well-
established institutions. Yet, as chapters four to seven will show, the irony in China’s 
quest for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO is that while both regional 
institutions were established to constrain American hegemony, the rising power’s 
increasing dominance has fueled mistrust among member states and hence 
undermined its efforts. As I will discuss in the conclusion, this has important 
implications for rethinking the relationship between China’s rise, order and change in 
world politics. 
 
Analytical Framework of Leadership Behavior 
This thesis develops an analytical framework to explain China’s leadership behavior 
in international institutions. Leadership’s omnipresence in human social life and its 
multidimensional nature have led scholars across paradigms and disciplines to 
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approach the subject from different perspectives. For the purpose here, I draw upon 
leadership research not only from IR but also from Sociology and Social Psychology. 
The analytical framework proceeds from Philip Selznick’s concept of institutional 
leadership as the ability to maintain and promote an institution’s identity by steering 
its adaptation to a changing external environment.10 Meanwhile, based on a behavioral, 
two-dimensional view of leadership as the combination of relationship and task, I 
identify six ideal types of leadership behavior: delegating, supporting, brokering, soft 
selling, hard selling and directing. While the focus here remains on China as the leader, 
the analytical framework underscores the nature of leadership as situational by 
explaining how the rising power weighed the need to consider followers’ interests 
against the need to accomplish collective purposes on its own terms as it sought to 
promote APT and the SCO’s adaptation to a changing international environment. 
 
Method and Sources 
 
Within-Case Comparison 
This thesis is designed to enable comparison of China’s leadership behavior across 
both space and time. Conceptual ambiguity and the distinctive nature of international 
institutions in Asia, however, raise the question about the comparability of APT and 
the SCO. The former has been referred to as a “process” or “mechanism,” whereas the 
latter is designated as an intergovernmental organization.11 Nevertheless, they are both 
structures of rules and norms that govern relations between member states with highly 
asymmetric capabilities. Moreover, their institutional designs are defined by 
informality, low degree of intrusiveness and consensus decision-making. Even though 
APT and the SCO were first launched for economic and non-traditional security 
cooperation respectively, both regional institutions were intended from the beginning 
to perform functions in both domains. But whereas APT is formally led by ASEAN, 
China is the SCO’s de facto leader. Still, as chapters four to seven will show, China’s 
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leadership challenges in the two regional institutions were highly similar. 
 
The first decade after the global financial crisis corresponded with the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term and the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. In the light 
of the ongoing debate on China’s future under Xi Jinping, comparison between the two 
administrations will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the continuity 
and change of the rising power’s foreign policy. As chapters five and seven will show, 
China’s leadership behavior underwent a significant change from supporting and soft 
selling under Hu Jintao to hard selling under Xi Jinping. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the launch of new foreign policy concepts and initiatives, the Xi 
Jinping administration continued to wrestle with the same challenges that hampered its 
predecessor’s pursuit of institutional leadership. 
 
Analytic Eclecticism 
Drawing upon leadership research across paradigms and disciplines, this thesis 
embodies what Sil and Katzenstein call “analytic eclecticism.” Its aim, as they point 
out, is to identify the interconnectedness and complementarity of explanations with 
seemingly incompatible assumptions by 
extricat[ing], translat[ing], and selectively integrat[ing] analytic elements – 
concepts, logics, mechanisms, and interpretations – of theories or narratives 
that have been developed within separate paradigms but that address related 
aspects of substantive problems that have both scholarly and practical 
significance.12 
Given the omnipresence of leadership in human social life, its multidimensional nature 
and the limitations of leadership research in IR, an interdisciplinary and eclectic 
approach is necessary for dissecting a phenomenon characterized by complex 
interactions between multiple actors. Nevertheless, analytic eclecticism raises the 
question about the relationship between interrelated variables. This question is of 
particular importance here, since leadership as a form of agency cannot be understood 
outside the context of the “agent–structure problem” in IR and social sciences in 
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My theoretical starting point corresponds in general with that of neoclassical 
realism. 14  Structure, which consists in the distribution of capabilities, does not 
determine behavior and outcomes; rather it defines the parameters within which other 
variables influence how individual states perceive and act. 15  Thus, while relative 
capability advantage is not the prerequisite of leadership, it gives a powerful state a 
greater potential scope of action. On the other hand, relative material capabilities do 
not determine whether a state is capable and ready to lead, let alone how it leads. To 
neoclassical realists, structural effects on state behavior are mediated by intervening 
variables at domestic level. 16  But while domestic variables including ideology, 
identity, elite perceptions and economic policy – as chapters one and two will show – 
are important to understanding China’s leadership behavior, the study of institutional 
leadership requires me to consider variables that belong to neither systemic nor unit 
level, including institutional design, trust and task.17 I will discuss how these variables 
combine with capability to influence leadership behavior in chapter three. 
 
A number of issues, however, needs to be clarified before proceeding further. 
To begin with, while leadership research in behavioral sciences is driven by the aim of 
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prescription, my aim, to use Verba’s words, is a more modest one of “direct[ing] one’s 
attention to certain significant phenomena and the relationships among them without 
presenting a coherent and interdependent set of propositions.”18 Indeed, the problem 
of equifinality in the study of leadership – that different causal paths could lead to the 
same outcome – explains not only why rigorous hypothesis testing is difficult, but also 
why case study remains an indispensable tool in the study of leadership.19 Although 
some of the social psychological theories I draw upon have had little empirical support, 
this does not affect the validity of the analytical framework. As these theories were 
originally designed to explain leadership behavior of different actors in different social 
systems, their empirical tests are not relevant indicators of their usefulness as heuristic 
devices for explaining state behavior in international politics.20 
 
Assumption of China as a Unitary Actor 
The choice of method and sources for the study of China’s leadership behavior cannot 
be justified without considering the problematic assumption of the state as a unitary, 
coherent actor. While the assumption risks overlooking the influence of sub-state 
actors, any attempt to trace the decision-making process is complicated by the 
opaqueness of China’s political system. Indeed, as Lo points out, even though scholarly 
attempts to typologize different views within the state or bureaucracy have deepened 
our understanding of the Chinese domestic discourse, one cannot infer from these 
typologies the influence each view has on policy making, since more often than not 
they all exercise some influence.21 Moreover, worldviews, interests and preferences 
often crisscross rather than align with social, political and administrative divisions.22 
In this thesis, I will first analyze the Chinese domestic discourse in chapter two in order 
to illustrate the dominant thinking of the country’s foreign policy elites. The analysis 
will inform the study of China’s leadership behavior in APT and the SCO in chapters 
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four to seven. 
 
Sources 
This study is based on a combination of document analysis and elite interviews. The 
data consist of three types of authoritative and non-authoritative documentary sources 
– official documents, publications by Chinese policy elites and international non-
authoritative sources. Despite the informality and opaqueness of APT and the SCO’s 
decision-making structures, official documents of the two regional institutions and the 
Chinese and other governments provide important information about China’s 
leadership behavior as well as the dynamics of cooperation and competition. 
 
To analyze the evolving worldviews of the Chinese government and foreign 
policy elites, I draw upon large numbers of Chinese-language publications by Chinese 
academics, think tank researchers and (ex)officials. Some of them, such as the SCO’s 
first Secretary-General Zhang Deguang or Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Professor Zhang Yunling, have participated in policy making and implementation in 
various capacities. Others, such as Tsinghua University Professor Yan Xuetong or 
retired Rear Admiral Yang Yi, are major voices representing different views among 
Chinese foreign policy elites.  
 
Among Chinese-language, non-authoritative sources, of particular note are 
articles in leading foreign policy journals run by government-affiliated think tanks such 
as Strategy and Management (战略与管理), Contemporary International Relations 
(现代国际关系), International Studies (国际问题研究) or Russian, East European 
and Central Asian Studies (俄罗斯东欧中亚研究). The value of these publications as 
primary sources remains a subject of debate. Shambaugh argues that they provide 
“early warning indicators of policies.”23 Medeiros, on the other hand, warns against 
overestimating their usefulness.24  Indeed, there is a general consensus among the 
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academics and researchers intervieweed for this thesis that foreign policy journals do 
not have direct influence on policy making. Research that informs policy making 
primarily takes the form of internal reference (内部参考); foreign policy journals are 
first and foremost open platforms for academics, think tank researchers or (ex)officials 
to justify government policies and promote their own ideas.25 These publications, in 
other words, are not indicators of what is to come but rather what has been decided. 26 
On the other hand, they provide insights into the worldviews of those who do 
participate in policy making and the foreign policy elites in general.27 In Medeiros’ 
view, the analytical value of foreign policy journals is the greatest when they are 
analyzed over a long time period and complemented by interviews.28 
 
In this thesis, therefore, I draw upon Chinese-language publications that 
spanned over almost two decades. Notwithstanding their sheer volume, I do not adopt 
random sampling in data selection. While data selection based purely on the author’s 
position or fame could cause selection bias, the data selected through random sampling, 
as Lynch points out, could turn out to be just “noise” rather than “signals.”29 Taking 
selection bias into consideration, I follow Lynch’s method by first conducting a broad 
survey of the Chinese domestic discourse and then selecting materials that are more 
likely to contribute to the foreign policy debate. 30  Where useful, I refer to a 
considerable number of English-language, non-authoritative sources from other 
countries, from think tank publications like Russia in Global Affairs, English-language 
newspapers like The Strait Times to online media sources like Eurasianet. 
 
Meanwhile, I conducted thirty semi-structured, anonymous interviews of 
Chinese academics and think tank researchers. Elite interviews are useful in identifying 
the gap in documentary sources. Despite the expanding scope and diversity of the 
Chinese domestic discourse, the majority of open sources adhere to the parameters of 
public discussion set by the government. Even if they do not actively promote and 
                                                          
25 Medeiros, “Agents of Influence,” 292. 
26 Medeiros, “Agents of Influence,” 293. 
27 Nevertheless, as interviewee 7 pointed out, very few scholars could provide input into policy 
making processes. Interviewee 7, Beijing, 25th/30th March 2016.  
28 Medeiros, “Agents of Influence,” 293. 
29 Daniel C. Lynch, China’s Futures: PRC Elites Debate Economics, Politics, and Foreign Policy, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), xvi. 
30 Lynch, China’s Futures, xiii-xvi. 
14 
 
justify government policies, for the most part they tend to tone down criticisms of the 
government or avoid reference to sensitive issues. Elite interviews could demonstrate 
the gap between public discourse and private opinions. 
 
Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into three parts. Chapters one and two put China’s quest for 
institutional leadership in APT and the SCO in the context by analyzing the 
international and the Chinese domestic discourse on China’s power and purpose. 
Chapter one shows that regardless of divergent perspectives, the dominant view 
considers China’s power limited and imbalanced. Having increased primarily its share 
of international economic leadership, the rising power is not yet capable of challenging 
the United States’ global leadership. Likewise, while scholars and policy makers differ 
widely in their views on the rising power’s purpose, the general perception of China 
emerging from the discourse is one of a reformist stakeholder that seeks to change 
certain aspects of the existing order without overthrowing it. 
 
Chapter two shows that although the imperative of “peaceful development” 
has led the Chinese government to shun the term leadership, the question of leadership 
has in effect been central to the grand strategic debate among the country’s foreign 
policy elites since the early 2000s. The global financial crisis did not end but 
intensified the debate on the question of leadership and the continuing relevance of 
Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “biding its time and hiding its capabilities.” China’s 
uncertainty about its own power and ambiguous attitude toward the existing order 
meant that even though a changing international environment and domestic economic 
imperatives spurred the rising power to pursue an increasingly active foreign policy 
under Xi Jinping, Beijing has continued to exhibit a cautious attitude toward the 
question of leadership. 
 
Together, chapters one and two reveal the perceptual gap between China and 
the world over what the rising power’s legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities 
should be. Euro-American centrism means that skepticism about China’s capacity to 
lead and mistrust of Beijing’s purpose is rooted in Western perception of its 
authoritarian political system. Status quo bias, meanwhile, is manifested in the 
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equation of leadership with China’s fulfillment of its “responsibilities” toward the 
liberal international order. China’s quest for leadership, in this regard, is integral to its 
struggle for self-determination and great power status by renegotiating the 
international order and its role in it on its own terms. Institutions are viewed in both 
discourses as the locus of renegotiation. The entrenchment of the Western-led global 
architecture led the rising power to expand its diplomatic and material investment not 
only in the reform of existing institutions, but increasingly in the launch of parallel 
initiatives. Nevertheless, if leadership hinges on legitimacy and followership, the 
perceptual gap between China and the world over what the rising power’s legitimate 
interests, rights and responsibilities should be underscores the problem of trust that 
has continued to hamper its quest for leadership. 
 
Chapter three lays out the analytical framework of leadership behavior. IR 
scholars have for a long time conceived of leadership mainly as a role based on a 
state’s relative power position and overlooked its behavioral dimension. While the 
institutionalist scholarship has filled the gap by examining different forms of 
leadership in international negotiations, its focus remains on the “bargaining” stage of 
institutional development and the various forms of influence derived from a leader’s 
power resources. Based on Selznick’s classic work Leadership and Administration, 
the analytical framework proceeds from the idea of institutional leadership as the 
ability to promote an institution’s identity by steering its adaptation to a changing 
external environment. Adopting a two-dimensional view of leadership behavior as the 
combination of relationship and task, the analytical framework further dissects 
leadership behavior in international institutions by explaining how capability, 
positional authority, trust and task structure influence a leader’s weighing of 
relationship against task as it responds to external challenges. The analytical 
framework identifies six ideal types of leadership behavior: delegating, supporting, 
brokering, soft selling, hard selling and directing. 
 
In chapters four to seven, I will apply the analytical framework to explain 
China’s leadership behavior in APT and the SCO. Chapter four shows that the 
interplay of international and domestic developments after the global financial crisis 
increased the pressure on China to pursue institutional leadership in APT. Regional 
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common interests, shifting distribution of power and ASEAN countries’ capability 
deficit provided an opportunity for China to lead by supporting and soft selling. Under 
Hu Jintao, the precedence of relationship over task led Beijing to promote collectively 
agreed purposes by deploying its capabilities in support of capacity building while 
proposing institution-building initiatives. China’s greatest success was in financial 
cooperation, wherein it shared joint leadership with Japan in institution and capacity 
building. Nevertheless, structural, political and institutional constraints restricted the 
domain, form and scale of Chinese institutional leadership. Low level of trust, in 
particular, prevented China from mobilizing member states as a group behind its 
preference in the “critical decision” concerning regional free trade. As a result, 
Chinese institutional leadership throughout the Hu Jintao administration’s second term 
was confined largely to functional tasks in the economic domain with low uncertainty 
and interdependence. Notwithstanding the shifting regional balance of power, China 
was far from displacing Japan’s role in the supply of regional economic goods. The 
abandonment of the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and the idleness of Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) indicated the thirteen-member institution’s 
inability to fully adapt to a changing international environment. 
 
Chapter five shows that the buildup of international and domestic pressure, 
together with APT’s impasse, led to a shift in China’s leadership behavior to hard 
selling under Xi Jinping. As task took precedence over relationship, China engaged 
member states selectively and individually rather than as a group. Beijing’s proposals 
of a “China-ASEAN community with a shared future” and a “2+7 cooperation 
framework,” as well as its launch of the AIIB and Lancong-Mekong Cooperation 
(LMC), constituted an attempt to redefine collective purposes and initiate structures 
of cooperation on its own terms. Nevertheless, structural, political and institutional 
constraints continued to restrict Chinese institutional leadership in very much the same 
way as they did during the Hu Jintao era. Rather than promoting APT’s identity, 
China’s hard selling intensified Sino-Japanese leadership competition and furthered 
the regional institution’s fragmentation. 
 
If China was not successful in uniting East Asian states behind its purpose in 
the ASEAN-led regional institution, would the rising power be able to do so in an 
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institution founded by itself? Chapters six and seven show that China faced very much 
the same leadership challenge in the SCO as it did in APT. Although the SCO was 
established first and foremost for security cooperation, member states’ lingering 
mistrust of China and Beijing’s self-restraint severely restricted the organization’s 
security functions and prevented it from responding effectively to external challenges. 
Indeed, China continued to defer responsibilities for regional security leadership to 
Russia. On the other hand, the global financial crisis provided incentives for China to 
break the impasse of regional economic cooperation under the SCO. As was the case 
in APT, although member states’ capability deficit and their demand for public goods 
provided an opportunity for China to exercise institutional leadership through 
supporting and soft selling, their negative perception of the rising power’s growing 
influence prevented Beijing from uniting them behind its preferences in the “critical 
decisions” on the establishment of a free trade area, a development fund and a 
development bank. Russia’s leadership aspirations and its mistrust of China led 
Moscow to check Beijing’s influence by blocking the latter’s institution-building 
initiatives on the one hand while pushing for India’s accession to the organization on 
the other. Consequently, Chinese institutional leadership was confined largely to 
functional tasks in the economic domain with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
 
Chapter seven shows that China’s hard selling in economic cooperation with 
the launch of the BRI failed to promote the SCO’s adaptation to a changing 
international environment. Although American withdrawal from Afghanistan 
compelled China to shoulder greater responsibilities for the rebuilding of Afghanistan 
than before, Beijing continued to concentrate its diplomatic and material investment 
in the economic domain. The launch of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 
constituted its attempt to redefine collective purposes and initiate structures of 
cooperation on its own terms. Notwithstanding the agreement between China and 
Russia on the integration of the SREB and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), 
Moscow’s leadership aspirations and member states’ mistrust of China continued to 
prevent Beijing from securing their support for its institution-building initiatives in 
trade and finance. The tension between the SREB and the EAEU, the shift in the locus 
of activities to parallel mechanisms, and the accession of India and Pakistan threatened 
to undermine the organization’s identity and further its fragmentation. 
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China’s behavioral shift marked a significant change in the rising power’s 
approach toward the geopolitical reconstruction of its peripheral regions. Under Hu 
Jintao, China considered APT and the SCO the closest embodiments of its conception 
of East and Central Asia. Its pursuit of institutional leadership, therefore, represented 
an attempt to anchor the two regions to the two institutions. The launch of the BRI 
under Xi Jinping signified a shift from consolidating the boundaries, structures and 
rules of East and Central Asia to reintegrating the two regions into an expanding, Sino-
centric construct of periphery. 
 
The conclusion reviews the key findings of this thesis, discusses their 
implications and explores future directions for research. To begin with, the findings 
underscore how the perceptual gap between the rising power and the world has shaped 
the dynamics of cooperation and competition. Moreover, they demonstrate the 
indivisibility of domestic politics and foreign policy, as China’s behavioral change 
was driven as much by domestic as by international pressure. In this regard, Beijing’s 
struggle to balance relationship and task was a manifestation of the contradictions in 
its grand strategy of “peaceful development.” Indeed, notwithstanding its 
unprecedented scale, the BRI remains in essence a compromise between relationship 
and task. The study of China’s leadership behavior leads us to rethink about 
international political change. The findings suggest that Beijing’s initiatives amounted 
to change by addition rather than by replacement, as they are not so much parallel as 
“parasitical” to the current international order. Finally, I identify four future directions 
for research, including China’s leadership behavior in other international institutions; 
Beijing’s legitimation strategy; the relationship between multilateralism, 
minilateralism and bilateralism; and the relationship between China’s rise, order and 
change. 
 
China’s rise, the late Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew predicted, would force 
the world to search for “a new balance in 30 to 40 years.”31 What will such a new 
balance look like depends on how “the biggest player in the history of the world” 
combines its power and purpose.32 To understand the significance and implications of 
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China’s struggle for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO, I will first analyze 
the international and the Chinese domestic discourse on the “rise of China.”
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1. Power and Purpose: the “Rise of China” from Western 
Perspectives 
 
The “rise of China” seems to have become a premise on which scholars and policy 
makers contemplate order and change in world politics in the twenty-first century.  It 
is certainly unlikely that anyone would question if China really “matters” today as 
Segal did two decades ago; yet the debate on how it matters has become more intense 
than ever.1 The growing belief that American unipolarity and the liberal international 
order have or will come to an end has raised questions about the rising power’s 
capacity, readiness and strategy to lead Asia and the world. If leadership hinges on 
legitimacy and followership, how other states assess China’s power and purpose 
affects their attitude toward its quest for leadership, which, in turn, shapes the rising 
power’s leadership behavior. The question of perception is where academic and policy 
debate becomes crucial. 
 
This and the next chapter examine the international and the Chinese domestic 
discourse on the “rise of China.” The international discourse, as the following 
discussion will show, is intellectually ambiguous yet politically important. Behind the 
façade of plurality, it manifests Euro-American centrism at two levels. To begin with, 
scholars have long debated and criticized Euro-American centrism in IR.2 There seems 
to be no better evidence of disciplinary bias than the International Relations Teaching, 
Research & International Policy (TRIP) survey, which covered academics in 32 
countries and 9 languages. According to the survey, 53% of respondents categorized 
their approach as realist, liberal or constructivist; overall, more than 70% of them 
identified themselves with one of the major Western theoretical paradigms. The ten 
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most influential scholars according to respondents are all Anglo-American. 3 
Theoretical dominance, meanwhile, leads to and is in turn bolstered by institutional 
bias. The top ten taught and research postgraduate programs, as well as the ten most 
influential journals and publishers, are all in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. This partly explains why 86% of respondents based their scholarship on one 
of the major Western theoretical paradigms at the beginning of their career.4 Certainly 
we should avoid overstating the dominance of any country, paradigm or agenda in IR. 
As Turton’s study shows, not only is the discipline more diverse than assumed; there 
have been continuing efforts to promote theoretical, thematic and methodological 
pluralism.5 Nonetheless, academia in the United States and the West have continued 
to play a leading role in disciplinary development. 
 
It was in the context of disciplinary bias that the discourse on the “rise of 
China” emerged. Notwithstanding the diversity of the research agenda, China has 
become one of the most important subjects of study today. According to the TRIP 
survey, 30% of respondents considered China’s rising economic or military power one 
of the three most important foreign policy issues facing their countries. The shortage 
of country expertise, however, is shown by the fact that less than 1% and 2% of 
respondents identified China as their primary or secondary country of study. 6 
Meanwhile, as Kristensen’s survey shows, although the number of journal articles on 
China and other rising powers has steadily increased, only a very small percentage of 
the articles were authored by local academics.7 Between 2010 and 2015, Chinese 
scholars contributed less articles to the top 20 IR journals than their colleagues in 
Norway, Sweden or Switzerland.8 Moreover, it remains highly exceptional for non-
Western scholars to contribute to theory building; those who do continue to base their 
work on existing Western theoretical paradigms.9 Consequently, Chinese scholars 
have primarily played the role of “native informants” providing in-country expertise 
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or “quasi-officials” defending the government’s policy.10 They will have their “voice” 
heard only when they address the Euro-American-centric agenda on the “rise of 
China.” 
 
On the other hand, the weight China’s foreign policy elites give to the views 
of their Western and especially American counterparts – as epitomized by China 
Foreign Affairs University’s ranking of the most influential American “China 
watchers” in 2015 – reinforces Euro-American centrism in the both the discipline and 
the discourse on the “rise of China.”11  As the university’s president Qin Yaqing 
pointed out, the study of international relations in China has for a long time been 
driven by the ethos of “learning from the West.”12 The process of “Westernization” 
has accelerated with an expanding cohort of foreign educated scholars and the 
translation of Western literature. 13  Although dissatisfaction with Euro-American 
centrism has given rise to efforts to develop a “Chinese School” of IR, scholars have 
continued to engage in the debate on the “rise of China” in Western terms.14 
 
This chapter shows that despite divergent assessments, the dominant view in 
the international discourse considers China’s power limited and imbalanced. The 
rising power has increased primarily its share of international economic leadership, 
but it is far from capable of mounting a comprehensive challenge to the United States’ 
global leadership. Likewise, while scholars and policy makers differ widely on 
China’s purpose, the general perception of the rising power is one of a reformist 
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stakeholder that seeks to change certain aspects of the existing international order 
without overthrowing it.15 
 
Skepticism of China’s capacity to lead and mistrust of its purpose, as the 
following discussion will illustrate, stem first and foremost from Western views on its 
political system. Status quo bias, meanwhile, is expressed in an implicit equation of 
leadership with China’s fulfillment of what the United States and the West consider 
its “responsibilities” toward the liberal international order. As a result, the scholarship 
on China’s multilateralism has for a long time tended to see the rising power as a 
reactive actor either to be socialized or preoccupied with balancing against the United 
States. Nevertheless, China has demonstrated increasing capacity and readiness to 
exercise leadership not only within existing institutions, but also through the launch 
of parallel institutions and initiatives. The periphery has become the locus of China’s 
struggle for self-determination and great power status. 
 
1.1 Power: The Means of Leadership 
 
1.1.1 Rising, Risen, or Begun to Rise 
Expectations of Chinese international leadership emanate first and foremost from a 
growing perception of its rising power. While the works of scholars like Kang, Wang 
as well as Schell and Delury remind us that China’s worldviews, identities and 
interests have informed the rising power’s behavior in distinct ways, the Chinese 
weltanschauung has evolved, particularly since the mid-nineteenth century, in parallel 
with its changing position in the international distribution of power.16 As 1.2 and 2.1.1 
will show, historical memories of China’s dominance in East Asia and the nation’s 
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“victimhood” during the “century of humiliation” have shaped the rising power’s 
perception of itself and others. 
 
Although it is generally agreed that China is a great power, there are divergent 
assessments of its power, growth, and power position in the international system. In 
1999, Segal dismissed China as a “second-rank middle power” whose influence was 
overblown in 1999; only five years later, Ramo already considered China “a rival of 
the United States in many important areas” and anticipated it to become the “greatest 
asymmetric superpower the world has ever seen.”17 On the eve of the global financial 
crisis, Leonard saw the country as a “miniature USA” in terms of political influence.18 
After another five years, however, Shambaugh emphasized that China remained a 
“partial power” due to its imbalanced influence, free riding behavior and lack of a 
comprehensive vision of world order. 19  Indeed, China is a country marked by 
contradictions that it could be simultaneously viewed as a developing country, a 
regional power, an emerging power, a global power and a quasi-superpower.20 
 
The multitude of labels attests to the conceptual ambiguity in the discourse. To 
begin with, as Chestnut and Johnston point out, there is no consensus on how “rise” 
should be defined and measured.21 Their study finds that although China’s capabilities 
as a percentage of the United States’ capabilities increased steadily, their gap 
continued to widen in absolute terms until 2014.22 China’s rise, in short, has just 
begun.23 Likewise, based on sixteen indicators of military, economic and soft power, 
the annual study by Spain’s Elcano Royal Institute shows that China overtook 
Germany to become second in global presence only in 2015.24 While China has since 
                                                          
17 Segal, “Does China Matter,” 24, 35-6; Joshua Cooper Ramo, “The Beijing Consensus,” The 
Foreign Policy Centre, (2004), 2-3, 37-8, http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf 
18 Mark Leonard, What does China Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008), 8. 
19 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 6-7; 175-6, 246. 
20 Shaun Breslin, “China and the global order: signally threat or friendship?” International Affairs, 
Vol. 89, No. 3, (2013), 616-7. 
21 Sheena Chestnut and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China Rising?” in Eva Paus, Penelope B. Prime 
and Jon Western (eds.), Global Giant: Is China Changing the Rules of the Game? (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 238-42. 
22 Chestnut and Johnston, “Is China Rising?” 242-8. 
23 Chestnut and Johnston, “Is China Rising?” 248. 






increased its edge over other great powers, its gap with the United States has widened. 
In 2015, China’s global presence was 38% of that of the United States; it fell to 30% 
a year after.25 The trajectory of power shift led Brooks and Wohlforth to define the 
current international system as a “1+Y+X” system wherein China is an “emerging 
potential superpower” distinct from other secondary powers yet incapable of 
challenging American unipolarity.26 
 
China’s relative power position is no less equivocal at the regional level. On 
the one hand, Kang and Ma conclude that a Sino-Japanese regional power transition 
has already taken place.27 The rise of Donald Trump and American isolationism, 
meanwhile, were believed to speed up China’s rise to regional hegemony.28 Others, 
on the other hand, argue that the United States still retains significant advantage over 
China in many areas.29 Before changing his view after the beginning of the Trump 
presidency, White argued that China was “trapped” in the position as a potential, 
emerging superpower that was “too strong to accept a subordinate role under 
American leadership” but “not yet strong enough to lead Asia itself.”30 As chapters 
four to seven will show, while shifting regional balance of power enabled China to 
increase its share of leadership in East and Central Asia, the rising power was far from 
displacing the role of Japan and Russia in the supply of regional economic and security 
public goods. 
 
The above discussion shows that the “rise of China” is to some extent a 
discursive construct. The domain-specificity of leadership, however, requires us to 
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examine different “faces” of Chinese power in order to understand how the rising 
power might attempt to lead.31 As the following discussion will show, the domain and 
instruments of Chinese international leadership remain first and foremost economic. 
China’s domestic developmental challenges, its “soft power deficit” and international 
anxiety about its behavior led many to retain skepticism about the rising power’s 
capacity to lead. 
 
1.1.2 Economic Power 
Four decades of “reform and opening-up” mean that economic power continues to be 
the cornerstone of China’s “comprehensive national power” and the principal 
instrument of leadership. What Jacques calls the “gravitational pull” and “centrifugal 
impact” of China’s economic rise owe first and foremost to size and speed. 32 As White 
points out, China’s workforce is four times larger than that of the United States; in 
other words, the rising power will overtake the hegemon even when its productivity 
per capita is merely one-fourth of the latter’s.33 Yet what distinguishes China from 
previous rising states, according to Kynge, is not just size but also the “compression 
of developmental time.”34 The amalgamation of “Industrial Revolution-era labor costs 
and twenty-first century production technology” has led to high productivity, 
enormous comparative advantage and historic growth.35 Around the time of the global 
financial crisis, Bergsten et al already saw China as a “global economic superpower” 
whose economy was sufficiently “large,” “dynamic” and “open” to have structural 
impact on the global economy. 36  The rising power’s persistent pursuit of an 
economically-oriented grand strategy, Lee Kuan Yew argued, will enable it to “suck” 
Southeast Asia, and eventually South Korea and Japan, into its economic orbit.37 
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It is the prospect of a power transition from the United States to a non-liberal 
democratic rising power that has generated so much anxiety about China’s purpose 
and the future of international leadership. Maddison predicted on the eve of the global 
financial crisis that China would overtake the United States as the world’s largest 
economy around 2015.38 By 2030, the Chinese economy will comprise a quarter of 
the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), with a per capita GDP one third above 
world average.39 His prediction was echoed by Subramanian, who argued that by 2030 
China will dominate the global economy as the British Empire did around 1870 or the 
United States after the Second World War. The Chinese currency renminbi, meanwhile, 
could displace the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency as soon as the early 
2020s.40 Hitherto their predictions have turned out to be generally accurate. According 
to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s GDP as a percentage of the United 
States’ GDP rose from 25% to 62% in the first decade after the global financial crisis, 
and is projected to reach 88% by 2023.41 If calculated in purchasing power parity 
(PPP), China already overtook the United States as the world’s largest economy in 
2014.42 In 2016, the IMF included the renminbi as the fifth currency of its basket of 
special drawing rights (SDR). 
 
A giant economy provides China with the instruments of international 
economic leadership – production capacity, market, capital and innovation.43 To begin 
with, China now demonstrates the potential to contest for global leadership in critical 
domains, as epitomized by its “technological leapfrogging.” According to one 
measure, the capacity of China’s technological industry grew from only 15% of that 
of its American counterpart in 2012 to 42% in the next six years.44 The aggregate 
venture capital raised by Chinese technological companies, meanwhile, reached 85% 
                                                          
38 Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run: Second edition, Revised and 
Updated, 960-2030 AD, (OECD, 2007), 93. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance, (Washington 
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011), 39-42, 99, 101-2. 
41 “World Economic Outlook Database,” The International Monetary Fund, (April 2018), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/01/weodata/index.aspx  
42 Ibid. 
43 For example typologies of Chinese power, see, for example, Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese 
Power, 88; Shaun Breslin, “China’s Global Power/China as a Global Power” in Jae Ho Chung (ed.), 
Assessing China’s Power, (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 235. 
44 “Schumpeter: Chinese Tech v American Tech,” The Economist, (17th February 2018), 69. 
28 
 
of that of their American competitors in 2017.45 In specific areas such as electronic 
commerce and payment, China trails only slightly behind or is already ahead of the 
United States. In the view of former chairman of Alphabet Eric Schmidt, China will 
surpass the United States in artificial intelligence by 2025.46 China’s technological 
leapfrogging might eventually give Beijing an opportunity to exercise leadership by 
initiating structures of international cooperation in technology on its own terms.47  
 
The sheer weight of the Chinese economy also accords Beijing an increasingly 
important role in the supply of international public goods. Norrlof and Reich’s study 
shows that although the United States remained the principal stabilizer of the global 
economy, China’s role had become so significant by the time of the global financial 
crisis that except international policy coordination, the responsibilities for providing a 
market for distressed goods, providing countercyclical capital buffers, stabilizing 
exchange rates and serving as lender of last resort were more evenly divided between 
the two powers.48 If the current trend continues, China, they conclude, will displace 
the United States as the principal stabilizer of the global economy in the future.49 
 
The resilience of the Chinese economy in the global financial crisis, the appeal 
of the “China model” of development and Western malaise gave the rising power the 
legitimacy to mobilize developing countries behind its quest for global governance 
reform. As I will further discuss in 1.3.3, China, while playing an increasingly 
important role in decision-making within existing institutions, launched new 
institutional and regional initiatives such as the BRI, BRICS and multilateral 
development banks. Situated at the geopolitical margins of American power and the 
liberal international order, APT and the SCO became the platforms for China’s pursuit 
of international leadership. The United States’ isolationist turn under Trump and 
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China’s global governance initiatives led some to conclude that Washington has lost 
its leadership to Beijing.50 
 
1.1.3 Domestic Hurdles to International Leadership 
Although China has increased its share of international economic leadership, many 
believe that it is still far from capable of challenging the United States’ global 
leadership. Despite four decades of historic growth, what some refer to as an 
“economic superpower” remains a developing country in per capita terms. In 2017, 
China was “poorer” than Equatorial Guinea, Lebanon and Grenada in terms of per 
capita GDP.51  The gap between China and the United States in per capita GDP, 
Christensen argues, means that any attempt to extract national resources for major 
foreign policy initiatives will be considerably costlier to Chinese than American 
society.52  
 
The Xi Jinping administration’s “Made in China 2025” (中国制造 2025) 
initiative represents the rising power’s ambition and its struggle to build an innovation-
based economy. Although Chinese products have become increasingly competitive, 
as much as 80% of the country’s high-tech, high-value-added exports continue to come 
from foreign-invested corporations.53 If measured by national investment in research 
and development, China still trails significantly behind the United States in 
innovation.54 Indeed, China’s “technological leapfrogging,” as Kynge points out, has 
been driven not so much by research and development as by international commerce, 
which enables the rising power to move up the value-added ladder quickly through 
acquisition, technology transfer or piracy.55 In finance, notwithstanding the IMF’s 
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inclusion of the renminbi in its SDR basket, the fact that the currency is not freely and 
fully traded continues to rule out the prospect of Chinese international financial 
leadership. Indeed, the US dollar still comprises 64% of the world’s total foreign 
exchange reserves; only 1.1% are in the renminbi.56 
 
The effectiveness of Chinese economic statecraft also should not be 
exaggerated. As Norris and others have shown, relative capability advantage does not 
guarantee foreign policy success. 57 Beijing’s ability to control sub-state actors, which 
is crucial to the success of economic statecraft, has turned out to be considerably 
constrained.58 Chinese economic power has been most effective when deployed to 
“multiply” shared preferences or pressurize weaker states on symbolic issues.59 The 
outcomes became mixed when Beijing sought to change target states’ preferences, 
whether through persuasion, inducement or coercion.60 Moreover, the usefulness of 
economic power is sometimes offset by its “side effects.” China’s dumping of cheap 
products, its “scramble” for raw materials and Chinese companies’ irresponsible 
business practices have provoked backlash in both developed and developing 
countries. 61  In the West, mistrust of the authoritarian Chinese government has 
generated growing concern with how Beijing might turn its economic influence into 
“sharp power” to interfere with other states’ domestic affairs.62 As chapters four to 
seven will show, the findings of this thesis largely correspond with these views. 
China’s leadership behavior was most effective when it provided the public goods that 
its neighbors needed. On the other hand, negative perception of China’s growing 
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economic influence prevented Beijing from mobilizing support behind its institution-
building initiatives in trade and finance. 
 
To many, however, the greatest pitfalls on China’s quest for leadership remain 
internal. Slumping global commodity demand and rising domestic labor costs have 
rendered China’s export-led growth model increasingly unsustainable. 63  The 4-
trillion-renminbi stimulus program has only postponed the country’s economic 
slowdown; without fundamental reform, it has exacerbated the problems of excess 
capacity, low-return investment and mounting debt.64 This led some scholars and 
observers to conclude that China faces increasing risks of a financial crisis.65 The 
passage of the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 
on Some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform” (中共
中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定) demonstrated the Xi Jinping 
administration’s awareness of the urgency of structural economic reform. Yet, as the 
vagueness of the document suggests, the speed of reform is still considered too slow 
to enable China to escape from stagnation.66  
 
In this regard, China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO, 
as chapters four to seven will show, was as much a response to domestic economic 
challenges as to a changing international environment. The need to sustain growth and 
expedite structural reform led Beijing to promote the two regional institutions’ 
adaptation to a changing international environment through institution-building 
initiatives in trade and finance. The Hu Jintao administration’s failure to mobilize 
support behind its purpose, however, paved the way for its successor’s embarkation 
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on the BRI and a corresponding shift in China’s leadership behavior from supporting 
and soft selling to hard selling. 
 
Besides structural economic challenges, four decades of growth have spawned 
social and environmental problems – from population aging, inequality, corruption to 
pollution – of a magnitude that lead many to retain skepticism not only about China’s 
capacity to lead but also its long-term domestic stability. 67  Such skepticism is 
expressed in its most extreme form in the “China collapse thesis.” In 2001, Chang 
claimed that China was beset by so many problems that it was close to collapse.68 
Fourteen years later, Shambaugh argued that “[t]he endgame of Chinese communist 
rule” had not only “begun” but “progressed further than many think.”69 Mattis went 
so far as to call for the United States to “prepare” for China’s collapse.70 While the 
“China collapse thesis” has hitherto remained a hypothesis, its recurrence reflects 
Western skepticism about the rising power’s authoritarian political system. To many, 
as long as the Communist Party of China (CPC) continues to flinch from the political 
reform necessary to address the country’s domestic challenges, they will prevent it 
from assuming global leadership.71 Under Xi Jinping, however, China has moved 
“backward” politically from what Shambaugh calls “soft” to “hard 
authoritarianism.”72 
 
Rudd and White, however, argue that such skepticism is based on the 
assumption that there exists only one single political model for sustainable economic 
growth.73 Indeed, not only has the CPC proved to be more resourceful and adaptable 
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than assumed in addressing domestic problems; it has achieved overall an equally high 
standard of governance as Western democratic governments. 74  Meanwhile, the 
country’s economic power resources and the competence of its policy elites endow the 
Chinese government with considerable capacity to maintain a high growth rate for at 
least another decade.75  
 
Barring unexpected contingencies, China, in my view, has demonstrated the 
capacity and political will to keep many of its domestic problems under control for a 
considerable period in the future. Yet even if domestic problems do not reverse the 
long-term power shift, they remain liabilities on China’s quest for international 
leadership. Thus Lee Kuan Yew concluded that China, on the one hand, “cannot lose” 
as long as it continues to develop peacefully, “economically” and “technologically”; 
on the other hand, given the magnitude of its domestic developmental challenges, the 
rising power “must know that to dominate Asia is not possible.”76 As chapter two will 
show, however, the need for external solutions to internal problems increased the 
pressure on the rising power to pursue international leadership. 
 
1.1.4 Soft Power 
If leadership hinges on legitimate power and willing followers, soft power is a crucial 
indicator of China’s potential to lead. The prominence of the concept in the Chinese 
domestic discourse attests to the rising power’s struggle to cultivate a positive image, 
counter the “misperception” of “China threat” and gain the world’s trust.77 A state-led 
project rather than a society-driven development, China’s “charm offensive” now 
amounts to a billion US dollars per year.78 To tell “Chinese stories” to the world, 
Beijing invests enormous resources in mega events, mass media and cultural exchange, 
as exemplified by the hosting of the Olympics, the launch of internationally-oriented 
television channels and the establishment of Confucius Institutes across the world. 
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The debate on Chinese soft power, however, is no less intense and divided than 
on its economic power. Ramo argued that China’s economic model is of enormous 
appeal to the world that the “Washington Consensus” will eventually be replaced by a 
“Beijing Consensus,” a new “paradigm” of development defined by innovation, 
“sustainable and equitable” development, and self-determination. 79 The United States’ 
decline in its global image further aided the success of China’s “charm offensive.”80 
On the other hand, based on a range of indicators from a country’s governance model 
to its contributions to global culture, the consultancy Portland ranked China only 
twenty-fifth out of thirty countries in soft power in 2017, trailing behind not only the 
United States and other Western powers but also Portugal, Greece and Poland.81 
 
The divergence of opinions is rooted in the ambiguity of the concept of soft 
power. Originally defined by Nye as the ability to “[get] others to want the outcomes 
that you want” through co-optation and attraction, the concept has been applied in such 
a way as to include literally everything that is not military.82 Nevertheless, however 
the concept of soft power is defined and measured, China’s ability to attract and co-
opt emanates primarily from three sources: the country’s developmental experience, a 
foreign policy of reassurance and traditional culture. 83  Perception of China’s 
economic clout, especially after the global financial crisis, means that the country’s 
developmental experience has attracted the most attention. 
 
The argument that China’s developmental experience constitutes a “model” 
has been subject to criticisms.84 What is important, however, is not whether there 
really is a model, but the fact that people perceive and speak about it.85 The discourse 
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gives China what Breslin calls “imagined power” by enhancing the legitimacy of its 
development path and the appeal of its initiatives to potential followers. 86  The 
attraction of China’s developmental experience was demonstrated in the 2014 Pew 
Global Attitudes Survey, wherein the country’s scientific and technological 
achievements received 61% to 85% of admiration ratings in all of the third world 
countries under survey. 87  In areas such as environment and energy, China’s 
technological advancement and its ability to appeal to the common interests of 
developing countries led governments and publics across Africa and Latin America to 
view the rising power as the leader in climate change governance.88 
 
Nonetheless, China’s expanding diplomatic and material investment has not 
changed its “soft power deficit.”89 Although the United States’ reputation has slumped 
since the rise of Trump, overall it enjoyed higher favorability ratings than China 
throughout the first decade after the global financial crisis.90 The soft power gap 
between the two countries is the starkest in immigration.91 Whereas the United States 
is the unrivaled destination of international migrants in terms of number and talents, 
China remains the fourth largest country of origin of international migrants.92 What is 
more surprising, though, were the largely negative approval ratings on Chinese ideas 
and culture in third world countries.93 
 
To many in the West, the major obstacles to China’s soft power development 
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are again rooted in the country’s political system.94 Censorship stifles culture and 
innovation, while domestic social and political problems from human rights violations, 
corruption to pollution undermine the country’s appeal.95 Negative perception of the 
authoritarian Chinese government and growing suspicion of Chinese “sharp power” 
have continued to hamper Beijing’s efforts to improve its image in the West.96 The 
high favorability ratings it received in developing countries, on the other hand, do not 
guarantee diplomatic success. 97  As mentioned in 1.3, China’s growing economic 
presence in the developing world has provoked backlash among local populations. In 
foreign relations, China’s popular nationalism and growing “assertiveness” in 
territorial disputes have undercut its policy of “good neighborliness.”98 Thus even 
though global public opinions on China and its economic ascent are positive on 
average, the country’s positive perception has been more than offset by high-level 
threat perception of its growing military power, especially among American allies and 
partners in East Asia.99  
 
As the following chapter will show, while China’s foreign policy elites are not 
unaware of the country’s soft power deficit, there exists a perceptual gap between them 
and the world over the nature of the problem. As chapters four to seven will show, 
despite Beijing’s expanding diplomatic and material investment in economic, social 
and cultural cooperation, negative perception of China’s growing economic influence, 
anxiety about its assertiveness in maritime disputes and deep-seated Sinophobia 
prevented it from mitigating mistrust among its neighbors. 
 
1.1.5 Military Power 
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Although China continues to pursue an economically-oriented grand strategy, it has 
never disregarded the importance of military modernization. Indeed, Friedberg 
considers military power central to the “contest for supremacy” between China and 
the United States in East Asia.100 The danger of the “Thucydides’ trap” and other 
regional security issues means that how China develops and employs its military 
power is a critical indicator of its attitude toward the status quo.101 Of the three forms 
of power discussed here, military power is where the rising power is believed to trail 
the furthest behind the hegemon. Paradoxically, China’s military modernization is 
necessary yet counterproductive to its quest for international security leadership. 
 
China’s military development has been no less remarkable than its economic 
ascent. The growth of economic, industrial and technological capabilities has greatly 
facilitated force modernization. While staying approximately constant as a share of 
GDP and even falling as a share of government expenditure, China’s defense budget 
has been consistently rising in absolute terms for over two decades to become the 
second largest in the world.102 Indeed, the United States government and foreign think 
tanks continue to estimate the country’s defense budget to be significantly higher than 
official figures suggest.103 
 
Of the greatest significance to the future of global and regional security 
leadership is China’s development of power projection capabilities. Driven by what 
Ross calls “naval nationalism,” the building of a “blue-water” navy symbolizes 
China’s aspiration to be a “maritime power.” 104  Notable advances included the 
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commissioning of the country’s first aircraft carrier, the buildup of a modern fleet, 
acquisition of large amphibious ships and the establishment of its first overseas 
military base in Djibouti.105 The rapid expansion of the China Coast Guard further 
strengthened China’s control over disputed waters while freeing up the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to conduct more long-distance missions.106 Equally 
astounding progress in modernization was achieved in other forces. The People’s 
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), for instance, underwent capability upgrade with 
the expansion of its fleet of fourth generation fighters and the development of fifth 
generation aircraft, heavy transport aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles.107 
 
Growing capabilities and expanding overseas interests enabled China to step 
up its contributions to the supply of international security public goods. For instance, 
Beijing now deploys more personnel – including not only logistical and law 
enforcement units but also combat troops – to United Nations peacekeeping force than 
other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 108 
Improved experience and competence enabled the PLAN to expand the scope and 
domain of its operation from anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden to naval escort of 
Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, citizen evacuation from Libya and Yemen to 
search mission for the missing Malaysian Airline flight MH370. 109  Nevertheless, 
China’s contributions of international security public goods remain limited. According 
to Hirono and Lanteigne, its role in international peacekeeping corresponds largely 
with that of a norm-taking middle power.110 
 
Indeed, China is still a long way from being capable of challenging the United 
States’ international security leadership. As Brooks and Wohlforth show, the United 
States’ capabilities to exercise “command of the commons” are greater than the 
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aggregate capabilities of the next five military powers in all of the fourteen key areas 
in sea, air, space and infrastructure.111 China’s capabilities amount to over 15% of the 
United States’ capabilities only in surface ships and fourth-generation aircraft, and 
over 30% only in the latter. Indeed, the rising power still trails behind Russia, France 
and the United Kingdom in areas such as nuclear power submarines, tanker/transport 
aircraft, satellites, attack helicopters and amphibious ships. 112  Technological, 
institutional and operational limitations led Swaine to conclude that no “leapfrogging” 
in military modernization would be possible for China in the next two decades.113 
 
Although geography makes it possible for China to dominate its periphery 
without achieving parity with the United States, international security leadership 
hinges not only on force but also willing followers.114 Whereas the United States has 
about sixty security allies and partners across the world, China only has North Korea 
as its formal ally.115 Moreover, the perceptual gap between China and the world over 
what the rising power’s legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities are has 
heightened mistrust of its purpose.  
 
Anxiety about China’s growing military power and mistrust of its purpose 
render it necessary for Beijing to demonstrate maximum self-restraint by restricting 
the scope and scale of its security diplomacy. Indeed, as 6.2.1 and 7.2.1 will show, 
even though the SCO was established first and foremost for security cooperation, its 
security functions remained highly limited. Notwithstanding regional security 
challenges from political upheavals in Kyrgyzstan to American withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Beijing continued to demonstrate a cautious attitude and defer 
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responsibilities for regional security leadership to Russia. This, in turn, prevented the 
organization from adapting to a changing international environment. 
 
1.1.6 Leading “Without Catching Up” 
The above discussion has shown that conceptual ambiguity has led to divergent 
assessments of Chinese power. After four decades of historic growth, China now 
exercises enormous impact across many dimensions of international political life; 
impact, however, does not necessarily convert to power, let alone leadership.116 While 
the debate continues, the dominant view considers China’s power limited and 
imbalanced. Beijing has increased its share of international economic leadership, yet 
it remains far from capable of challenging Washington’s global leadership. Indeed, 
the country’s authoritarian political system and the magnitude of its domestic 
challenges have led many to question its long-term domestic stability and hence 
capacity to lead. 
 
On the other hand, capability constraint accentuates the importance of leadership as 
the ability to mobilize followers behind China’s quest for change. As has been the case 
for all rising states in history, the periphery is the locus and cornerstone of Beijing’s 
quest for leadership. 117  The incomplete nature of the American world order, the 
shifting balance of power and regional common interests converged with mounting 
strategic pressures and domestic imperatives to provide the incentives for and put 
pressure on China to assume leadership and renegotiate order in its peripheral regions 
“without catching up.”118 As chapters four to seven will show, however, Beijing’s 
efforts to exercise institutional leadership in APT and the SCO were hamstrung not so 
much by capability constraint as the problem of trust. Notwithstanding its increasing 
capacity to provide the public goods that other member states needed, low level of 
trust prevented China from uniting them behind its purpose. 
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1.2 Purpose: The Goals of Leadership 
Power only defines the possibilities of leadership; it is the interplay between power 
and purpose that determines if and how Beijing would set out to lead. Indeed, 
perception of China’s power and its growing assertiveness has made the question of 
what the rising power wants more important than ever, as manifested in the biggest 
debate among the American foreign policy elites on the United States’ China policy 
since the 1950s.119 Nevertheless, Euro-American centrism and status quo bias of the 
international discourse are manifested in the equation of leadership with what the 
United States and the West consider China’s “responsibilities” toward the liberal 
international order. Perhaps not surprisingly, the works that specifically address the 
question of Chinese international leadership are mostly by non-American scholars.120 
 
Like the debate on China’s power, there is no consensus on what the rising 
power wants. Nevertheless, the general perception emerging from the international 
discourse sees China as a “reformist stakeholder.” Having integrated itself into the 
liberal international order, China has neither the capacity nor the intentions to 
overthrow the status quo; it even remains adamant on upholding some of its 
foundational principles. On the other hand, Beijing has increasingly displayed its 
dissatisfaction with some aspects of the existing order. As I will show in 1.2.3, the 
“rise of China” represents the country’s struggle for self-determination and great 
power status by renegotiating the international order and its role in it. As the locus of 
the ongoing renegotiation, international institutions are where China mobilizes support 
for its visions and initiates collective action to implement them. Yet, the scholarship 
on China’s multilateralism has for a long time tended to view the rising power as a 
reactive actor either to be socialized or preoccupied with balancing against the United 
States. Nevertheless, since the global financial crisis Beijing has not only played an 
increasingly influential role in existing institutions but also embarked on institution-
                                                          
119 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Debate Over US China Strategy,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 3, (June/July 
2015), 89-110; Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 38, 
No. 3, (2015), 95-122. 
120 See, for instance, Christopher Dent, China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia, 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008); John Kirton, China’s G20 Leadership, (New York: Routledge, 
2016); Peter Marcus Kristensen and Pippa Morgan, “Leadership with Chinese Characteristics,” 
Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 3, (2018), 1-9; Andrew F. Cooper and Yanbing Zhang, 
“Chinese Leadership in the Evolution of ‘Hub’ and ‘Parallel’ Globally Oriented Institutions,” Chinese 
Political Science Review, Vol. 3, (2018), 28-47. 
42 
 
building and regional initiatives. It is thus increasingly important to investigate not 
only how China responds to external pressure in Western-led institutions, but also how 
it exercises leadership in institutions that are situated at the margins of American 
power and the Western-centric international order. 
 
1.2.1 China as Hegemonic Aspirant? 
If leadership, in its broadest sense, involves initiation of structures of interactions, 
what emerge from the discourse are three perspectives on China’s attitude toward 
leadership – hegemonic aspirant, irresponsible free rider, and reformist stakeholder. 
On the one end, some believe that China aspires for hegemonic leadership. Not 
surprisingly, this view is espoused by many realists, who see the similarities between 
China and other rising powers in history. Mearsheimer, for instance, argues that China 
seeks to maximize its power and expel the United States from Asia. 121  Once it 
establishes regional hegemony, China will “dictate the boundaries of acceptable 
behavior to neighboring countries.”122 The “rise of China,” in this regard, is inevitably 
“unpeaceful.” 123  As the following chapters will show, while Beijing explicitly 
opposed hegemony and denied any intention to seek dominance, its leadership 
behavior represented an ongoing attempt to renegotiate the geopolitical definition of 
its peripheral regions – their boundaries, structures and rules – on its own terms. 
Anxiety about China’s growing influence and mistrust of its purpose explain the 
continuing prominence of the realist perspective. 
 
Like many assessments of Chinese power, assessments of the rising power’s 
purpose are often based on understandings of the country’s history and other national 
attributes. The century-long humiliation and aspirations for “wealth and power” led 
many to believe that China is determined to (re)claim its status as Asia’s dominant 
power, become a “co-equal” of the United States and ultimately displace it as the new 
hegemon.124 Chinese hegemony, it is believed, will herald the return of a Sinocentric 
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order or even an “empire,” though an “informal” one built upon “cash” and 
“infrastructure.”125 Although many argue that China lacks a comprehensive vision of 
international order, the now revived ancient Chinese concept of “all-under-heaven” 
(天下) contains many elements that correspond with those of hegemony.126  
 
Personality lends further support to such belief. Xi Jinping, according to Rudd, 
is distinguished by his unmatched personal authority since Mao Zedong, his vision of 
China’s future and “an even deeper sense of urgency.” 127  Not surprisingly, the 
president’s rejection of liberal political values and espousal of a proactive foreign 
policy have led some to view him as more nationalistic than his predecessor. 128 
Allison, for instance, argues that the Xi Jinping presidency marks the end of China’s 
long policy of “biding its time and hiding its capabilities.” 129   Under his rule, a 
growing external threat perception and an “inflated” perception of the shifting Sino-
American balance of power have increased both oppressiveness at home and 
assertiveness abroad.130  
 
Euro-American centrism of the international discourse means that China’s 
aspirations are perceived not as a legitimate quest but as a challenge to be managed. 
Nevertheless, while today there is a growing belief among regional states that the 
rising power aims to resurrect a tributary system in East Asia, Kang’s study shows that 
historically they did not perceive their giant neighbor as a threat and balance against 
it.131 China, whose identity is defined by the primacy of sovereignty and the lack of 
expansionist tendency, has continually displayed a status-quo orientation.132 Indeed, 
notwithstanding worsening regional security, East Asian defense spending as a 
percentage of GDP has decreased. 133  Rather than balancing against China, most 
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regional states have continued to accommodate it or hedge against it.134 The absence 
of balancing, on the other hand, does not imply trust, let alone willingness to follow. 
As chapters four to seven will show, low levels of trust prevented Beijing from 
exercising institutional leadership in tasks with high uncertainty and interdependence 
in APT and the SCO. 
 
1.2.2 China as “Irresponsible Free rider”? 
On the other end, some see in China not so much a relentless pursuit of hegemony as 
continued evasion of responsibilities. To Christensen, it is the rising power’s 
irresponsibility rather than assertiveness that poses the biggest challenge to the status 
quo. 135  China’s behavior in the World Trade Organization (WTO), according to 
Bergsten et al, ranged from being “passive” to “disruptive,” driven first and foremost 
by “wholly political” motives.136 In finance, Beijing exploited unfair advantage in 
trade through currency manipulation. 137  Its provision of foreign aid without 
conditions, meanwhile, threatened to undermine international norms. 138  Domestic 
economic interests, moreover, led China to rebuff for a long time international calls 
for more substantial measures to curb greenhouse gas emissions. In security, China 
did not cooperate fully with the West on nuclear nonproliferation and humanitarian 
intervention.139 
 
Chinese irresponsibility led Nye to argue that the threat to order and stability 
comes not from a “Thucydides trap” but from a “Kindleberger trap,” wherein a 
declining United States can no longer shoulder the responsibilities for providing public 
goods, while a rising China is yet able or willing to fill the leadership vacuum.140 
Others argue that China’s free-riding behavior and its efforts in “biding its time and 
hiding its capabilities” are all parts of a deliberate, patient strategy, whereby Beijing 
                                                          
134 Kang, China Rising, 54-66. 
135 Christensen, The China Challenge, Chapter 5. 
136 Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy and Mitchell, China’s Rise, 14-5. 
137 Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy and Mitchell, China’s Rise, 17 
138 Bergsten, Freeman, Lardy and Mitchell, China’s Rise, 20-1. 
139 Christensen, The China Challenge, Chapter 5. 





will grow within the current international order until it is powerful enough to remold 
it on its own terms.141 
 
Some of the accusations against Chinese irresponsibility have proved to be 
exaggerated.142 What is important, however, is the perceptual gap between China and 
the world over what its legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities should be. Euro-
American centrism and status quo bias mean that China’s quest for leadership is 
considered legitimate only if Beijing fulfills what the United States and the West 
define as its responsibilities toward the liberal international order. Thus even though 
Ikenberry is not incorrect in stressing the capacity of the liberal international order to 
accommodate China, his argument, as Stuenkel points out, is based on an implicit 
assumption that China and other new rising states intend to be “followers.” 143 
Nevertheless, even though China has neither the intention nor the capacity to 
overthrow the status quo, it seeks to renegotiate the international order and its role in 
it on its own terms. It is not surprising, as the following chapter will show, that the 
United States’ proposed role for China in the existing order, from Zoellick’s 
“responsible stakeholder” to Bergsten’s “G2,” were interpreted by China’s foreign 
policy elites not as the United States’ recognition of China’s great power status but 
rather as a trap to “tie China down.”144  
 
1.2.3 A More Complex Picture: Reformist Stakeholder 
These two perspectives, however, do not reflect the ambiguity of China’s attitude as a 
“reformist stakeholder.” China has integrated, albeit incompletely, into the liberal 
international order; however, as Feigenbaum points out, it “accepts most forms but not 
necessarily our [the United States and the West’s] preferred norms.”145 As a result, 
Beijing seeks to renegotiate some aspects of the international order – especially in its 
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peripheral regions – and its role in it within the existing institutional architecture.146 
The former United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State’s categorization of 
China as a “reluctant stakeholder,” however, continues to manifest a status quo bias 
that Beijing simply shuns its international responsibilities without acting on its own 
terms. As I am going to discuss in 1.3.3, since the global financial crisis China has 
demonstrated increasing capacity and readiness to launch its own global and regional 
governance initiatives both within and without the existing institutional architecture. 
 
Euro-American centrism means that mistrust of China’s purpose is rooted in 
its national character as a non-liberal democratic rising power. As Lieberthal points 
out, “democracies,” in Washington’s view, “are inherently more trustworthy than are 
authoritarian systems.”147 Given the opaqueness of China’s political system, separate 
and sometimes conflicting decisions stemming from bureaucratic rivalry are perceived 
as coordinated efforts at deception.148 Beijing’s rejection of liberal values and human 
rights violations do not help but increase uncertainty about its attitude toward 
international rules and norms.149 
 
Nevertheless, nationalism remains the greatest factor of instability in an 
authoritarian regime’s international behavior. As Downs and Saunders argue, the 
CPC’s raison d'être is based on two contradictory narratives: its fulfillment of China’s 
nationalist aspirations and its indispensability to the country’s continued economic 
growth. 150  The nationalist narrative provides the rationale for maximizing the 
country’s power, redeeming lost territory and “pacify[ing] the periphery.” 151  The 
importance of nationalism as a source of legitimacy means that public pressure could 
one day compel Beijing to resort to international crises to prop up its legitimacy.152 
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Indeed, since the global financial crisis there has been a growing perception of China’s 
rising “popular nationalism” and “assertiveness” in its international behavior. 153 
Although Johnston and others argue that it is a misperception, the dominant view now 
sees the rising power as moving further away from fulfilling its responsibilities toward 
the liberal international order.154 As Westad argues, China’s “bellicosity, self-interest 
and narrow nationalism” are the “by-products” of its “domestic governance”; as long 
as Beijing rejects political reform, it is unlikely to compromise, win its neighbors’ trust 
and lead Asia.155 
 
The objectives in the nationalist narrative, however, are often at odds with 
those in the economic narrative, such as sustaining the growth of China’s export-
oriented economy and reassuring neighboring states of its peaceful intentions.156 More 
committed than other states to liberal economic principles, China has exhibited the 
greatest “absorption capacities” and become more deeply integrated into the global 
economy.157 Certainly, as Bergsten et al point out, the country’s authoritarian system, 
non-market economy and low per capita GDP determine that it will not fully comply 
with the rules and norms of the existing international order and shoulder the 
responsibilities of a superpower.158 Nonetheless, since China’s historic growth would 
not have taken place and continue without “opening up” to the world, many believe 
that the rising power is “too dependent on others to bite the hands that feed it.”159  
 
So what, then, does China want as a reformist stakeholder? In my view, China 
pursues two overarching, interrelated objectives: self-determination and great power 
status. As Leonard argues, by reinstating sovereign supremacy in international 
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relations and promoting its developmental experience overseas, China seeks to stem 
the “universalization of Western liberal democracy,” change the dynamics of 
“assimilation” and “isolation” in order building, and renegotiate the rules of 
development. 160  China’s struggle for self-determination over the “terms” of its 
domestic development and international engagement, in turn, is integral to its quest 
for great power status. As Yong Deng argues, China’s growing “status disadvantage” 
in the current international order as a result of its rapid rise means that it is a “non-
status-quo” power. 161 Beijing pursues great power status through a strategy combining 
“conformity and revisionism,” attaining legitimacy through “constructive” 
engagement while pushing for reform in order to renegotiate “the boundaries 
disadvantaging its international status.” 162 
 
If “regional preponderance” is the prerequisite of any claim to great power 
status, China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO is crucial to the 
success of its rise.163 As Acharya points out, however, China’s “legitimacy deficit” and 
its enduring rivalry with other great powers have for a long time prevented Beijing 
from assuming full regional leadership in East Asia. 164  Great power competition 
explains not only the ongoing contestation over the geopolitical definition of East Asia 
but also the centrality of ASEAN in regional cooperation. 165 Yet, as chapters four and 
five will show, even though ASEAN was increasingly incapable of steering East Asian 
regionalism, the problem of trust continued to prevent China from assuming full 
regional leadership by uniting East Asian states as a group behind its purpose. 
 
1.3 International Institutions: The Locus of Leadership Activities 
The nature of the liberal international order, the United States and other countries’ 
policy of engagement, and China’s changing attitude toward multilateralism have 
focused scholarly attention on international institutions as the locus of China’s 
renegotiation with the world on the terms of the international order and its role in it. 
                                                          
160 Leonard. What does China Think, 117-8. 
161 Deng, China’s Struggle for Status, 29-30. 
162 Deng, China’s Struggle for Status, 39. 
163 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (3rd ed.), (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2002), 207-9. 
164 Amitav Acharya, “Can Asia lead? Power Ambitions and Global Governance in the Twenty-First 
Century,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, (2011), 863-4. 
165 Acharya, “Can Asia Lead?” 864. 
49 
 
Under the influence of Euro-American centrism, however, the scholarship on China’s 
multilateralism has for a long time tended to view the rising power as a reactive actor 
either to be socialized or preoccupied with balancing against the United States. 
Nevertheless, since the global financial crisis China has demonstrated increasing 
capacity and readiness to exercise leadership not only within existing institutions but 
also through the establishment of parallel structures of cooperation. 
 
1.3.1 Integrationist Approach: China as the Object of Socialization 
Scholars and policy makers explain China’s institutional behavior primarily from two 
approaches: integrationist and instrumentalist. As the intellectual underpinning of the 
United States and other countries’ policy of engagement, the integrationist approach 
views China’s institutional participation as a process of socialization into the values, 
norms and rules of the liberal international order. In their pioneering study, Jacobsen 
and Oksenberg argued that China’s accession to the World Bank and the IMF in the 
1980s was largely successful.166 While they attributed the early success mainly to 
China’s domestic developments, both institutions facilitated the country’s reform 
without the use of coercion.167 Echoing Jacobsen and Oksenberg’s findings, Kent 
shows that China has for the most part complied with the rules of international 
institutions in areas from non-proliferation, finance to environmental protection.168 
Beijing’s compliance is the result of repeated “bargaining,” “jawboning” and “mutual 
explanation” rather than coercion. 169  On the other hand, China has not been 
“cooperative,” as manifested in its continued rejection of liberal international values, 
particularly in the area of human rights.170  
 
China’s political and value system explains Beijing’s recalcitrance over the 
issue of human rights. Yet one would be mistaken to conclude that Beijing has been 
utterly intransigent. As Foot shows, China’s signing of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), its changing view of sovereignty and the 
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discursive shift toward acknowledging the “universality” and “indivisibility” of 
human rights represented significant, albeit still limited, progress toward accepting 
international human rights norms.171 This, she explains, was the result of a process of 
norm diffusion that operated through power and symbols.172 
 
Increasing “breadth” and “depth” of China’s institutional participation have 
led Johnston and others to conclude that China is status quo-oriented. In his study of 
China’s socialization in global and regional security institutions, Johnston shows that 
the rising power displayed an increasing degree of conformity to international norms, 
even when compliance would incur “relative power costs.”173 China’s participation in 
the United Nations Conference on Disarmament represented the attempt of a “novice” 
to “mimic” other member states’ behavior. 174  “Social influence,” meanwhile, led 
Beijing to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the nineties. 175  Whereas 
mimicking and social influence could cause an actor to conform to international norms 
without their internalization, persuasion shapes actor’s preferences by convincing the 
actor of the “correctness” of shared norms and values.176 The effect of persuasion, 
albeit more limited than the other two “microprocesses,” could be discerned in China’s 
changing attitude toward “mutual security” in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).177 
China’s “tendency toward cooperation and self-restraint,” Johnston concludes, 
signifies the rising power’s status quo orientation.178 China acquiesces to American 
preeminence and, if necessary, it will challenge it from within.179 
 
The integrationist approach contributes to a more balanced assessment of 
China’s orientation. Nevertheless, as the above discussion has shown, although China 
has complied in general with the rules of existing institutions, it has not internalized 
and even continued to reject some of the liberal international values. This substantiates 
                                                          
171 Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human 
Rights in China, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3-4. 
172 Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 6, 13. 
173 Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), 41. 
174 Johnston, Social States, 52-72. 
175 Johnston, Social States, 99-117. 
176 Johnston, Social States, 25, 45-6, 80. 
177 Johnston, Social States, 167-82. 
178 Johnston, Social States, 207. 
179 Johnston, Social States, 207-8. 
51 
 
Feigenbaum’s argument that China has accepted the “forms” but not necessarily the 
“norms” of the existing order.180 The cases under study, meanwhile, remain by and 
large institutions where the United States and/or the West continue to play a major role. 
The growth of Chinese power not only means that Beijing is less likely to be 
pressurized into accepting the rules and norms established by others as it was before; 
it is now capable of establishing parallel institutions on its own terms. China’s defiance 
undermines the assumption of the United States’ policy of engagement that the country 
could be transformed in accordance with Washington’s preferences. 181  As China 
redoubles its efforts in global and regional governance reform, how the rising power 
behaves in institutions situated at the margins of American power and the liberal 
international order – which include APT and the SCO – will be an equally important 
indicator of its attitude toward the existing international order.  
 
1.3.2 Instrumentalist Approach: China as a Reactive Balancer 
Uncertainty about China’s purpose have led others to view Beijing’s multilateralism 
as driven first and foremost by strategic motives. According to Kim, China’s 
organizational behavior until the 1980s retained “a mixture of neo-realism and neo-
functionalism.” 182  This was manifest in three dimensions of behavior: 
symbolic/normative, security and functional behavior. Beijing regarded international 
institutions as platforms to project its identities and world views. 183  In security 
organizations, its behavior was guided by the “maxi/mini principle” – maximizing 
security while minimizing normative costs.184 China’s engagement with functional 
intergovernmental organizations was driven largely by its socio-economic and 
technological needs. 185  Entering the nineties, China’s institutional behavior, as 
Oksenberg and Economy point out, exhibited a shift “from idealism to practicality, 
from ideology to economic rationality, and from reticence to nationalistic 
assertiveness.” 186  As chapters four to seven will show, these traits could still be 
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discerned in China’s multilateralism today. 
 
Multilateralism has become a pillar of China’s grand strategy since the mid-
nineties.187 To many, Beijing’s multilateral turn was first and foremost a response to 
American hegemony.188 Foot, for instance, views China’s institutional engagement as 
part of its strategy to “hedge” against future downturn in Sino-American relations.189 
To Shambaugh, Beijing’s objective is to “constrain and dilute American power and 
influence” in order to promote “multipolarism.”190 Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu argue 
that multilateralism is integral to the rising power’s attempt to “deconcentrate” and 
“delegitimate” the hegemon’s power. 191  
 
At the regional level, multilateralism serves to safeguard China’s security 
interests, create a peaceful peripheral environment and promote its embryonic vision 
of the international order. 192 Among the key regional platforms are the institutions led 
by ASEAN. As Kuik Cheng Chwee argued, Beijing’s activism within these institutions 
shows that multilateral diplomacy now plays “a complementary rather than a 
subsidiary role to bilateral diplomacy.” 193  Chinese multilateralism, meanwhile, is 
characterized by its emphasis on soft power and adept shift between bilateral and 
multilateral diplomacy.194 As chapters four to seven will show, these traits can be 
discerned in the country’s diplomacy in APT and the SCO. Beijing’s long-term 
objective, Kuik believed, is to shape the “rules of the game.”195  
 
As I pointed out in 1.2.3 and will demonstrate again in chapters four to seven, 
leadership in regional institutions is central to China’s renegotiation of order in its 
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periphery. But whereas the instrumentalist perspective tends to see China as a reactive 
actor preoccupied with balancing against the United States, the importance of 
legitimacy and followership to leadership means that China’s institutional behavior is 
directed as much to other regional stakeholders as to the hegemon. As chapters four to 
seven will show, however, even though China has demonstrated increasing capacity 
and readiness to provide the public goods that neighboring countries needed since the 
global financial crisis, structural, political and institutional constraints have prevented 
it from uniting them behind its purpose. 
 
1.3.3 Reform From Within and Without 
1.3 has shown that international institutions are the locus of China’s ongoing 
renegotiation with the world over the international order and its role in it. Despite 
China’s growing influence, the entrenched power structure in the existing institutional 
architecture meant that for a long time it has participated in global and regional 
governance on the terms laid down by others. China’s aspirations for self-
determination and great power status led Beijing to adopt what Cooper and Zhang call 
a “dual” approach toward international leadership by undertaking initiatives 
simultaneously from within and without existing institutions.196 The growth of its 
power and mounting pressure for change have led China to shift its diplomatic and 
material investment from reform from within to without. 
 
As the embodiment of the global shift and diffusion of power, the Group of 
Twenty (G20) has become the central platform for China’s quest for leadership and 
change. Measuring its performance in terms of six indicators from leader’s attendance, 
member state’s agenda-setting capacity to the content of the communiques, Kirton 
argues that China has pursued “cautious” yet “cumulating leadership” in the twenty-
member grouping. 197  While adhering to an incremental approach to change and 
refraining from unilateral initiatives, Beijing utilized its newfound economic 
capabilities and political influence to initiate joint action, provide public goods and 
support institution building. The group has also become the springboard for China to 
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exercise leadership in other areas of global governance such as climate change.198 
Nevertheless, Cooper and Zhang argue that without transforming the G20 into a formal 
institution, Chinese diplomacy aims primarily to uphold the global architecture 
centered on the UN and the WTO.199  
 
While playing an active role in existing institutions, China, Cooper and Zhang 
argue, retained its role as an “outsider” through the establishment of parallel 
institutions wherein it rallied developing countries behind its call for global 
governance reform.200 China’s embarkation on ambitious institution building projects 
under Xi Jinping has focused scholarly attention to China’s “institutional statecraft” 
and its implications for international political change. In their study of the AIIB, 
Ikenberry and Lim argue that the Chinese-led multilateral development bank 
represents a mild attempt at “external innovation.”201  While the new multilateral 
development bank provides a new “node of international cooperation” and a “tool of 
statecraft” to advance the rising power’s interests and international leadership, 
structural and institutional constraints mean that it serves more to bolster the existing 
order than to counter American hegemony.202  
 
Stuenkel, on the other hand, argues that the establishment of the AIIB, BRICS 
and other institutions represents the emergence of a “parallel order” wherein China 
and other dissatisfied rising states could promote their interests independently from 
the United States and the West.203 Nevertheless, whether scholars and policy makers 
view these initiatives as China’s attempts to “diversify” the rising power’s “portfolio” 
or to “marginalize” the United States, they continue to proceed from the idea of China 
as a reactive actor constantly preoccupied with the United States.204 Indeed, whether 
or not China could establish a parallel order depends as much on its engagement with 
other countries as its competition with the United States. 
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The BRI, which is often equated with the United States’ Marshall Plan after 
the Second World War, will be an important test of China’s ability to rally followers 
behind its purpose. In Beeson’s view, however, China’s quest for leadership is likely 
to be hamstrung by the robustness of the liberal international order, its want of a clear 
vision of the international order, lack of “followers” and assertive maritime 
behavior.205 The findings in chapters four to seven largely substantiate Beeson’s view. 
Indeed, the challenges China faces in the BRI’s implementation are essentially the 
same challenges it faced in its struggle to exercise institutional leadership in APT and 
the SCO. While Beijing was able to provide public goods that partner countries needed, 
structural, political and institutional constraints prevented it from uniting them as a 
group behind its purpose. 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has dissected the international discourse on the “rise of China.” 
Notwithstanding four decades of historic growth, Chinese power remains limited and 
imbalanced. Although China has increased its share of international economic 
leadership and investment in the development of other domains of power, many 
believe that it is far from capable of challenging the United States’ global leadership. 
The biggest obstacle to China’s quest for leadership, however, is not the deficit of 
power but that of trust. Uncertainty about how China might use its newfound power 
has continued to fuel anxiety and suspicion among its neighbors and across the world. 
 
Equally important is the question of China’s purpose. The rising power’s 
developmental experience means that it is neither a full revisionist nor a full status quo 
power but a reformist stakeholder. Having integrated itself into the global economy, 
China has neither the capacity nor the intention to overthrow the liberal international 
order; its aspirations for self-determination and great power status, on the other hand, 
mean that Beijing seeks to renegotiate the international order and its role in it both 
from within and from without.  
 
As the above discussion has shown, the focal point of contestation lies in the 
                                                          
205 Mark Beeson, “Why has Leadership in the Asia-Pacific Proved so Elusive?” Chinese Political 
Science Review, Vol. 2, (2017), 578. 
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implicit equation of leadership with China’s fulfillment of what the United States and 
the West consider its “responsibilities” toward the liberal international order. This 
explains why the scholarship on China’s institutional engagement has for a long time 
tended to view the rising power as a reactive actor either to be socialized into accepting 
liberal international rules and norms, or preoccupied with balancing against the United 
States. China’s quest for leadership in intenational institutions, in this regard, is 
integral to the rising power’s struggle to renegotiate its legitimate interests, rights and 
responsibilities on its own terms. The entrenchment of the global architecture has led 
Beijing to expand efforts not only in the reform of existing institutions, but 
increasingly in the building of parallel initiatives. 
 
Nevertheless, the international debate provides only one side of the picture. It 
is important to understand if China wants to lead, how it leads, and what its objectives 
are. The relational nature of leadership means that China’s international behavior 
represents as much its initiative to pursue national interests as a response to the 
perception and behavior of others. It is for the purpose of investigating the Chinese 
domestic debate that we turn to the next chapter.
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2. “Peaceful Development” and the Question of Leadership 
from Chinese Perspectives 
 
There is a fundamental difference between the rise of a big state into a world 
power within thirty years, and that within three hundred years. The former is 
the result of human endeavor, the latter of fate. The former requires a strategy, 
the latter fortune.1 
The words of Yan Xuetong, Dean of Tsinghua University’s Institute of Modern 
International Relations, explains China’s aspirations for great power status and the 
world’s anxiety about its purpose. As the essence of great power status, leadership is 
at the heart of China’s ongoing struggle to renegotiate the international order and its 
role in it. 
 
This chapter provides the other half of the picture by examining the 
contemporary Chinese foreign policy discourse. As one of this thesis’s contributions 
to the scholarship, the in-depth analysis of Chinese writings on international relations 
is of not only analytical but also substantive significance. Without understanding 
China’s thinking about international politics, we cannot identify where the perceptual 
gap between the rising power and the world lies and explain how it shapes the 
dynamics of order and change in world politics. Before proceeding further, three 
general characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy discourse should be noted. First, 
despite increasing diversity of views, the discourse conforms largely to the parameters 
defined by the government. 2  The leading journal Strategy and Management, for 
instance, was shut down in 2004 after it published an article that was highly critical of 
North Korea’s political system and irresponsible behavior.3 The parameters, however, 
have shifted over time. While Beijing has long adhered to a policy of non-interference 
and non-alliance, the need to safeguard China’s expanding overseas interests and 
                                                          
1 Xuetong Yan, Xuefeng Sun et al [阎学通、孙学峰等], China’s Rise and Its Strategy [中国崛起及
其战略] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2005), 71. 
2 Shambaugh, China Goes Global, 15-6. 
3 Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis, 
(Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 299. 
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counter strategic pressure from the United States opened the debate on the need for 
policy change.4 
 
Second, the Chinese foreign policy discourse is marked by both continuity and 
eclecticism. On the one hand, the official concepts introduced by each of the 
administrations are often new terms for old ideas. On the other hand, as I pointed out 
at the beginning of chapter two, the historical ethos of “learning from the West” and 
the introduction of Western IR theory to China have led academics and think tank 
researchers to draw widely on Western ideas. Dissatisfaction with Euro-American 
centrism, however, has prompted efforts to develop a “Chinese School” of IR based 
on ancient Chinese thought. 
 
Third, the discourse reflects a belief in the inherent uniqueness about China. A 
“Cold War,” “zero-sum” mindset, it is believed, has led some in the West to “misread” 
the country’s political system and strategic intentions, and even propagated different 
versions of “China threat theory.”5 With its emphasis on “mutual respect,” “equality,” 
“justice” and “cooperation,” Chinese thinking about international relations represents 
the transcendence of Western theoretical paradigms.6 This is crucial for understanding 
where the perceptual gap between China and the West lies and why it matters. 
 
While opposing hegemony ( 霸权 ) and denying any intention to seek 
dominance (主导权), the Chinese government has shunned the term leadership (领导
权) in its official discourse. The country’s foreign policy elites, however, have in effect 
been debating the question of leadership and the sometimes interchangeable concept 
of dominance since the beginning of the twenty-first century. As the debate over Deng 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Xuetong Yan [阎学通], Inertia of History: China and the World in the Next Ten 
Years [历史的惯性: 未来十年的中国与世界], (Beijing: China Citic Press [中信出版社], 2013), 
191-4; Ruonan Liu and Feng Liu, “Contending Ideas on China’s Non-Alliance Strategy,” The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, (2017), 151-71. 
5 Zurong Wu [吴祖荣], “The Real Intention behind the West’s Creation of Theories of Chinese 
Influence and Threat” [西方制造中国影响力威胁论的真实用意], Global Times [环球时报], (28th 
March 2018), http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2018-03/11703493.html. 
6 Xiaojun Ma [马小军], “Xi Jinping Thought on Great Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics 
for the New Era Guides Chinese Diplomacy Forward” [习近平新时代中国特色大国外交思想引领




Xiaoping’s dictum of “biding [China’s] time and hiding its capabilities” intensified 
after the global financial crisis, there was an increasing openness to the idea of a more 
active quest for international leadership. On the other hand, both the Chinese 
government and the country’s foreign policy elites are aware of the problem of trust 
arising from anxiety about China’s growing power and uncertainty about its purpose, 
even though there exists a perceptual gap between them and the world over what the 
rising power’s legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities should be. Thus 
notwithstanding its pursuit of a more active foreign policy under Xi Jinping, China’s 
attitude toward the question of leadership remains ambiguous and cautious. 
 
This and the previous chapter together show that the international and the 
Chinese domestic discourse do tend to converge on the questions of China’s power 
and purpose. China’s comprehensive national power remains limited and imbalanced 
compared to that of the United States; the biggest impediments to the country’s quest 
for leadership, though, come from its domestic developmental challenges. Benefiting 
from yet increasingly dissatisfied with the current international order, Beijing seeks to 
reform and build upon the existing global and regional architecture without 
overthrowing it. Nevertheless, the two discourses together represent an ongoing 
renegotiation between China and the world over the terms of the existing order and 
Beijing’s role in it that were previously dictated by the United States and the West. 
The periphery is the geopolitical focal point of China’s quest for “peaceful 
development,” leadership and great power status. 
 
2.1 “Peaceful Development” and China’s Mission in the Twenty-
First Century 
No term encapsulates China’s national purpose in the twenty-first century better than 
“peaceful rise” (和平崛起). At the 2003 Bo’ao Forum for Asia, a high-level regional 
dialogue between leaders in government, business and other sectors, Zheng Bijian, a 
prominent party intellectual, argued that peaceful rise was the only choice for China 
to “develop socialism with Chinese characteristics independently and autonomously” 
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while remaining connected to economic globalization. 7  “Promoting a peaceful 
international environment conducive to its development,” China’s peaceful rise would 
in turn “contribute to world peace.”8 Although concern with the connotations of “rise” 
led to the term’s substitution by “peaceful development” (和平发展) one year later, 
China has more or less adhered to the same course.9 Meanwhile, “rise” has continued 
to be used and debated among the country’s foreign policy elites.10 
 
2.1.1 Aspirations for Great Power Status 
As the strategic expression of the “China Dream” of the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” (中华民族伟大复兴), peaceful development is the means to attain 
great power status.11 The words of Renmin University professor and State Council 
counselor Shi Yinhong and PLA Nanjing International Relations College professor 
Song Dexing encapsulated the aspirations of the Chinese foreign policy elites at the 
beginning of the new century: 
World power status is the rarest and most precious kind of value. Competition 
for it is always zero-sum; losers will be placed in a more passive and 
subjugated position… [World power status] is the goal many patriots in China 
have aspired and striven for in the past hundred years – the realization of 
which concerns the self-respect and self-confidence of the Chinese nation 
                                                          
7 Bijian Zheng [郑必坚], “China’s New Path of Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia – Speech at the 
2003 Boao Forum for Asia” [中国和平崛起新道路和亚洲的未来—在 2003 年博鳌亚洲论坛的讲
演], Journal of Theoretical Reference [理论参考], No. 5, (2004), 3. 
8 Zheng, “China’s New Path of Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia,” 4. 
9 Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in 
China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of ‘Peaceful Rise,’” The China Quarterly, No. 190, 
(2007), 299-301. 
10 Glaser and Medeiros, 300-1. 
11 Jintao Hu [胡锦涛], “The Three ‘Musts’ for Achieving the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese 
Nation” [实现中华民族伟大复兴需要做到三个‘必须’], People’s Daily [人民日报], (9th October 
2011), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/15834697.html; Jinping Xi [习近平] “Xi Jinping’s 
Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress” [习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告] 
People’s Daily [人民日报], (28th October 2017), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1028/c64094-
29613660.html; Yinhong Shi [时殷弘] and Dexing Song [宋德星], “China’s International Attitude, 
Diplomatic Philosophy and Fundamental Strategic Thinking in the Early Twenty-First Century” [21
世纪前期中国国际态度、外交哲学和根本战略思考], Strategy and Management [战略与管理], 
No. 1, (2001), 10-2; Angang Hu [胡鞍钢] and Honghua Men [门洪华], “A Comparative Study of the 
Tangible Strategic Resources of China,the United States, Japan, Russia and India – with a Discussion 
on China’s Grand Strategy of ‘Enriching the People and Strengthening the Country” [中美日俄印有
形战略资源比较—兼论旨在‘富民强国’的中国大战略], Strategy and Management [战略与管理], 
No. 2, (2002), 40. 
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with a population of over a billion. Its attainment would greatly reduce the 
possibility of China’s subjugation and bullying by the superpower today, 
greatly mitigate the actual and potential threat from states with malicious 
intentions, and secure cooperation with and support from other states 
(including other great powers) for [its role in international affairs] so as to 
more effectively defend and pursue the international interests that are China’s 
entitlements.12 
China’s “rise,” therefore, involves changes not only in the country’s power but also its 
status.13 In this regard, Chinese understanding of international relations does not differ 
very much from realism in Western IR theory.  
 
China’s expectation for world power status has continued to grow with its 
comprehensive national power, as manifested in Xi Jinping’s reference to the terms 
“great power” (大国) and “strong power” (强国) twenty-six times in his report to the 
Nineteenth Party Congress.14 This, however, raises the question of what great power 
status means from Chinese perspective. In Shi Yinhong’s words once again, a “power” 
is a state at regional or global level of the international system that 
has extensive political, economic and strategic interests overseas at regional or 
global level…possesses sufficient comprehensive national power… [A great 
power] is generally considered to have the right to participate in decision-
making on all major international affairs at regional or global level, as well as 
in the domestic affairs [of another state] that seriously threaten the security of 
[others]. Moreover, it often shares common interests, values, norms and 
institutions with other powers at regional and global levels so as to be 
considered a participant in ‘great power coordination.15 
                                                          
12 Shi and Song, “China’s International Attitude, Diplomatic Philosophy and Fundamental Strategic 
Thinking in the Early Twenty-First Century,” 12. 
13 Honghua Men [门洪华], “International Strategic Framework for China’s Peaceful Rise,” [中国和
平崛起的国际战略框架], Journal of World Economy and Politics [世界经济与政治], No. 6, (2004), 
14; Yan Xuetong, in Yan, Sun et al, China’s Rise and Its Strategy, 3, 212; 
14 Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, “Xi Jinping’s Marathon Speech: Five Takeaways,” The New 
York Times, (18th October 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/18/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-
party-congress.html  
15 Shi Yinhong, in Yaqing Qin [秦亚青], Jianming Zhou [周建明], Tiejun Wen [温铁军] et al. 
“China’s Grand Strategy: Issues and Approaches” [中国大战略: 问题与思路], Academics in China [
学术界], No. 2, (2006), 15. 
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As Shi Yinhong’s words suggest, China’s foreign policy elites understand very 
well that great power status is defined by the rights and responsibilities of leadership. 
At the same time, they reveal the origins of China’s ambiguous and cautious attitude 
toward the question of leadership. To begin with, the nation’s aspirations for great 
power status reflect uncertainty about its self-identity. On the one hand, some 
emphasize that China is and has always been “a natural major power”; “rise,” therefore, 
is a process of restoring the country’s “natural,” “original” position. 16  Indeed, 
notwithstanding its capability deficit, China, to many, was at the very least a regional 
power at the beginning of the twenty-first century.17 Song Xinning went so far as to 
conclude in 2004 that China had already “risen.”18 Nevertheless, the rising power was 
deprived of what they saw as its rights under American hegemony.19 A strong sense 
of entitlement and injustice has reinforced its aspirations for leadership and great 
power status.20 
 
On the other hand, the Chinese government and policy elites have continued to 
emphasize China’s status as a developing country. Indeed, Wen Jiabao and Zheng 
Bijian stressed domestic development as both the means and the end of “peaceful 
rise.”21 China’s mission in the twenty-first century, the latter pointed out, is modest – 
to improve Chinese people’s living standard to that of a medium developed country 
by the middle of the century.22 In this regard, “rise,” according to Deputy Secretary-
General of the China Foundation for International Strategic Studies Liu Xige, would 
eventually mean China’s entry into the ranks of developed countries and a 
                                                          
16 Jin Canrong and Yan Xuetong in Yan, Sun et al, China’s Rise and Its Strategy, 63, 242. 
17 Jiemian Yang [杨洁勉]. “Period of Important Strategic Opportunity and the Historic Mission of 
Chinese Diplomacy” [重要战略机遇期与中国外交的历史任务], Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng 
Xiaoping Theories [毛泽东邓小平理论研究], No. 4, (2003), 64-5; Honghua Men [门洪华]. 
“Advancing China’s National Strategic Interests” [中国国家战略利益的拓展], Strategy and 
Management [战略与管理], No. 2, (2003), 83; Yan Xuetong in Xuetong Yan [阎学通], Baijia Zhang 
[章百家], Yaqing Qin [秦亚青] et al. “Power over International Rule-Making and China’s Position” [
国际规则制定权与中国的位置], World Affairs [世界知识], No. 6, (2002), 42. 
18 Song Xinning in Yan, Sun et al, China’s Rise and Its Strategy, 214. 
19 Pan Wei in in Yan Xuetong, Baijia Zhang, Yaqing Qin et al., “Power over International Rule-
Making and China’s Position,” 39. 
20 Yan Xuetong in Yan, Sun et al, China’s Rise and Its Strategy, 63. 
21 “Premier Wen Jiabao Speaks at Harvard: Turn Your Eyes to China,” [温家宝总理哈佛演讲: 把目
光投向中国], People’s Daily [人民日报], (11th December 2003), 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/2241298.html ; Zheng, “China’s New Path of Peaceful 




corresponding change of its national identity.23 Yet, given China’s stigmatization for 
its deviation from Western values, Beijing, he argued, should continue to consider the 
developing world a strategic base for its “peaceful rise.”24  
 
China’s aspirations for the right to participate in international decision-making 
and “great power coordination” suggest that its objective is not so much to displace 
the United States and other great powers as to join them and acquire its “fair share” of 
global and regional leadership. In this regard, whether or not China could rise 
peacefully, as Vice President of the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) 
Ruan Zongze pointed out, depends not only on the country’s choice of development 
path but also on the world’s acceptance of a rising China.25 Nevertheless, although the 
Chinese government and foreign policy elites are aware of the anxiety China’s rise has 
generated among neighboring states and in the world, they do not believe that the 
rising power should bear full responsibility for tension and instability. The recurrence 
of the “China threat theory” (中国威胁论), in Gao Fei’s view, is primarily due to the 
“mindset” of some countries.26 “Peaceful development” is Beijing’s response to the 
“China threat theory” and its attempt to persuade the world into accepting a rising 
China. 27  Nevertheless, as chapters four to seven will show, the problem of trust 
remained one of the biggest challenges in China’s quest for institutional leadership in 
APT and the SCO. Notwithstanding its supply of public goods and expanding 
investment in “people-to-people” diplomacy, Beijing was unable to mitigate mistrust 
among member states and unite them as a group behind its purpose. 
 
On the other hand, China’s quest for recognition should not be equated with 
unconditional acceptance of the terms imposed by the United States and the West. As 
former ambassador the United Kingdom Ma Zhengang argues, China fulfills its 
international responsibilities based on “objective needs”; it acts on its own terms rather 
                                                          
23 Liu Xige in Yan, Sun et al, China’s Rise and Its Strategy, 239. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Zongze Ruan [阮宗泽], “Theoretical Exploration of China’s Road of Peaceful Rise and 
Development” [中国和平崛起发展道路的理论探讨], International Studies [国际问题研究], No. 4, 
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than “following the order of anyone” or “serving the plot of any state or bloc.” 28 The 
sole aim of those states that attribute all of the world’s problems to China and “lecture” 
the country on its responsibilities is to advance their own interests by making it support 
the existing order.29 China’s greatest responsibility to the world, in the end, is to 
promote its own development. As a “responsible great power,” it will strive to uphold 
justice for developing countries while adhering to the principles of equality and non-
interference.30 In this regard, China’s quest for international leadership is central to 
the rising power’s struggle to renegotiate its legitimate interests, rights and 
responsibilities on its own terms. The ambassador’s view explains Beijing’s cautious 
attitude toward the question of leadership, especially in international security. 
Developing countries, meanwhile, continue to be considered the target followers in 
China’s quest for leadership. 
 
2.1.2 “Biding its Time and Hiding its Capabilities” 
China’s ambiguity over the question of leadership has its origins in Beijing’s 
assessments of the international environment and its position in it. At least until 
recently, the rising power’s foreign policy has continued to be guided by the dictum 
Deng Xiaoping lay down at the turn of the nineties. As the late former Foreign Minister 
Qian Qichen recalled, Deng 
exhorted us to remain calm, calm, and again, calm, and timely proposed 
guiding principles such as observing calmly, coping with [the situation] 
steadfastly, securing our position, biding our time and hiding our capabilities, 
and doing something worthwhile. He pointed out that however the international 
situation changes, we need to develop friendly relations with all countries on 
the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. We need to remain 
vigilant, fearing no one but antagonizing no one; we need to make friends 
indeed, but we also [need to] understand in our heart [who our real friends are]. 
We need to bide our time and hide our capabilities, concentrating on our efforts, 
taking neither the standard nor the lead, neither saying nor doing things that are 
over the top; we need to genuinely and solidly manage economic development 
                                                          
28 Zhengang Ma [马振岗], “China’s Responsibility and ‘China Responsibility Theory’” [中国的责任
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and not to delay. China is not unimportant on the international stage, but rather 
has the ability and duty to do something worthwhile.31 
Although Deng Xiaoping’s remarks contain multiple phrases with different meanings, 
“biding its time and hiding its capabilities” has since become the guiding principle of 
Chinese foreign policy and the subject of ongoing debate among the country’s foreign 
policy elites until today. 
 
The choice of the concept “peaceful development” embodied Beijing’s 
continued observance of Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, at least until the end of the Hu 
Jintao era. The paramount concern of China’s foreign policy elites at the turn of the 
century was the “disequilibrium in the strategic balance of power” that was manifested 
in the unprecedented hegemony of the United States.32 Still, Beijing maintained its 
basic judgement that the contemporary era would be one of “peace and development” 
(和平与发展) wherein the long-term trends of globalization and multipolarization 
would facilitate China’s peaceful development.33 Most importantly, September 11 and 
the shift in Washington’s strategic focus turned the first two decades of the new 
century into a “period of important strategic opportunity” (重要战略机遇期).34  
 
Chinese foreign policy served to “bide its time and hide its capabilities” in 
three ways. First and foremost is concentration on economic development. As Yu 
Zhengliang argued, to accomplish peaceful development “within the shortest time at 
the lowest costs,” all aspects of Chinese foreign policy should be directed at 
facilitating domestic economic development and closer economic ties with the 
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world.35 Economic diplomacy, in turn, would help China break the United States’ 
containment, promote common interests and deepen mutual trust with the world.36 Yu 
Zhengliang’s view shows that notwithstanding Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation against 
“taking the lead,” domestic economic imperatives and a changing international 
environment put pressure on China to pursue leadership in global and regional 
economic governance. As chapters four to seven will show, China’s quest for 
institutional leadership in APT and the SCO was driven by the need to address 
domestic economic challenges, respond to the American-led Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and break the stalemate in regional economic cooperation. As a result, its 
leadership activities in both the economically-oriented APT and the security-oriented 
SCO remained concentrated in economic cooperation. 
 
Second is conflict avoidance. The emphasis on “peacefulness” represents the 
foreign policy elites’ recognition of the danger of conflict and war that could arise 
from China’s rise.37 History, as Zheng Bijian pointed out, shows that attempts of new 
rising states to change the international system and seek hegemony through aggression 
and expansion always ended in failure. 38  Thus “peacefulness” entails, first and 
foremost, avoidance of what is now referred to as the “Thucydides trap.”39 Since the 
late nineties, China has endeavored to avoid conflict and develop cooperative relations 
with the United States so as to convince the hegemon of “the inevitability and 
desirability” of its rise.40 The Xi Jinping administration’s proposal of a “new type of 
great power relations” (新型大国关系) represents the continuation of Beijing’s efforts 
                                                          
35 Zhengliang Yu [俞正梁], “Strategic Consideration on China’s Peaceful Rise” [中国和平崛起的战
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to stabilize the bilateral relationship.41 On the other hand, while adhering to a policy 
of non-alliance, China deepens relations with other states and expands its influence 
through a web of bilateral partnerships. 
 
Conflict avoidance, however, does not diminish China’s aspirations for 
national security. Indeed, China would not be able to “develop socialism with Chinese 
characteristics independently and autonomously” unless it is able to safeguard its 
“core interests” (核心利益). According to former State Councilor Dai Bingguo, 
China’s “core interests” are 
first, stability of China’s constitutional system, political system and politics, 
which [in effect] refer to the Communist Party’s leadership, socialist system and 
socialism with Chinese characteristics; second, China’s sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and unification; third, basic guarantee for the sustainable development 
of China’s society and economy.42  
As Dai’s words suggest, the rising power’s insecurity and its perceptual gap with the 
world over what its legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities should be lie in the 
fact that what Beijing considers China’s core interests either have a significant 
international dimension or are simply not recognized by others as legitimate.43 
 
This presented the rising power with a dilemma: China could not “rise” if it 
was not able to achieve basic security, yet “peaceful development” could be disrupted 
if the country embroiled itself in conflict and war. China’s foreign policy elites, 
therefore, have sought to justify the indivisibility of peace and force. Zhu Feng and 
Chen Yingwu, for instance, argue that “peaceful rise” does not exclude the possibility 
of conflict or the use of force in self-defense or in accordance with the UN Charter.44 
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As they redefine it, “peaceful rise” is a development path along which a rising state 
does not initiate war or undertake any military action with the purpose of disrupting 
regional or global order.45 To “blame” a rising state for any military conflicts without 
understanding the nature of conflicts is not only unjust, but also not conducive to the 
establishment of a long-term, stable and just international order. 46 Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding its adherence to a “defensive national defense policy,” the rising 
power’s military build-up and its attempt to assert its interests and rights on its own 
terms have done more than anything else to heighten mistrust among its neighbors and 
in the world. 47 Thus it is not surprising, as 6.2.1 and 7.2.1 will show, that Russia and 
Central Asian states’ mistrust of China’s security posture reinforced Beijing’s 
reluctance to shoulder greater responsibilities for regional security leadership, which, 
in turn, prevented the SCO from responding effectively to external challenges. 
 
Third is multilateralism. While the era of “peace and development” did not 
alter the belief of many among the Chinese foreign policy elites in the centrality of 
power to international politics, they were convinced that the nature of power politics 
has changed. 48  International competition, Yan Xuetong argued, would no longer 
concern control over natural resources but instead over “rules and norms.”49 Certainly 
the strong could always ignore the rules and norms they themselves created regardless 
of the consequence on their credibility; nonetheless, since China remained a regional 
power at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it needed to maintain its own 
credibility in order to advance and safeguard its national interests.50 Multilateralism, 
from this perspective, is central to China’s pursuit of leadership by dampening fear of 
the “China threat,” enhancing its credibility and projecting a positive image as a 
“responsible great power.”51 
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Competition over international rule-making would be all the more important 
under American hegemony. To leading Americanist Jin Canrong, the United States is 
distinguished from previous great powers by its adroitness in utilizing rules and norms 
to serve its national interests. 52  Conflicts between China and the United States, 
therefore, are more likely to revolve around rules and norms rather than involving 
direct power competition.53 The views of Yan, Jin and others are now shared by the 
Chinese government. As Xi Jinping pointed out in the 27th Politburo group study 
session in 2015, competition over rule-making is what defines contemporary 
international relations. Global governance reform concerns not only “competition for 
the vantage ground of development, but also the position and role of states in the long-
term institutional arrangement of the international order and system.”54 In this regard, 
China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO was integral to its 
struggle to renegotiate order in its peripheral regions – their boundaries, structures and 
rules – on its own terms. 
 
Although the debate on Deng’s dictum became internationally prominent after 
the global financial crisis, it already began as China embarked on peaceful 
development. The crux of the debate concerned the relationship between “biding its 
time and hiding its capabilities” and “doing something worthwhile.” Yan Xuetong, for 
instance, argued that adoption of the theory of “peaceful rise” marked the end of 
Beijing’s policy of “biding its time and hiding its capabilities.” “Rise,” to him, is the 
mission “worthwhile” to “do.”55 However, to others, such as former president of the 
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies Yang Jiemian, Central Party School 
Professor Gong Li and former Vice-Minister of the CPC Central Committee’s 
International Liaison Department Yu Hongjun, “biding its time and hiding its 
capabilities” and “doing something worthwhile” are complementary. Even if China 
could accomplish all of its objectives within twenty years, it would remain a 
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developing country. The rising power, therefore, should continue to “bide its time and 
hide its capabilities” as it concentrated on domestic development.56 
 
Nevertheless, “biding its time and hiding its capabilities,” they argued, does 
not mean inaction.57 Yet given its limited capabilities, China should be discriminating 
in what it should and should not do.58 While avoiding concentration of all opposing 
forces on itself, China should strive to play a leading role in the promotion of 
multipolarization, globalization and international governance in order to create a 
favorable international environment, uphold justice in the international society, with 
the ultimate aim of creating a just and reasonable new order.59  
 
The above discussion shows that while the Chinese government and foreign 
policy elites shunned the term leadership, the subject was in effect central to the grand 
strategic debate from the very beginning. Since then, however, the Chinese foreign 
policy elites have continued to differ over where the balance between “biding its time 
and hiding its capabilities” and “doing something worthwhile” should be. As the 
following discussion will show, the shifting balance of power and legitimacy after the 
global financial crisis intensified the debate on the question of leadership and the 
continued relevance of Deng’s dictum. China’s ambiguity, as I will discuss in 2.3 and 
2.4, is rooted in the country’s uncertainty about its own power and its ambiguous 
attitude toward the current international order. 
 
2.2 The Global Financial Crisis and the Question of Leadership 
The global financial crisis and a changing international environment intensified the 
debate among China’s foreign policy elites on the country’s need for strategic 
adjustment. Although Beijing continued to shun the term leadership, the domestic 
discourse exhibited increasing openness to the subject. As Pang Zhongying and Wang 
Ruiping argued, a powerful state that does not exercise international leadership is not 
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a great power in meaningful terms.60 China, in their view, was yet to acquire its fair 
share of international leadership proportional to its comprehensive national power. 
Western malaise in the global financial crisis, however, gave it an opportunity to play 
a more active role in global governance. As a developing country, China should not 
just aim to provide more development assistance to the third world; it should also 
exercise greater influence in defining the principles of cooperation in international 
development.61 
 
As the global financial crisis precipitated China into the “sprinting” stage of 
its rise,  Zhao Kejin called for Beijing to assume “constructive leadership.”62 Having 
overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2010, China should embark 
on its third “diplomatic transition” from “peace diplomacy” to “strength diplomacy.”63 
Apart from repeating many of the suggestions made by Yang Jiemien, Gong Li, Yu 
Hongjun and others in the early 2000s, he argued that China should contribute 
“Chinese ideas” and “wisdom” to the reform of the international order.64  
 
Yan Xuetong went further by arguing that China should assume not only 
economic but also security leadership. A foreign policy oriented toward economic 
development could not establish China’s role as a “responsible great power” and 
strengthen its “capacity for international political mobilization.” 65  Nor should 
deterrence of Taiwan’s independence continue to be the guiding objective of the 
country’s military development. 66  China, he argued, should pursue an active 
diplomacy to increase its “strategic credibility,” develop its financial market in order 
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to strengthen the country’s economic power, and accelerate military development so 
as to be capable of providing security guarantee to neighboring states.67 
 
Others, in contrast, advised caution. Peking University Professor Wang Jisi 
argued that China should adhere to Deng Xiaoping’s dictum of “biding its time and 
hiding its capabilities” while “doing something worthwhile.” 68  Although China 
overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy, it would be “totally unrealistic” 
to conclude that it was the second most powerful state and would become an equal to 
the United States in another one or two decades.69 Indeed, China remained stigmatized 
by the West due to political and ideological differences. Its common identity with Asia, 
meanwhile, remained geographical and economic but not political, and thus it had not 
been able to act as the region’s “leader” or “spokesperson.”70 China should be more 
appropriately categorized as “the most powerful developing power.”71 In the end, the 
leading Americanist believed that it would be impossible for China to become another 
superpower like the United States.72 
 
In Wang Jisi’s view, while China should remain vigilant about Western 
political conspiracy, it would be more important for Beijing to avoid confrontation 
with the West so as to maintain stability in both the domestic and the international 
realm. To “bide its time and hide its capabilities,” China should “remain calm, cautious 
and dedicated to its own efforts; concentrate on doing what it should do; and refrain 
from taking the ‘lead’ in the international arena.” 73  On the other hand, to “do 
something worthwhile” would require China to play the role it should in the 
international arena, though this would not necessarily mean confrontation with the 
                                                          
67 Yan, “Direction of the World’s Reconfiguration and China’s Opportunity,” 12-3. 
68 Jisi Wang [王缉思], “The Question of China’s International Role and the Strategic Thought of 
‘Biding Its Time and Hiding Its Capabilities, Doing Something Worthwhile” [中国的国际定位问题
与‘韬光养晦、有所作为’的战略思想], International Studies [国际问题研究], No. 2, (2011), 7. 
69 Wang, “The Question of China’s International Role and the Strategic Thought of ‘Biding Its Time 
and Hiding Its Capabilities, Doing Something Worthwhile,” 4-5. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Wang, “The Question of China’s International Role and the Strategic Thought of ‘Biding Its Time 
and Hiding Its Capabilities, Doing Something Worthwhile,” 5. 
72 Wang, “The Question of China’s International Role and the Strategic Thought of ‘Hiding Its 
Capabilities and Biding Its Time, Doing Something Worthwhile,” 9. 
73 Wang, “The Question of China’s International Role and the Strategic Thought of ‘Biding Its Time 
and Hiding Its Capabilities, Doing Something Worthwhile,” 6. 
73 
 
West. 74  Interestingly, while stressing the need to “understand and express more 
accurately China’s long-term strategic objectives and directions of development,” he 
argued that Beijing should state its foreign policy publicly as “modest and prudent” 
rather than invoking Deng Xiaoping’s dictum.75 Wang Jisi’s last point was a response 
to international mistrust of China’s intentions I have described in the previous chapter.  
 
As one of the most high-profile overseas Chinese scholars, Zheng Yongnian 
also argued against “blindly” pursuing great power responsibilities and international 
leadership.76 Like Ma Zhengang and others, the Singapore-based scholar argued that 
China’s greatest responsibility to the world remained the management of its domestic 
developmental challenges, as it did by implementing a stimulus package that not only 
sustained national economic growth but also stabilized the world economy. In the end, 
Bergsten’s proposal of a “G-2,” Zheng concluded, was not a relationship of equals but 
one where China “answered to” and “worked for” the United States.77 Nevertheless, 
even if China continued to “bide its time and hide its capabilities,” the need to shoulder 
greater responsibilities and promote democratization of international relations would 
require the rising power to lead. The key to China’s quest for international leadership, 
in his view, hinges on its ability to promote change and innovation in the global 
architecture.78 
 
Zhou Fangyin is one of the few who pointed out the contradiction in Deng 
Xiaoping’s dictum. Successful implementation of the strategy at one stage increases 
its difficulty at the next stage, as capability growth renders “biding its time and hiding 
its capabilities” more difficult.79 Moreover, the strategy sometimes requires China to 
make concessions to the other party in a conflict in return for a favorable external 
environment. Such concessions, likewise, make the strategy more untenable in the 
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future because China’s opponents might take its concessions for granted in the next 
conflict.80 
 
China’s pursuit of a more active foreign policy under Xi Jinping did not end 
the debate. To some such as Yan Xuetong and Zhao Kejin, the President’s exhortation 
to “strive for achievement” and the launch of the BRI meant that the rising power no 
longer “bid its time and hid its capabilities.”81  While China has no intention to 
challenge the United States, Beijing should be prepared to fill the global leadership 
vacuum left by a reticent Washington.82 On the other hand, the rise of nationalist and 
jingoist sentiments in China led Li Chenyang to emphasize the continuing relevance 
of Deng’s dictum.83 As chapters five and seven will show, while the pressure to “strive 
for achievement” in peripheral diplomacy resulted in a shift in China’s leadership 
behavior to hard selling, the need to mitigate mistrust among its neighbors meant that 
Beijing continued to demonstrate self-restraint in its quest for leadership. 
 
2.3 Uncertainty about Power 
The debate on the relevance of Deng Xiaoping’s dictum and the question of leadership 
reflected China’s uncertainty about its power and ambiguous attitude toward the 
existing international order. To the country’s foreign policy elites, the changing nature 
of power politics means that great power competition is no longer based solely on 
military power but more extensively on “comprehensive national power.” In the era 
of “peace and development,” competition for “comprehensive national power” is 
economic-centric, manifested in the ability to steer regional cooperation and provide 
public goods.84 The need to counter misperceptions of the “China threat” and make 
the world accept a rising China is manifested in the importance Beijing attached to the 
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development of soft power, as the concept has been mentioned in every general 
secretary’s report since the Sixteenth Party Congress. 
 
China’s policy elites, however, differ as widely as international observers do 
in their assessments of the country’s comprehensive national power. As Lynch points 
out in his comprehensive study of the Chinese domestic discourse, there exists a 
perceptual gap between the country’s IR scholars and economists over China’s power 
and the country’s future.85 On the one hand, many IR scholars believe that even though 
China still trails behind the United States – and to a lesser extent the European Union 
(EU) – it has certainly overtaken other major powers in comprehensive national power. 
In their study of the “tangible strategic resources” of China, the United States, Russia, 
Japan and India in 2002, Hu Angang and Men Honghua concluded that China was 
already second to none other than the United States.86 The global financial crisis, in 
the views of many, was the final proof of the United States’ relative decline vis-à-vis 
China.87 Not only did the rising power continue to close its capability gap with the 
declining hegemon; in certain areas the former was believed to have already overtaken 
the latter. Hu Angang went so far as to conclude that China outstripped the United 
States in comprehensive national power in 2013. 88  The Tsinghua University 
professor’s conclusion, however, has since become the target of criticisms.89 
 
Others, on the other hand, were more cautious. In his assessments of the 
comprehensive national power of eleven major states in 2009, Li Shaojun ranked 
China seventh overall, behind not only the United States, Japan and Germany but also 
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Canada, France and Russia.90 Although China was ranked first in population, second 
in military capabilities and fourth in “territory and natural resources” and “capability 
growth sustainability,” it was ranked below seventh in economic development, 
technology, social development, domestic governance and international 
contributions.91 Likewise, according to Chen Zhimin and Chang Lulu’s comparative 
study of the power resources of and their deployment by China, the United States and 
the EU, the rising power still lagged behind its counterparts in all dimensions of power, 
particularly in the coercive use of both tangible and intangible power resources. 92 
China’s dominant power strategy remained one of economic and diplomatic 
attraction.93 
 
As Yan Xuetong argues, although the country’s high and even accelerating 
relative growth rate since the global financial crisis has consolidated its position as the 
world’s second most powerful state, its comprehensive national power remains highly 
imbalanced. 94 China’s strength lies primarily in its hard economic power; its soft 
power, in contrast, continues to trail behind not only the United States but also 
Germany. Geographically, although China’s economic influence has achieved a global 
reach, its political and cultural influence is confined to the West Pacific. China’s 
military power, which remains its greatest weakness vis-à-vis the United States, is 
adequate mostly for peripheral defense. Thus it would be too early to call the twenty-
first century the “China century.”95 
 
Meanwhile, many economists emphasize China’s development gap with the 
developed world. Liu Shijin and Zhao Jinping, both of whom have held senior 
positions at the State Council’s Development Research Center, stress that compared 
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with the United States’ per capita GDP of 58,000 US dollars and developed countries’ 
average of over 40,000 US dollars, China’s per capita GDP has just surpassed 9,000 
US dollars and not even reached the world’s average in 2018.96 As China is still 
“learning and catching up,” the nation should not be “conceited”; instead, it should 
have a “correct,” objective understanding of its domestic developmental challenges 
and position in the international system.97 As Zhao Jinping warns, the view that China 
has already become “the world’s number one” and therefore could do what a “number 
one” could do is not only “wrong” but “dangerous.”98 
 
2.4 Ambiguity of Purpose 
 
2.4.1 Ambiguous Attitude toward the Status Quo 
China’s ambiguity over the question of leadership is also rooted in its attitude toward 
the existing international order. As prominent party historian Zhang Baijia already 
foresaw in early 2000s, partial disequilibrium of the post-Cold War international order 
did not undermine China’s interests, but rather provided it with a strategic 
opportunity.99 The real danger, however, would arise when the world collapsed into 
serious, worldwide disequilibrium that could disrupt China’s development, or when 
the rising power was subjected to a disadvantaged position in the rebuilding of 
order.100 China, therefore, should strive to play a greater role in rule-making in the 
rebuilding of order.101 
 
The equal emphasis on China’s connection with globalization on the one hand, 
and the country’s independence and autonomy in development on the other, led to an 
ambiguous attitude toward the status quo. Pan Wei, for instance, saw the current 
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international order as both advantageous and disadvantageous to China.102 Having 
benefited from globalization more than any state other than the United States, China 
accepted the existing institutional architecture and sought to integrate itself into the 
international society.103 Nevertheless, as a result of its rising power, China had been 
the target of both cooptation and oppression.104 This explains why Beijing sought to 
reform the institutions that were deemed unsuitable for the country.105 Nevertheless, 
as Qin Yaqing argued, China will acquire the right to make and reform the rules and 
norms of existing institutions only if it joins them.106 
 
The global financial crisis and developments in world politics since then have 
made China’s attitude toward the existing international order nothing but more 
ambiguous. There has been an increasing belief among the country’s foreign policy 
elites that China could not achieve peaceful development without reforming the 
existing international order. Pang Zhongying, for instance, argued that China should 
not be satisfied with the status quo.107 Even if China has continued to benefit from an 
international system dominated by the United States and Europe, it can end up like 
Japan and not be able to “truly” rise in it.108 Thus, while continuing to develop itself 
within existing institutions and promote their reform, China, Pang Zhongying and 
Wang Ruiping argued, should not exclude the possibility of establishing 
alternatives. 109  Similarly, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Professor Zhang 
Yunling argued that China will not achieve “peaceful rise” if it simply follows the 
United States and complies with the rules lay down by the West.110 The only choice 
open to the rising power in the era of globalization is to create a new path through the 
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building of a “community with a shared future” with neighboring states. 111 
Nevertheless, China, he stresses, had no intention to change the existing international 
order and the “rules of the game.” 112  “Peaceful rise,” in his words, involves 
“renovating and building rather than demolishing the temple,” and “not seizing the 
stocks but making additions.”113  
 
As chapters four to seven will show, China’s quest for institution leadership in 
APT and the SCO embodied the rising power’s purpose of reforming and building 
upon the existing order without overthrowing it. Notwithstanding the impasse of APT 
and the process of East Asian regionalism it represented, China continued to uphold 
the thirteen-member grouping as the “main vehicle” for East Asian cooperation and 
the Association’s centrality in the process. The new financial facilities established by 
Beijing or with its support, such as CMIM, remained limited in their capacities as to 
mount a challenge to the existing order. Likewise, the institutional bargain between 
China, Russia and the Central Asian states demonstrated that the SCO served primarily 
to consolidate the post-Soviet regional order. On the other hand, China’s quest for 
institutional leadership was integral to its ongoing attempt to renegotiate the 
geopolitical definition of its peripheral regions – their boundaries, structures and rules 
– on its own terms. 
 
2.4.2 Chinese Visions of World Order: from “Harmonious World” to 
“Community with a Shared Future for Mankind” 
 
2.4.2.1 Harmonious World 
Like many international observers, many in China’s foreign policy elites argue that 
the rising power is yet to have a clear vision of the international order.114 This does 
not mean, however, that there haven’t been any attempts to formulate one. Indeed, 
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China’s embryonic vision of world order found its first official expression in the 
twenty-first century in the Hu Jintao administration’s theory of “harmonious world” 
(和谐世界).115 States should abandon “Cold War mindset” and establish collective 
security institutions on the basis of the “new security concept” of “mutual trust,” 
“mutual benefit,” “equality” and “coordination.” They should resolve conflicts 
peacefully and unite in opposition against sovereignty violations. The key to common 
prosperity is to ensure that developing countries would benefit from globalization. 
Developed countries, therefore, should shoulder greater responsibilities in global 
governance and increase their assistance to the third world. A harmonious world, 
however, could only be built on a spirit of tolerance. Respect for other nations’ right 
and autonomy to choose their social system and development path is the precondition 
for “democratization of international relations.” Multilateralism is the means to 
achieve common security and prosperity.116 
 
The theory of “harmonious world” is mostly a synthesis of elements from older 
concepts such as the “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” the “new security 
concept” and the Shanghai Spirit.” Nevertheless, it represented the first clear attempt 
to draw upon ancient Chinese thought. Soon after Hu Jintao unveiled China’s vision 
of a “harmonious world” at the UN, Zhao Tingyang, a philosopher at the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, provided the intellectual underpinnings to the official 
discourse with his now prominent theory of “All-under-heaven.” Western, anarchic 
and state-centric international order, Zhao argues, encompasses the world only in 
geographical but not political terms.117 Putting individual rights above sovereignty, 
the concept of liberal international order not only has failed to resolve but also 
intensified international and civilizational conflicts. In contrast, the concept of “All-
under-heaven” embodies ancient Chinese vision of establishing a society with an order 
that could accommodate all forms of differences.118 At the heart of this worldview is 
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the concept of harmony, which is defined by the idea of co-existence as the 
precondition for existence.119 Whereas Western worldview starts from and extends to 
the “international,” the Chinese worldview of “All-under-heaven” proceeds from the 
world. In this regard, the theory of “All-under heaven” is capable of incorporating 
Western worldview and providing a solution to the problem of order.120  
 
2.4.2.2 Community with a Shared Future  
The leadership transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping was accompanied by the 
introduction of a new diplomatic lexicon. Nevertheless, a comparison of the foreign 
policy concepts of the two administrations shows that the now ubiquitous concept of 
“community with a shared future for mankind” is nothing but a new term for 
essentially the same ideas – “mutual respect and equality”; “win-win cooperation and 
joint development”; “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security”; 
and coexistence and exchange of civilizations.121 
 
As I will further discuss in 2.5, the interplay of international and domestic 
developments increased the pressure on China to renegotiate the geopolitical 
definition of its peripheral regions through community building. At the Work Forum 
on Peripheral Diplomacy in 2013, Xi Jinping emphasized the need to connect the 
“China dream” with the aspirations of the peoples in neighboring states so as to 
“enable the mindset of a community with a shared future to take root.”122 This requires 
a peripheral diplomacy of “affection, sincerity, benefit and accommodation.” 123 
“Affection” develops from deepening friendship, exchange and mutual assistance that 
“win” and “warm” the “hearts of the peoples.” More friends and partners can be won 
over if China demonstrates “sincerity” in its diplomacy. Cooperation with neighboring 
states should be guided by the principle of “mutual benefit.” While adopting a more 
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open and active attitude toward regional cooperation, China should stress that the 
Asia-Pacific can “accommodate” all of the stakeholders.124 
 
On the other hand, rather than accepting the terms of rights and responsibilities 
imposed by the United States and the West, China will fulfill its international 
responsibilities in accordance with a “correct outlook on duties and interests.”125 As a 
responsible great power, China has the duty to provide the assistance to developing 
countries within the limits of its capabilities, uphold fairness and justice in 
international relations, and oppose power politics and destabilization of the region.126  
 
As the above discussion has shown, the official concepts signal China’s self-
restraint more than providing a comprehensive vision of world order; indeed, one 
could go as far as to conclude that they are new terms for past concepts. Zhao 
Tingyang’s reconstruction of the ancient Chinese of “All-under-heaven,” on the 
contrary, embodied the rising power’s aspirations to rejuvenate itself and play a central 
role in the rebuilding of world order. The vagueness of these concepts and the gap 
between the official and the academic discourse, however, did not help but heighten 
mistrust of the rising power’s purpose among its neighbors and across the world. 
 
2.4.3 Contemporary Chinese Conception of International Leadership 
While the American-centric IR scholarship provides comprehensive insight into the 
nature of the United States’ global leadership, the relative poverty of the Chinese 
scholarship on international leadership reflects the rising power’s ambiguity over the 
question. Indeed, leadership is inseparable from the equally contested question of 
dominance. As Chen Fengjun explains,  
‘authority’ [权威] or ‘dominance’ refers to decisive leadership status in 
regional cooperation[.] Such status is usually enjoyed by a state or bloc of 
states that exercises far more, far greater and far stronger political and 
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economic influence than other states. Under most circumstances, this kind of 
influence manifests itself in the ability to determine the rules within a region 
and provide guidance on the direction and process of integration.127 
Chen Fengjun’s words explain why, even if Beijing has indeed sought to renegotiate 
regional order in its periphery and steer regional economic integration, it has continued 
to shun the term leadership in its diplomatic lexicon. 
 
Like Zhao Tingyang’s theory of “All-under-heaven,” Yan Xuetong’s theory of 
“moral realism” epitomizes the efforts of China’s intelligentsia to legitimize the state 
and provide the intellectual underpinnings to its foreign policy based on ancient 
Chinese thought.128 “Morality,” according to Yan, refers not to political-moral values 
but to universal moral principles of international relations, such as observance of 
treaties and other diplomatic protocols.129 Commitment to these principles enhances a 
rising state’s credibility, legitimacy and power, since political leadership, which is the 
deciding factor in a state’s relative capability growth, derives from “strategic 
credibility.”130 
 
Morality determines the nature of international leadership. According to Yan, 
a great power could exercise three forms of international leadership: tyranny, 
hegemony and humane authority. Tyranny is based on power and the “law of the 
jungle.” Hegemony is defined by “double standards,” whereby the great power 
observes “moral constraints” in its relations with allies but bases its relations with 
enemies on the “law of the jungle.” A great power that exercises human authority 
consistently observes moral constraints. 131  Yan’s theory not only justifies the 
superiority of China’s foreign policy to that of the United States; it provides the 
theoretical basis for the belief that China will displace the United States and exercise 
a superior form of international political leadership. Nevertheless, as chapters four to 
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seven will show, China’s self-constraints in APT and the SCO did not mitigate 
mistrust among member states. Anxiety about the rising power’s expanding influence 
meant that the institutional bargains were no longer sufficient to reassure them of 
Beijing’s intentions and promote collective purposes.  
 
2.5 Peripheral Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership 
As I mentioned in 1.2.3, the periphery is the geopolitical locus of China’s struggle for 
peaceful development, leadership and great power status. China borders fourteen 
countries on the continent and shares maritime boundary with eight countries. 
Moreover, present in the country’s neighborhood are some of the world’s great powers 
– the United States, Russia, Japan and India. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
periphery is of foremost importance in China’s “overall diplomatic posture” (外交总
体布局) of “major powers as the key, periphery as the priority, developing countries 
as the foundation, multilateralism as an important stage” (大国是关键,周边是首要
，发展中国家是基础，多边是重要舞台). A changing international environment 
means that other dimensions of the rising power’s overall diplomatic posture have 
converged on its periphery. 
 
The periphery is where other great powers exert pressure on China.132 As Pang 
Zhongying pointed out, the East Asian order is “abnormal” and “unreasonable” in that 
the dominant state is an external hegemon.133 Zhang Wenmu went so far as to argue 
that the Cold War has not ended. Not only has the “Yalta system” not completely 
disintegrated in East Asia; the influence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) has even extended to Central Asia.134 To China’s foreign policy elites, the 
United States has continually sought to delay the rising power’s capability growth and 
quest for leadership in East Asia through a “hedging” (两面下注) strategy that 
combines containment and engagement.135 Preempting the United States’ containment, 
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the formation of any anti-China bloc and other “destructive effects” of American 
hegemony and Western culture has therefore always been central to the rising power’s 
peripheral strategy.136 Great power diplomacy and peripheral diplomacy, in this regard, 
have become inseparable. 137 
 
The periphery is also where the internal and the external dimensions of China’s 
basic security converge. According to Liu Feng, Qi Huaigao and Shi Yuanhua, the 
major threats from the periphery to China’s core interests include separatism and the 
collaboration of separatists with “external hostile forces”; Western ideological 
“infiltration” and instigation of regime change; territorial and maritime disputes with 
neighboring states; and other non-traditional security threats such as transnational 
crime, terrorism, drug-trafficking and illegal immigration.138 
 
2.5.1 Peripheral Diplomacy and the Question of Leadership 
As the above discussion has shown, although officially Beijing has continued to shun 
the term leadership, the foreign policy elites have been debating the need and the 
means to pursue regional leadership since the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
On the one hand, the need to dampen anxiety among neighboring states about China’s 
rising power led Beijing to demonstrate self-restraint through a diplomacy of “good 
neighborliness” (睦邻). Multilateralism is central to its efforts to “befriend, reassure 
and enrich its neighbors.” (睦邻、安邻、富邻). As Sun Xuefeng and Chen Hanxi 
pointed out, Beijing initially viewed regional multilateral mechanisms as targeted at 
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itself; only after 2004 did it begin to openly support regional cooperation.139 Success 
in China’s regionalist policy in the early 2000s, in their view, was due primarily to its 
self-restraint and gradualism, which struck a balance between advancing the country’s 
interests while containing pressures from the external world.140  
 
To stabilize its relations with the United States, China accepted open 
regionalism and refrained from any attempt to exclude the hegemon. As Jin Xide 
argued, reassuring the hegemon while “preventing it from interfering with the process 
of order-building” was essential to the success of regional economic cooperation in 
East Asia.141 Similarly, Pan Zhongqi stressed that China should not treat the United 
States or any other state as enemy while preventing others from treating itself as 
such.142 To its smaller neighbors, China demonstrated self-restraint by abstaining from 
a dominant role in regional cooperation while supporting ASEAN’s leadership in APT 
and the ARF. 143  In security, Beijing concentrated its activities in non-traditional 
security cooperation. Indeed, as chapters six to seven will show, the function of the 
Chinese-led, security-oriented SCO was confined to non-traditional security 
cooperation. Even if regional developments demanded China and the organization to 
expand its role in security cooperation, Beijing continued to exhibit reluctance, adhere 
to its long-standing policy of non-interference and non-alliance, and defer leadership 
responsibilities to Moscow. 
 
Nevertheless, to China’s foreign policy elites, the rising power’s strategic 
objective should not be confined to maintaining a favorable peripheral environment.144 
As Hu Angang and Men Honghua argued, regionalism has become the basis of a new 
form of great power competition in the twenty-first century; China needs to play an 
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active, dominant role in East Asia if it wants to become a pole in the international 
system.145 Having projected itself as a “responsible great power” during the Asian 
financial crisis, China should fulfill its international responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific 
by providing public goods and exercising leadership in institution building. 146 
Economically, Beijing should promote East Asian integration through the ASEAN-
China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), China-Japan-South Korea trilateral cooperation and 
APT. Regional economic multilateralism and integration will transform East Asia into 
a “strategic extension zone” of the Chinese economy and give the rising power 
significant influence over agenda setting and institution building.147 In security, China 
should promote initiatives of multilateral cooperation that will demonstrate its ability 
to shape the course of events.148 
 
Indeed, notwithstanding American security dominance and China’s pursuit of 
an economically-oriented grand strategy, the Chinese foreign policy elites exhibited 
clear aspirations for the rising power to exercise regional security leadership through 
multilateralism. For instance, Liu Jiangyong and Yan Xuetong proposed in an article 
in 2004 the creation of an “East Asian security community.” “Sustainable security,” 
they argued, could only be achieved through multilateralism; any bilateral 
arrangements could not be the foundation for a regional security community.149 The 
proposed East Asian security community would include primarily regional states, even 
though extra-regional states would not be excluded from participation. Moreover, the 
community would be established on existing, ASEAN-led institutions, together with 
new bodies such as a dialogue mechanism between China, the United States, Russia 
and Japan. Decisions-making would be based on consensus through consultation. The 
ultimate goal, they argued, would be the establishment of an “East Asian security 
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cooperation organization.” 150  Although the two Tsinghua University professors’ 
proposal was not realized, many of the elements could be identified in one way or 
another in China’s regional security diplomacy. Indeed, since its proposal of a “new 
security concept” at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1995, Beijing has 
continued to “repackage” and “resell” its vision through the ARF, the SCO and other 
regional institutions. 
 
As I discussed in 2.2, the global financial crisis has provided increasing 
incentives for China to assume leadership in its peripheral regions. As Li Wei argues, 
while China has since the global financial crisis adopted a “dual approach” of 
reforming the existing institutional architecture from within and building new 
institutions from without, the setbacks in global financial governance reform have led 
Beijing to shift its efforts to institution building at regional and mini-lateral level, as 
epitomized by the establishment of new mechanisms under APT, the SCO and 
BRICS.151 Indeed, the ineffectiveness of ASEAN-led regional institutions and the 
Association’s incapacity to steer the process of East Asian regionalism led Tang 
Xiaosong to conclude that regional integration is viable only under the joint leadership 
of China, the United States and Japan. 152  To do so, however, requires China to 
recognize the legitimacy of the United States’ presence in the region and Japan’s claim 
to be a “normal country.”153 
 
While Beijing has repeatedly stated its opposition to great power condominium, 
Tang Xiaosong’s view corresponds with my argument in 2.1.1 that China does not see 
its quest for great power status as a zero-sum competition but rather an attempt to 
obtain its fair share of international leadership.154 Tang Shiping and others, indeed, 
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have long argued for Sino-Japanese cooperation in the supply of regional public 
goods.155 This, however, does not mean that the responsibility for regional leadership 
deficit should be ascribed solely to China. Japan’s continued refusal to resolve the 
history question and its misperception of China as a strategic opponent were also 
believed to perpetuate the impasse of East Asian regionalism.156 The deadlock over 
the question of leadership explains why, however ceremoniously, Beijing has 
continued to support ASEAN centrality in regional cooperation. Nevertheless, as 
chapter five will show, ASEAN’s incapacity to steer APT and East Asian regionalism, 
combined with intensifying great power competition and domestic economic pressure, 
led to a shift in China’s leadership behavior under Xi Jinping.  
 
2.5.2 The Belt and Road Initiative and a Changing Geostrategic Posture 
The shift in China’s leadership behavior came with the Xi Jinping administration’s 
launch of the BRI. As a “grand regional cooperation” initiative to promote 
“connectivity in five areas” – policy, facilities, trade, capital and “peoples’ hearts” – 
the BRI aims to build a “community with a shared future” for Asia and ultimately for 
all mankind. 157  Nevertheless, despite the ongoing efforts of both the Chinese 
government and foreign policy elites to explain and elaborate on the all-encompassing 
concept, what the BRI is remains unclear.158 
 
The BRI is China’s response to mounting pressures for change from the 
interplay of international and domestic development. According to Gao Cheng, 
although East Asia’s “dual-centric” order – wherein China and the United States were 
respectively the economic and security nucleus – did not change after the global 
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financial crisis, the dynamics between the two great powers changed from 
complementarity and mutual benefits to zero-sum competition and mutual 
exclusion.159 To China’s foreign policy elites, the United States “rebalance to Asia” 
disrupted the “strategic equilibrium” of the region and spurred disputes between itself 
and its neighbors. 160  The TPP and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), meanwhile, were attempts by the United States and developed 
countries to “rewrite” global economic rules, exclude China from rule-making, and 
disintegrate the Sino-centric regional economic order and the ASEAN-centric regional 
architecture. 161  The United States’ “pivot to Asia,” in short, was an attempt to 
“exclude,” “balance” and “constrain” China. 
 
Strategic adjustment became all the more pressing when strategic pressure 
converged with the domestic imperative of rebalancing the Chinese economy.162 To 
China’s policy elites, global economic slowdown, industrial overcapacity and 
developed economies’ regional free trade initiatives put pressure on the rising power 
to search for new markets in the developing world and adjust its “opening-up strategy” 
from “coming in” to “going out” through foreign investment, manufacturing industry 
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transfer and export of surplus production capacity.163 As “reconstruction” of the global 
economic order was underway, they stressed the importance for China to participate 
actively in the (re)making of global economic rules in order to safeguard the rights 
and interests of itself and other emerging economies.164 
 
The BRI represents a significant change in China’s geostrategic posture. Given 
that the greatest threats to China’s national security – “foreign intervention into the 
unification process,” territorial disputes and other traditional security challenges – 
came from the “East,” the country’s geo-strategic posture, for a long time, remained 
East Asia-centered.165 The “West,” meanwhile, was viewed primarily as a “strategic 
rear base”.166 This, however, does not mean that China’s northwestern periphery is not 
important. As Jiang Yi argues, only when its strategic rear base is stable will China be 
able to concentrate its efforts on the “strategic front.”167 
 
The United States’ “rebalance to Asia” triggered a debate among the Chinese 
foreign policy elites on the rising power’s geostrategic posture. Eurasia, Wang Jisi 
argued, provided more strategic space and opportunities than the “East”; China, 
therefore, should consider “marching west.”168 Zhao Kejin, meanwhile, argued for 
“going south.”169 General Yang Yi went further by calling for Beijing to “consolidate 
the north, stabilize the west, pacify the east and explore the south.”170 The debate 
represented China’s shifting conception of its periphery. According to Zhang Yunling, 
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as the rising power’s influence continued to expand, its geostrategic outlook gradually 
shifted from one that is East Asia-centered back to one that conceives of the periphery 
as a whole. This, to him, signified a return to a traditional worldview that is constructed 
in terms of China-periphery relations, though no longer in the binary opposition 
between Chinese and barbarians. 171  Indeed, Wang Jisi sees China’s geostrategic 
position as anchored to all four directions at the same time. In short, China is a “central 
state.”172 Thus one year after his call for China to “march west,” the Peking University 
Professor argued for an “omni-directional strategy” based on the conception of the 
whole Asia as a strategic hinterland.173 In the words of Vice President of the China 
Institute of Contemporary International Relations Yuan Peng, the BRI is “historic” in 
that it “expands the Chinese nation’s “survival space, development space, interest 
space and strategic space.”174 
 
The launch of the BRI means that China can no longer avoid the question of 
leadership, even as Beijing continues to exclude the term from its official discourse. 
In Shi Yinhong’s view, it has become increasingly clear that under Xi Jinping, China’s 
strategic objective is to seek greater influence and even “dominance.”175 Nevertheless, 
as chapters four to seven will show, the indispensability of trust to the exercise of 
leadership underscores one of the biggest challenges to Beijing’s quest for greater 
influence. While welcoming the BRI, China’s neighbors continue to harbor fear that 
the rising power’s growing influence would result in their own marginalization.176 The 
problem of trust is further exacerbated by the vagueness of the foreign policy concept, 
which makes Beijing’s action susceptible to misinterpretation.177 To mitigate mistrust, 
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many among the Chinese foreign policy elites refute the view that the BRI targets the 
hegemon, even though they acknowledge the importance of the geoeconomic initiative 
in relieving China of strategic pressure and allowing it to avoid direct confrontation 
with the United States.178 To potential followers, China emphasizes the BRI as a new 
form of international cooperation based on the principles of mutual benefit, 
inclusiveness, equality, openness, and thus fundamentally different from initiatives 
undertaken by “hegemonic states” with the aim to “control other states’ economic 
lifeline” and “transform their political system.”179  
 
Beijing’s awareness of the problem of trust is manifested in the fact that the 
official discourse does more than anything to define what the BRI is not and 
deemphasize Chinese leadership. As Xi Jinping stressed in his keynote address to the 
Bo’ao Forum for Asia in 2015,  
the “Belt and Road” initiative is based on the principle of joint consultation, 
joint building and joint benefits; it is not closed but open and inclusive; it is not 
a solo by China but a choir by countries along the routes. The ‘Belt and Road’ 
initiative does not seek to replace existing regional cooperation mechanisms 
and initiatives, but instead to promote, upon existing basis, connection of 
developmental strategies of countries along the routes, as well as 
complementarity of their advantages.180 
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As chapters five and seven will show, however, China’s efforts to demonstrate 
self-restraint did not mitigate the mistrust arising from its growing influence, its 
behavior in maritime disputes and deep-seated Sinophobia in neighboring states. 
Whereas many among the country’s foreign policy elites preoccupy themselves with 
justifying and promoting the BRI, Shi Yinhong is one of the very few who openly 
advises “mental,” “political” and “strategic caution” in its implementation.181 China, 
he argues, needs to gain the trust of partner countries by emphasizing the mutual 
benefits of cooperation while avoiding any display of “benefactor mentality.” Rather 
than “overhyping” the BRI, it should adopt a gradualist approach and focus on 
functional cooperation in its implementation. Furthermore, China should widen 
participation by involving partners and extra-regional states in the BRI’s 
implementation, and pay attention to the socio-cultural dimension of cooperation.182 
Given the unprecedented scale of the geoeconomic initiative, the Renmin University 
Professor also cautions against “strategic overstretch.”183 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Chapters one and two have combined to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
changing perception of the “rise of China.” The two discourses together show that the 
“rise of China” is an ongoing, highly contested process wherein the rising power 
renegotiates with the world what its legitimate interests, rights and responsibilities 
should be. Nevertheless, although four decades of historically unprecedented growth 
has elevated China’s relative power position, the dominant view – both inside and 
outside the country – remains that rising power is far from capable of challenging the 
United States’ global leadership.  
 
Given the magnitude of the country’s developmental challenges, both the 
Chinese government and foreign policy elites remain ambiguous and cautious over the 
question of leadership. While Beijing has continued to shun the term leadership and 
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deny its intention to seek dominance, the country’s foreign policy elites have long 
debated the need for China to assume international leadership in its pursuit of peaceful 
development. Thus, even though China continues to attribute the anxieties, mistrust 
and suspicion in the world of its rise to the “Cold War mindset” of the United States 
and others, Beijing’s avoidance of the question of leadership demonstrates its 
awareness of the problem of trust in its quest for peaceful development, leadership and 
great power status. 
 
The anxiety, mistrust and suspicion arise from uncertainty about what the 
rising power wants.  As chapters one and two have shown, China is neither a fully 
revisionist nor status quo but a reformist power. It continues to accept the existing 
international order and upholds some of its foundational principles more strongly than 
other countries. On the other hand, Beijing is dissatisfied with some aspects of the 
existing order and set out to change them. Nevertheless, it is in the question of 
leadership that the biggest difference between the international and the Chinese 
domestic discourse lies. Euro-American centrism and status quo bias mean that the 
international discourse equates leadership with China’s fulfillment of what the United 
States and the West consider its responsibilities toward the liberal international order. 
China’s activities, therefore, tend to be viewed as challenges to the United States’ 
global leadership and the liberal international order. From China’s perspective, its 
quest for leadership does not necessarily lead to zero-sum competition, yet it is 
determined to renegotiate the terms of the international order and its role in it on its 
own terms.  
 
The question, therefore, is not whether China is a status quo or revisionist 
power, but how it projects its power and purpose to the world. This requires us to 
conceive of leadership not just as a role, but more importantly as behavior central to 
the initiation of international political change. China will not be able to renegotiate the 
international order if it cannot rally support behind its quest for change. Nevertheless, 
this requires the rising power to consider followers’ preferences and engage in 
compromise. In this regard, China’s leadership challenge is a manifestation of the 
contradictions in its grand strategy of “peaceful development.” 
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Structural constraints and a changing international environment determined 
that the periphery became the starting and focal point of China’s struggle for 
leadership. International institutions provided the platforms for Beijing to engage its 
neighbors, initiate collective action and renegotiate regional order in its periphery. To 
explain China’s successes and failures in its quest for institutional leadership in APT 
and the SCO, the next chapter will reexamine the concept of leadership and develop 








3. An Analytical Framework of Leadership Behavior 
 
This chapter develops an analytical framework for explaining China’s leadership 
behavior in international institutions. The previous two chapters have shown that the 
concept of leadership is of both analytical and substantive significance to the study of 
China’s rise, order and change in world politics. Although many inside and outside the 
country believe that China is far from capable of challenging the United States’ global 
leadership, Beijing has since the global financial crisis undertaken a variety of 
initiatives to mobilize collective action in pursuit of international political change. At 
the same time, China’s uncertainty about its own power, its ambiguous attitude toward 
the liberal international order and the need to mitigate mistrust led Beijing to exhibit a 
cautious attitude toward the question of leadership. How, then, do we explain China’s 
behavior?  
 
To provide a more nuanced interpretation of China’s leadership behavior in 
APT and the SCO, I draw upon leadership research not only from IR but also from 
Sociology and Social Psychology to develop an analytical framework of leadership 
behavior. Despite a large body of literature and the concept’s all-too-frequent usage, 
many important dimensions of leadership behavior in international relations remain 
understudied. The analytical framework proceeds from the concept of institutional 
leadership as the ability to promote an institution’s identity by guiding its adaptation 
to a changing external environment. Meanwhile, I adopt a two dimensional view of 
leadership behavior as the combination of relationship and task to explain how a leader 
weighs the need to consider followers’ interests against the need to accomplish 
collective purposes on its own terms in the face of external challenges. The analytical 
framework posits that variation in four contextual factors – capability, positional 
authority, trust and task structure – could cause a leader to adopt one or a combination 
of six types of leadership behavior – delegating, supporting, brokering, soft selling, 
hard selling and directing.   
 
3.1 Leadership: Essential Elements 
Given leadership’s omnipresence in human social life and its multidimensional nature, 
scholars in social and behavioral sciences have altogether provided as many as 850 
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definitions of the concept.184 For instance, according to Burns, 
[l]eadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives 
and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, 
political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy 
the motives of followers. This is done in order to realize goals mutually held by 
both leaders and followers.185 
Burns’ oft-quoted definition encapsulates the essence of leadership as involving “some 
kind of outstanding initiative in group activities.”186 Notwithstanding their variations, 
most of the definitions include many, if not all, of the seven attributes identified by 
Ahlquist and Levi – relationality, asymmetry, salience, domain specificity, 
instrumentality, institutionalization and coerciveness.187 
 
The idea of leadership as influence on behavior and outcomes renders it 
inseparable from the concept of power.188 But while power is integral to the exercise 
of leadership, not all acts of power amount to leadership. What distinguishes the two, 
Burns argues, is purpose. Whereas power is exercised to serve its holder’s motives 
without regard for those of its recipients, leadership is conditional on the fulfillment of 
followers’ motives.189 In this regard, the assumption of the free will of followers 
associates leadership more closely with authority – “legitimate power with reference 
to the activities of power-recipients as group members.” 190  The importance of 
legitimacy and followership underscores the role of trust, since group members’ 
willingness to follow hinges on their belief that the leader intends to cooperate with 
rather than exploit them.191 As I have shown in the previous two chapters and will do 
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so again in the next four chapters, the problem of trust is one of the biggest hurdles to 
China’s quest for leadership. 
 
3.2 Leadership in International Relations 
 
3.2.1 Leadership, Hegemony and Hegemonic Stability Theory 
In a hierarchical social system where power is purposively distributed and formalized, 
leadership is based in large part on a leader’s position and its prescribed authority.192 
On the other hand, although anarchy does not entail the absence of authority in the 
international system, the absence of a high degree of formal authority does not entirely 
invalidate Waltz’s observation that  
[w]hatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once 
removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of 
those elements. Authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of 
capabilities.193  
The need to secure legitimacy and followers, however, would require even a hegemon 
to signal self-restraint by entering into a bargain with weaker states in the making of 
rules, norms and institutions.194 As chapters four to seven will show, the institutional 
bargain of both APT and the SCO severely constrained the possibilities of Chinese 
institutional leadership regardless of the shifting regional balance of power after the 
global financial crisis. 
 
The prominence of the structural conception of leadership as a role based on a 
state’s relative power position in the international system has for a long time focused 
scholarly attention on great powers. 195 As the leading proponent of what is now known 
as “hegemonic stability theory,” Kindleberger argues that leadership is indispensable 
to international economic stability, which hinges on the supply of public goods, 
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especially in times of crisis.196 The problem of free riding, however, means that a 
hegemon is most likely to have both the incentives and capabilities to act as “stabilizer” 
by providing public goods including market, liquidity, exchange rate management and 
international policy coordination.197 
 
Given its focus on the systemic level, hegemonic stability theory does not 
explain the behavior of individual states.198 However, the multidimensional nature of 
leadership means that behavioral differences are of great importance. A great power, 
for instance, can exercise what Wiener calls “passive leadership” by providing “a 
market for distress goods” from its “mere state of being.”199 On the other hand, it could 
coordinate the policies of other states either by involving them in decision-making or 
by dictating decisions on its own terms. Indeed, Kindleberger’s definition of leadership 
as the ability to “persuade” – often with the use of “arm-twisting and bribery” – a 
follower into doing what “might not be in [its] short-run interest if it were truly 
independent” does have a behavioral dimension, even though he did not provide further 
elaboration. 200  By conceiving both hegemony and leadership in terms of a state’s 
relative power position, the structural approach renders the former the necessary 
precondition for the latter. 
 
Some distinguish between leadership and hegemony on questions of coercion 
and domination. 201  Nevertheless, Snidal shows that leadership could be either 
“benevolent” or “coercive.”202 A hegemon could either supply public goods regardless 
of the free rider problem, or exact contributions from followers in order to lower the 
costs of order maintenance.203 Conceptual ambiguity is further complicated by the neo-
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Gramscian conception of hegemony as domination by consent.204 The idea of power 
as “indirect,” “unintentional,” “impersonal” and “diffuse” renders it empirically 
indistinguishable from leadership.205 Since my focus is on leadership as intentional 
behavior, any conception of structural power will be considered the impact of 
leadership. 
 
The limitations of the structural approach do not diminish the relevance of 
capabilities. Nevertheless, as the distribution of interests and capabilities and the 
political process vary across issue areas, bargaining outcomes are likely to differ in one 
issue area from another.206 States with different composites of interests and capabilities 
can exercise leadership in different domains, at different levels and by different means. 
The “constitutionalization” of international relations, moreover, has shifted the locus 
of leadership activities to international institutions, wherein interstate interactions are 
no longer determined solely by capabilities but governed by mutually-agreed rules. 207 
Leadership competition now hinges on the ability to utilize rules, norms and other 
“organizationally dependent capabilities” to introduce initiatives, set the agenda and 
build coalitions.208 
 
3.2.2 Leadership in International Institutions 
Notwithstanding the importance of the question of leadership, the scholarship on 
international institutions has focused primarily on strategic interactions in different 
cooperation problems. 209  Young’s study of political leadership in institutional 
bargaining pioneered research on leadership behavior in international institutions.210 
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According to him, negotiators can exercise one or a combination of three forms of 
political leadership in institutional bargaining: structural, entrepreneurial and 
intellectual. Structural leadership is exercised through the conversion of superior 
capabilities to bargaining leverage. A structural leader could influence behavior and 
outcomes by deploying its power resources in the form of rewards, punishments or 
sanctions.211 Entrepreneurial leadership is embodied in a leader’s diplomatic skills to 
resolve collective action problems and promote cooperation. An entrepreneurial leader 
facilitates “integrative bargaining” by setting the agenda, raising issue awareness, 
mobilizing support for specific options and brokering agreements. 212  Intellectual 
leadership influences negotiating parties’ perception of interests through the 
production of “intellectual capital or generative systems of thought.”213 As Young 
reminds us, not only could there be more than one leader in institutional bargaining; 
negotiators often employ various mixtures of the three forms of political leadership.214 
 
Young’s typology provides the basis for subsequent scholarship on leadership 
in international negotiations. Underdal, for instance, also identifies three forms of 
leadership: “unilateral action,” “coercive” and “instrumental.”215 Malnes distinguishes 
between “problem-solving” and “directional leadership.” 216  Parker and Karlsson 
synthesize these typologies into “structural,” “directional,” “idea-based” and 
“instrumental leadership.”217 Notwithstanding their differences, all of these different 
types of leadership could be classified in two dimensions: forms and effects. On the 
one hand, their forms can be classified from material to normative. On the other hand, 
their effects can be classified from diffuse to specific (Table 3.1). 
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Nevertheless, how a leader initiates collective action also depends on the 
nature of both leader-follower relations and the task. By promoting follower 
participation in decision-making, an entrepreneurial leader’s behavior is oriented more 
toward relationship development than task implementation. Conversely, a structural 
leader’s behavior is oriented more toward task than relationship when it dictates not 
only the decisions but also the means to implement them. Meanwhile, different types 
of tasks are often accomplished by different forms of action. Functional tasks such as 
the provision of foreign aid can be accomplished through a leader’s unilateral 
deployment of capabilities. On the other hand, however powerful a leader is, it cannot 
establish a free trade area through unilateral action. 
 
A two-dimensional view of leadership behavior as the combination of 
relationship and task, which defined the behavioral and situational approaches to 
leadership research in social psychology from the fifties to the eighties, provides a 
useful “heuristic device” for understanding China’s leadership behavior. Even though 
my focus here remains the leader, the analytical framework takes the question of 
followership into consideration by explaining how China weighed relationship against 
task in its attempt to maintain the identity of the two institutions and promote their 
adaptation to a changing international environment after the global financial crisis.218 
 
3.3 An Analytical Framework of Leadership Behavior 
 
3.3.1 Institution 
Having reexamined the concept of leadership in the study of international relations, the 
remainder of this chapter will lay out the analytical framework for explaining China’s 
leadership behavior in international institutions. The framework proceeds from a 
conception of institution as an evolutionary process. Like the concept of leadership, 
institution has been defined and used in many different ways in social sciences. The 
differences between the international and other social systems mean that the concept is 
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defined somewhat differently in IR. Keohane defines it as “related complexes of rules 
and norms, identifiable in space and time”; to Mearsheimer, institution is “a set of rules 
that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each 
other.”219 Although social scientists in general distinguish between institutions and 
organizations as between the “rules” and the “players” of the game, the distinction is 
highly ambiguous in IR.220 Indeed, institution and the roughly interchangeable concept 
of regime have been used to refer to both.221 Organization, meanwhile, is used to refer 
to formal institutions. 
 
Drawing upon sociologist Philip Selznick’s classic work Leadership in 
Administration: A Sociological Interpretation, this analytical framework proceeds 
from another important conception of institution as an evolutionary process. According 
to him, whereas organization is a mere “technical instrument” to channel collective 
efforts toward specific purposes, institution is “more nearly a natural product of social 
needs and pressures – a responsive, adaptive organism.” 222  Underlying an 
organization’s transformation into an institution is the process of institutionalization, 
through which the social structure is “infuse[d] with value beyond the technical 
requirements of the task at hand.”223 Most social systems, however, are “complex 
mixtures” of both, as they evolve in their missions, structures and functions in order to 
adapt to a changing external environment.224 
 
Selznick’s distinction between organization and institution is not relevant to my 
purpose here. To avoid confusion, when I mention APT (the “institution”) and the SCO 
(the “organization”) in the following chapters I refer to them as institutions in the way 
as Selznick defines the concept. The conception of institution as an evolutionary 
process underscores the importance of leadership, or its lack thereof, in institutional 
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development. The equation of the problem of cooperation in international relations 
with market failure has for a long time focused scholarly attention on the “bargaining 
stage” of institution building.225 Notwithstanding the effects of path dependence, an 
institution continues to evolve in adaptation to a changing external environment. As 
the following discussion will show, the conception of institution as an evolutionary 
process is particularly useful for understanding the relationship between leadership, 
institution and regionalism. 
 
3.3.2 Institutional Leadership and Institutional Identity 
The conception of institution as an evolutionary process underscores the centrality of 
leadership to institutional development in times of change. Leadership, Selznick 
argues, should not be equated with “office-holding or high prestige or authority or 
decision-making,” nor is efficiency its raison d'être.226 As “a specialized form of 
activity, a kind of work or function,” leadership steers institutional development by 
instilling into the social structure “special values and a distinctive competence.”227 
Leadership is essential to an institution’s “self-maintenance,” which involves not only 
satisfaction and reconciliation of internal interests, but also maintenance and 
promotion of the institution’s identity against a changing external environment. 228 A 
Leader is an “agent” who guides “a process that would otherwise occur more 
haphazardly, more readily subject to the accidents of circumstance and history.”229  
 
The idea of leadership as the maintenance and promotion of an institution’s 
identity against external challenges distinguishes it from administration. Leadership 
deficit, in this regard, manifests itself in “an acute form” when an institution’s 
“survival” is mistaken as its successful adaptation to a changing external 
environment.230 Institutional leadership, Selznick argues, is embodied in the making 
of “critical decisions” that define the “character” of an institution, its underlying values 
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and “the distribution of the power to affect these values.”231 These decisions concern 
personnel development, organization building and relations with other 
organizations.232 In the context of international relations, “critical decisions” could be 
translated into decisions concerning membership, member states’ capacity building, 
institution building and the external relations of an international institution.  
 
The application of Selznick’s concept of institutional leadership to the study 
of international institutions raises questions about institutional identity.233 Generally 
referring to an understanding of the self in relation to the other, identity remains a 
highly contested concept in IR and social sciences.234 Organizational theorists, who 
conceive of organizations in corporate terms, use the concept to refer to the essential, 
distinctive, enduring and collectively shared qualities of an organization.235 Selznick’s 
use of the terms “character” and “identity” corresponds with this conception of 
organization and organizational identity. 236  In IR, however, anarchy and state-
centrism have for a long time led scholars to see international institutions mainly as 
rules; those who consider institutions as actors have focused their attention, for 
example, on the influence of institutional bureaucracy on member states’ identity, 
interests and behavior.237 
 
                                                          
231 Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 38-42, 57. 
232 Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 57-9. 
233 Andrea Oelsner, “The Institutional Identity of Regional Organizations, Or Mercosur’s Identity 
Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 57, No. 1, (2017), 116-9. 
234 Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2, (1st June 1996), 139-74. For surveys of different definitions and typologies of 
identity, see James D. Fearon, “What is Identity (As We Now Use the Word)?” Stanford University, 
(3rd November 1999), http://www.web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/What-is-Identity-as-we-now-use-the-word-.pdf; Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. 
Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott (eds.) Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social 
Scientists, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
235 See, for instance, Stuart Albert and David A. Whetten, “Organizational Identity” in Mary Jo Hatch 
and Majken Schultz (eds.), Organizational identity: A Reader, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 89-118; Dennis A. Giola, Majken Schultz and Kevin G. Corley, “Organizational Identity, 
Image and Adaptive Instability,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, (2000), 63-81; 
Mary Jo Hatch and Majken Schultz, “The Dynamics of Organizational Identity,” Human Relations, 
Vol. 55, No. 8, (2002), 989-1018; Michael G. Pratt, Majken Schultz, Blake E. Ashforth and Davide 
Ravasi, “Introduction: Organizational Identity: Mapping Where We Have Been, Where We Are, and 
Where We Might Go” in Michael G. Pratt, Majken Schultz, Blake E. Ashforth, and Davide Ravasi 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Identity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 
Oxford Handbook Online. 
236 Pratt, Schultz, Ashforth and Ravasi, “Introduction: Organizational Identity.” 
237 See, for instance, Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World: International 
Organizations in Global Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
108 
 
The rise of constructivism to prominence has produced a rich scholarship on 
the relationship between international institutions and identity formation, yet the focus 
has remained mostly on member states’ identity.238 Nevertheless, collective identity 
formation often impacts institutional form. As Wendt argues, social identities are 
embodied in the self’s “identification with the fate of the other.”239 The level of social 
identification, which is crucial to the self’s conception of its interests in relation to the 
other, conditions the possibility of collective action. Even though collective identity is 
not the precondition for the convergence of expectations and the establishment of an 
international institution, it determines the level of compliance and reciprocity.240 In 
this regard, institutional design, which reflects the level of compliance and reciprocity, 
is the embodiment of collective identity.  
 
Yet an institution’s values, structure and functions are at the same time the 
essential qualities that define itself in relation to others. As Oelsner argues, a “self-
definition” or “self-concept” is essential to an international institution not only 
because it is a collective social actor but also because it is itself a social construct.241 
Identity gives an institution an understanding of its purpose in relation to the external 
environment and hence enables its action in the same way as it does to an individual 
social actor.242 
 
Given the centrality of institution-building to the political construction of 
region, some scholars have in one way or another referred to institutional identity in 
the study of regionalism, even though none of them have attemped to elaborate on the 
term. In their study of NATO and EU enlargement, Fierke and Wiener argue that the 
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disappearance of a “border of order” separating “selves” and “others” in Europe after 
the end of the Cold War threatened the “institutional interests” and “identities” of the 
two organizations. 243  From this perspective, enlargement represented the 
reconstitution of NATO and the EU’s institutional interests and identities.244 In East 
Asia, Bergsten argued that the challenge facing the region in the twenty-first century 
changed from economic to “political and especially institutional.”245 The absence of 
“significant institutions of its own” heightened the pressure on East Asia to search for 
its “institutional identity.”246 In his analysis of APT’s “institutional discourses,” Naber 
showed how communicative action between member states changed their identities, 
promoted institutional development and fostered an “institutional identity.”247  
 
If region is an ideational construct continuously reproduced by “political 
power and purpose,” the identity of a regional institution is inseparable from that of 
the region itself.248 The making of a region implies the existence of a common identity 
and some form of order that governs interstate interactions. 249  Whether or not a 
regional institution is capable of being an actor, its essential, distinctive and enduring 
features – membership, institutional structure and relations with the external 
environment – are embodiments of region and regional order. 
 
The concept of institutional leadership provides a new perspective on China’s 
institutional behavior in APT and the SCO in three aspects. First, the decoupling of 
leadership from formal position of authority enables us to explain China’s pursuit of 
leadership in two regional institutions with consensus decision-making, one of which 
is formally led by ASEAN. Second, the concept underscores the nature of leadership 
                                                          
243 K. M. Fierke and Antje Wiener, “Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO 
Enlargement,” Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 5, (December 1999), 726. 
244 Ibid. 
245 C. Fred Bergsten, “The New Asia Challenge,” Institute for International Economics, (March 
2000), https://piie.com/publications/wp/00-4.pdf  
246 Bergsten, “The New Asia Challenge,” 1. 
247 Dirk Nabers, “The Social Construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN+3,” 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 3, No. 1, (1st February 2003), 113-36. 
248 Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2005), 6-13, 21-2; Paul Evans, “Between Regionalism and Regionalization: 
Policy Networks and the Nascent East Asian Institutional Identity” in T. J. Pempel (ed.), Remapping 
East Asia: The Construction of a Region, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 206. 
249 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 62-71; William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A 
Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 
1, (March 1973), 93-101. 
110 
 
as situational and contextual.250 Historical institutionalism posits that institutional 
development proceeds with long periods of stability “punctuated” by short intervals 
of momentous change, wherein innovation occurs in response to crises.251 There is no 
moment when leadership, or its lack thereof, is more decisive in determining the 
course of institutional development than a potential “critical juncture” like the global 
financial crisis.252 Third, the concept enables us to explain the impasse of the two 
regional institutions regardless of the holding of annual summits, the issuance of joint 
statements and the approval of new work plans. 
 
3.3.3 Leadership Behavior: Relationship and Task 
While the concept of institutional leadership provides a starting point, additional tools 
are needed to explain how a leader in an international institution acts in response to 
external challenges. As mentioned above, leadership behavior is by nature 
multidimensional. From a social psychological perspective, Yukl, Gordon and Taber 
categorize leadership behavior into three dimensions and twelve forms. 253  Paige, 
meanwhile, identifies eighteen dimensions of political leadership behavior.254  
 
For the purpose here, this analytical framework returns to a two-dimensional 
view of leadership behavior as the combination of relationship and task. 255 
Relationship behavior is oriented toward followers. It represents a leader’s attempt to 
achieve collective purposes by empowering followers, facilitating their participation 
in decision-making and assisting them in the implementation of decisions. 256 
Relationship behavior, therefore, is also referred to as 
consideration/supportive/subordinate-centered behavior. Task behavior, in contrast, is 
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directed at the tasks required for the accomplishment of collective purposes. It 
involves initiatives to define collective purposes, structure group activities or perform 
such tasks with the leader’s power resources. 257  Like relationship behavior, task 
behavior has been variously referred to as initiation of structure/deciding/boss-
centered behavior. 
 
This conception of leadership behavior is central to the behavioral and 
situational approaches that dominated leadership research in social psychology from 
the fifties to the eighties (Table 3.2). 258  Despite criticisms, they provide useful 
“heuristic devices” for understanding China’s leadership behavior in APT and the 
SCO. The behavioral approach is concerned with how variation in the balance between 
relationship and task behavior affects leadership effectiveness. 259  The situational 
approach, meanwhile, aims to prescribe the optimum “mix” of leadership behavior 
under different situations.260 The shift in the scholarly focus since the eighties to 
transformational leadership has led many to consider change an important, 
independent dimension of leadership behavior. While I agree with the importance of 
change, the concept of institutional leadership, as the previous two sections have 
shown, already incorporates it as an essential attribute of leadership.261  The two-
dimensional view of leadership behavior enables us to explain how a leader, in its 
attempt to respond to external challenges, weighs the need to consider followers’ 
interests against the need to achieve collective purposes on its own terms.  
 
3.3.4 Context 
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If institutional leadership is crucial in determining the path of institutional change in 
times of crisis, it is likely to be motivated by some degree of innovation. 262 
Nevertheless, how a leader responds to external challenges depends on the context in 
which it finds itself. Four factors – capability, positional authority, trust and task – 
structure the constraints and opportunities of leadership behavior. 
 
3.3.4.1 Capability 
Capability does not determine the outcomes of a leader’s behavior or leadership 
competition but defines the possibilities of leadership in terms of its form and domain. 
For the purpose here, I disaggregate capabilities into two domains: first, politics and 
security; and second, economy, society and culture. A leader’s capabilities are 
proportional to its potential control over task implementation. High capabilities enable 
a leader to perform functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence through 
unilateral action, whereas low capabilities require it to mobilize collective efforts and 
hence entail a higher degree of follower participation in decision-making. 
Nevertheless, as I will show in 3.3.4.4, a leader’s degree of control over a task depends 
not only on its capabilities but also on the structure of the task itself. 
 
Equally important are the capabilities of followers. According to Hersey and 
Blanchard, followers’ “ability” and “willingness” to accomplish their assigned tasks 
determine the optimal balance between relationship and task behavior in the exercise 
of effective leadership. 263  House and Mitchell, meanwhile, argue that followers’ 
“perception of their abilities” affect their level of acceptance toward a leader’s task 
behavior.264 Followers with high capabilities require lower level of support and have 
greater incentives to participate in decision-making or take initiatives; hence they have 
lower level of acceptance toward their leader’s task behavior. On the contrary, 
followers with low capabilities would give a leader with high capabilities greater 
control over task implementation. 
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The immanence of competition and conflict to leadership underscores not only 
the importance of capabilities but also their distribution in both the institution and what 
Underdal calls the “basic game,” the “system of activities” that comprise the 
domain. 265  Distribution of capabilities defines the possibilities of institutional 
leadership by defining the parameters of “critical decisions” concerning membership, 
members’ capacity building, institution building and the institution’s external relations. 
The more symmetric the distribution of capabilities within an institution is, the greater 
the likelihood of competition for and decentralization of leadership. The existence of 
a single dominant power, in contrast, is more likely to result in centralized leadership. 
Meanwhile, the more rapid the change in the distribution of capabilities is, the greater 
the uncertainty of member states and the need for relationship behavior.266 
 
3.3.4.2 Positional Authority 
A leader’s ability to promote an institution’s identity and its adaptation to a changing 
external environment depends not only on itself but also on the institutional context. 
Of all dimensions of institutional design, decision-making structure has decisive 
influence on leadership behavior. As I mentioned in 3.2.1, to secure weaker states’ 
participation and cooperation, the rules and norms of an institution need to enable them 
to protect their interests. Capabilities, therefore, often do not convert fully to positional 
authority over decision-making. In a formal institution with “strong” rules and norms, 
institutional leadership is likely to be based on a leader’s position and its prescribed 
authority.267 A decision-making structure that reflects the distribution of capabilities, 
such as the weighted decision-making structure of the IMF and the World Bank, gives 
a powerful state greater incentives to lead by employing its “organizationally 
dependent capabilities.” 268  In contrast, consensus decision-making in an informal 
institution like APT or the SCO gives every member state de facto veto over a leader’s 
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initiatives. On the other hand, this explains why a powerful state in an informal 




However powerful a leader might be, the outcomes of its initiatives hinge on the level 
of trust between itself and followers. As mentioned in 3.1, trust refers to followers’ 
belief that the leader, when given discretion, will cooperate with rather than exploit 
them. 270  Nevertheless, it is far more difficult to establish trust in the anarchic 
international system than other hierarchical social systems, and even more so in times 
of rapid shift in the distribution of capabilities.271 Although international institutions 
are more often than not established upon some degree of trust between member states, 
their operation does not presume continued trust between them. As Hoffman argues, 
institutionalized rules and norms in theory obviate the need of trust by eliminating the 
threat of defection.272 While there are different ways to measure trust, for the purpose 
here the most relevant and important indicator is the degree to which followers’ 
perception of a leader’s trustworthiness would lead the former to give the latter 
“discretion over outcomes previously controlled by themselves.”273 
 
3.3.4.4 Task Structure 
Although trust might not be necessary to an institution’s operation, it defines the 
possibilities of leadership behavior by determining what tasks a leader could 
accomplish. Indeed, task structure has long been considered a decisive factor in 
leadership behavior. 274 For the purpose here, the structure of a task is defined by its 
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degree of uncertainty and interdependence. 275  The higher in the “complexity,” 
“variability” and “unpredictability” of a task, the lesser the control a leader can 
exercise over its implementation. Implementation of a task with high uncertainty tends 
to require group coordination and hence relationship behavior. 276  Task 
interdependence, meanwhile, refers to the degree to which the implementation of an 
individual group member’s task depends on other group members. The higher task 
interdependence is, the greater the need will be for relationship behavior.277 A high 
level of trust is essential to the implementation of tasks with high uncertainty and 
interdependence, such as the creation of a free trade area, the adoption of a single 
currency or the establishment of a supranational institution, which often involve 
concessions on sovereignty. 
 
3.3.5 Six Types of Leadership Behavior 
The contextual factors discussed above influence how a leader promotes an 
institution’s identity and its adaptation to a changing external environment. The 
analytical framework identifies six ideal types of leadership behavior with varying 
combinations of relationship and task – delegating, supporting, brokering, soft selling, 
hard selling and directing (Table 3.3). 
 
3.3.5.1 Delegating 
At one end of the spectrum is delegating, which involves the highest degree of 
orientation toward relationship and decentralization of leadership. 278  A leader 
delegates by “empowering” followers, giving them discretion over decision-making 
and task implementation within specified limits.279 A leader chooses to delegate often 
when it is the single dominant power in an international institution with corresponding 
positional authority; when followers possess considerable capabilities; when there is 
a high degree of trust in leader-follower relations; and when the tasks have a relatively 
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low degree of uncertainty and interdependence. Delegating, however, should not be 
equated with relinquishment of leadership. While monitoring followers’ behavior and 
the progress of cooperation, the leader is ready to shift to supporting by assisting 
followers’ performance of their assigned tasks, or to directing in case of exigencies. 
An approximate example of delegating is the IMF, wherein the United States has 
delegated management responsibilities to its European allies.280 
 
3.3.5.2 Supporting 
A leader is unlikely to delegate when faced with a crisis; supporting, on the other hand, 
is central to a great power’s attempt to mobilize and sustain collective action in 
response to external challenges. Whereas Yukl, Gordon and Taber identify 
“considering,” “consulting” and “developing” as supporting, I classify developing as 
supporting and the other two brokering.281 Supporting involves a high degree of input 
from followers into decision-making. What distinguishes it from delegating, however, 
is followers’ incapacity to perform the tasks necessary to the promotion of an 
institution’s identity and its adaptation to a changing external environment. By 
providing public goods or assisting followers’ capacity building with its capabilities, 
a leader demonstrates its trustworthiness and commitment to the collective purposes 
that are decided upon consensus. An approximate example of supporting is the United 
States’ leadership “from behind” in NATO’s military operation in Libya.282 
 
3.3.5.3 Brokering 
Brokering is equivalent to what Young calls “entrepreneurial leadership.”283  Like 
supporting, it is characterized by a high level of input from followers into decision-
making. Nevertheless, brokering depends not so much on a leader’s possession of 
advantageous capabilities as its ability to set the agenda and build consensus.284 A 
leader engages in brokering by “consulting” followers as a group, giving due 
consideration to their input into decision-making, and identifying a “zone of possible 
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agreement.”285 In this regard, the leader defines collective purposes not so much by 
introducing original ideas as combining or elaborating on the input from followers. If 
the leader is a powerful state, it is likely to demonstrate a high degree of readiness to 
compromise in order to sustain the momentum of cooperation. Although brokering 
does not necessarily require the leader to hold a high position in a hierarchical structure, 
it often occupies an important node within an institution that allows it to utilize 
“organizationally dependent capabilities” to promote cooperation.286 Crucial to the 
implementation of tasks with high uncertainty and interdependence, brokering hinges 
on high level of trust from followers.287 In East Asia, ASEAN has for a long time 
engaged in brokering through its web of regional institutions. Nevertheless, as 
chapters four and five will show, it was increasingly incapable of steering the 
development of APT and East Asian regionalism after the global financial crisis. 
 
3.3.5.4 Soft Selling 
Whereas delegating, supporting and brokering are oriented toward relationship, soft 
selling is defined by the precedence of task over relationship.288 A leader engages in 
soft selling when it proposes an initiative to accomplish a collective purpose. By 
providing a “frame of reference” for understanding the purpose and the means to 
achieve it, soft selling exhibits a lower degree of readiness on the leader’s part to 
compromise than brokering, though it is likely to consult followers as a group and 
remain open to change.289 Depending on its capabilities, the leader seeks to sell its 
initiative by example or through persuasion, remuneration or a mix of both. 
Combining some aspects of “entrepreneurial” and “intellectual” leadership, soft 
selling has been practiced by many middle powers. For instance, South Korea’s 
proposal of the establishment of a “financial safety net” at the G20 is an example of 
soft selling.290 
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3.3.5.5 Hard Selling 
Compared with soft selling, hard selling is marked by an even higher degree of 
orientation toward task. A leader engages in hard selling when it attempts to define 
collective purposes and implement them on its own terms. Equivalent to a combination 
of structural leadership and what Underdal calls “leadership through unilateral action,” 
hard selling requires the leader to possess advantageous capabilities, as it seeks to 
exercise a high level of control over task implementation. The emphasis on results, 
meanwhile, requires the task to have a low level of uncertainty and interdependence. 
With little incentives to compromise but unable to enforce cooperation, the leader is 
likely to engage followers selectively or individually rather than as a group, especially 
when there exist divergent interests and preferences among group members. In an 
informal institution, as I mentioned in 3.3.4.2, a leader might resort to the use or 
establishment of parallel structures of cooperation. Marked by low level of follower 
participation, hard selling could affect the level of trust between leader and followers. 
The United States’ attempt to expand NATO’s membership under both the Clinton 
and Bush administrations is an approximate example of hard selling. 
 
3.3.5.6 Directing 
At the other end of the spectrum of leadership behavior is directing, which has the 
highest degree of orientation toward task. A leader, which is usually the single 
dominant power within an international institution, directs when it dictates decision-
making and enforce task implementation. The leader acts through the existing 
channels within the institution if its dominance is formalized in the decision-making 
structure. On the other hand, if the leader is unable to control outcomes and behavior 
through existing channels, it will have greater incentives to direct through informal 
channels. Since the leader seeks to maximize its control over decision-making and task 
implementation, directing involves minimal follower participation in decision-making. 
What distinguishes directing from hard selling is the use of coercion or the threat of it. 
In this regard, my conception of directing is distinct from what Malnes or Parker and 
Karlsson call “directional leadership.”291 Whereas they exclude coercion from 
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leadership, I demonstrated in 3.1 and 3.2.1 that the two concepts are inseparable. 
Success in directing, therefore, requires a high degree of trust between leader and 
followers. An example of directing is the United States’ attempt to direct the 
cooperation of member states of the Coordinating Committee for Export Controls in 




This chapter has developed an analytical framework of leadership behavior. The 
framework proceeds from Selznick’s concept of institutional leadership as the ability 
to promote an institution’s identity and its adaptation to a changing external 
environment. Institutional leadership instills “values” and “competence” into an 
institution through “critical decisions” concerning membership, member states’ 
capacity building, institution building and external relations. How a leader acts in 
response to external challenges, though, depends on how it weighs the need to consider 
followers’ interests against the need to accomplish collective purposes on its own 
terms. Variation in contextual factors – capability, positional authority, trust and task 
structure – influences a leader’s calculation and hence its behavior. Based on a two-
dimensional view of leadership as the combination of relationship and task, the 
analytical framework identifies six ideal types of leadership behavior: delegating, 
supporting, brokering, soft selling, hard selling and directing. 
 
In chapters four to seven, I will apply the analytical framework to explain 
China’s leadership behavior in APT and the SCO in the first decade after the global 
financial crisis. Born out of the critical junctures in the international politics of East 
and Central Asia, APT and the SCO have since their establishment suffered from 
leadership deficit. The global financial crisis, which generated pressure for 
institutional adaptation to external and internal changes, was a moment when 
institutional leadership was more important than ever in determining the trajectory of 
APT and the SCO’s development. China’s quest for institutional leadership was 
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integral to its attempt to renegotiate the international order and its role in it on its own 
terms. 
 
Contextual factors defined the possibilities of China’s leadership behavior. 
Different distributions of capabilities in security and economics explained why 
China’s leadership activities in both the economically-oriented APT and the security-
oriented SCO were concentrated in the economic domain. Informality and consensus 
decision-making, meanwhile, precluded Beijing from dictating decisions and 
enforcing cooperation. Domestic and international pressure for change, however, led 
task to take precedence over relationship, as manifested in China’s behavioral change 
from supporting and soft selling under Hu Jintao to hard selling under Xi Jinping. 
Nevertheless, although capability growth increased Beijing’s capacity to exercise 
leadership in institution and capacity building, member states’ mistrust of the rising 
power continued to confine Chinese institutional leadership to functional tasks in the 
economic domain with low uncertainty and interdependence. In short, while China 
was able to provide what other member states needed, it was unable to unite them as 
a group behind its purpose.
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4. The Hu Jintao Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in ASEAN Plus Three, 2007-2012 
 
The previous chapter laid out the analytical framework for explaining China’s 
leadership behavior in international institutions. Institutional leadership is embodied 
in the ability to maintain and promote an institution’s identity by steering its adaptation 
to a changing external environment. It involves the making and implementation of 
“critical decisions” on an institution’s membership, members’ capacity building, 
institution building and external relations. How a leader acts in response to external 
challenges, however, depends on how it weighs the need to accommodate followers’ 
interests against the need to accomplish its objective. Contextual factors including 
capability, positional authority, trust and task structure influence a leader’s calculation 
and hence its behavior. The analytical framework identifies six types of leadership 
behavior: delegating, supporting, brokering, soft selling, hard selling and directing. In 
this and the next three chapters, I will apply the analytical framework to explaining 
China’s leadership behavior in APT and the SCO in the first decade after the global 
financial crisis. 
 
This chapter examines China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT during 
the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. Born out of the Asian financial crisis and 
the closest embodiment of the Chinese vision of East Asian order, APT seemed to 
provide the ideal platform for the rising power to renegotiate the geopolitical definition 
of the region. Beijing sought to promote the thirteen-member institution’s identity and 
its adaptation to a changing international environment through supporting and soft 
selling. China’s greatest achievement lay in financial cooperation, wherein it shared 
joint leadership with Japan in institution and capacity building. Nevertheless, 
structural, political and institutional constraints meant that China’s leadership 
activities were concentrated in the economic domain. Low level of trust, in particular, 
confined its institutional leadership to functional tasks with low level of uncertainty 
and interdependence. Notwithstanding the shifting balance of power between China 
and Japan, Beijing trailed behind Tokyo in its supply of regional public goods 
throughout the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. In short, China was able to 
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provide what other member states needed but unable to rally them as a group behind 
its purpose. The contestation over the “critical decisions” on APT’s development 
marked China’s failure to remake East Asia on its own terms. Whereas the rising 
power sought to anchor East Asia to APT, other regional stakeholders balanced its 
growing influence by incorporating the region into the larger constructs of “ASEAN 
Plus Six,” the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific. 
 
4.1 Origins, Structure and Operation 
 
4.1.1 The Unfulfilled Promise of East Asian Regionalism 
Established by the ten ASEAN countries with China, Japan and Korea in December 
1997, APT represents a “critical juncture” in East Asian regionalism.1 However, the 
impasse of the exclusively East Asian institution since then has testified to both the 
contested nature and durability of the “East Asian regional bargain” since the end of 
the Second World War.2 As an “external” hegemon, the United States established 
regional security dominance with a bilateral “hub-and-spokes” system of alliances and 
partnerships. Economically, while condoning anti-communist regimes’ 
authoritarianism and their pursuit of state-led development, the superpower precluded 
its exclusion from or entanglement in regional institutions by keeping regionalism 
“soft” and “open.”3 No less important than American foreign policy in the geopolitical 
reconstruction of East Asia has been the legacy of colonialism, which shaped not only 
the making of nation-states in the region but also the rules and norms that govern their 
relations.4 
 
While the “hub-and-spokes” system has continued to buttress American 
security dominance, three dynamics have influenced the evolution of East Asian 
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economic order.5 From the top of the regional state system, the United States, together 
with Japan and Australia, have sought to integrate East Asia into the broader 
geoeconomic construct of the Asia-Pacific. Beginning with Kiyoshi Kojima’s idea of 
a “Pacific Economic Community,” successive governmental and non-governmental 
initiatives led to the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
in 1989.6 While exclusive regional integration was ruled out under the “East Asian 
regional bargain,” another dynamic of “soft” and “open” regionalism arose from the 
bottom of the regional state system with the establishment of ASEAN in 1967. 
Originally founded for dispute settlement and non-traditional security cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, ASEAN has assumed the “driver’s seat” in East Asian regionalism 
through the building of a web of informal mechanisms. No less important than the 
state-driven processes of regionalism has been the process of regionalization led by 
non-state actors, which has deepened regional interdependence by creating a complex 
web of production networks.7 
 
The end of the Cold War changed the equilibrium of dynamics in the remaking 
of East Asia. Freed from ideological and military competition against another 
superpower, the United States intensified its promotion of economic liberalization – 
or what came to be known as the “Washington Consensus” – in the region. Parallel to 
the advent of the American “unipolar moment” was the rise of China, which, together 
with other former Communist bloc countries, were reintegrated into the regional order. 
The United States and China’s “parallel resurgence” resulted in the formation of what 
some Chinese scholars conceive as a “dual-centric” regional order, wherein 
Washington and Beijing became respectively the security and economic “nucleus.”8 
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The impact of globalization and liberalization, together with growing 
dissatisfaction with the dominance of the United States, Canada and Australia in 
APEC, engendered a shared belief among East Asian states in the need for unity in the 
face of regional challenges.9 This belief was manifested first in Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammad’s proposal of an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), 
later renamed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC). However, like South Korea’s 
“Asian Common Market” in 1970 or Japan’s “Asian Network” in 1988, Mahathir’s 
brainchild was to no avail in the face of opposition from the United States, Japan, 
Australia and other ASEAN countries.10 
 
Comprised essentially of what are now the member states of APT, EAEC 
represented an ongoing attempt by regional states to renegotiate the geopolitical 
definition of East Asia in terms of its membership, structures and values. Although it 
was unsuccessful, an embryonic regional identity began to take shape in the Asia-
Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, when China, together with Japan and South Korea, 
participated at ASEAN’s invitation as “Asia’s representatives.”11 While ASEM itself 
is seen by some as another “anti-regional” initiative, the grouping of ten Southeast and 
Northeast Asian countries paved the way for APT cooperation.12 
 
4.1.2 ASEAN Plus Three and East Asian Regionalism  
A “critical juncture” in East Asian regionalism came with the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis. APEC and ASEAN’s lack of both capacity and political will to provide support 
compelled East Asian states to seek assistance from outside the region. Much to their 
resentment, however, the United States adopted a “hands-off” attitude, while the IMF 
imposed stringent conditions on its “adjustment and reform programs.”13 This gave 
rise to what Higgott calls the “politics of resentment.”14 To many across East Asia, not 
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only did the IMF “misdiagnose” the crisis; its rescue programs exhibited double-
standards and caused immense domestic upheavals in Thailand and Indonesia.15  
 
Like Mahathir’s EAEC, Japan’s proposal of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) 
was aborted due to strong opposition from the United States and the IMF.16 China, 
which did not support Japan’s proposal, projected itself as a “responsible great power” 
and won praise across the region by not devaluing the renminbi while providing 
financial assistance to Thailand and Indonesia, even though some attributed one of the 
causes of the crisis to Beijing’s devaluation of the renminbi in 1994.17 Incapable of 
tackling the crisis on its own, ASEAN invited the leaders of the two regional powers 
and South Korea to meetings on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur 
on 16th December 1997. The meetings marked the birth of APT and an exclusively 
East Asian regionalism, as encapsulated by the publication of the first East Asian 
Vision Group (EAVG I) report on the building of an “East Asian community” in 
2001.18 
 
APT’s significance consists not only in the aggregate weight of the member 
economies – which increased from 19% of world GDP in 1998 to 27% in 2017 – but 
also in the conception of region it represents.19 As the closest embodiment of the 
Chinese conception of East Asia – which, according to Zhang Yunling, includes China, 
Japan, the Koreas, Mongolia and the ten ASEAN countries but excludes the United 
States and other external powers – APT provided Beijing with a structure to 
consolidate the boundaries and values of the region.20 As I mentioned in chapter two, 
China’s accession to the WTO and the United States’ shift of strategic focus after 
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September 11 gave the rising power an “important strategic opportunity” to deepen 
relations with its neighbors. In 2002, China became the first dialogue partner to 
conclude a framework free trade agreement with ASEAN. One year after, it was again 
the first to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) 
and form a strategic partnership with the Association. China also achieved a 
breakthrough in Northeast Asian cooperation in the same year when it issued with 
Japan and South Korea a “Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite 
Cooperation.” 
 
The shifting balance of power and competing visions of East Asia turned 
regionalism into the locus of leadership competition. In the views of Chinese scholars, 
Japan began from the turn of the century on to perceive China as a strategic opponent 
and balance its growing influence.21 The attempt of the United States, Japan and some 
ASEAN countries to prevent the rising power from dictating the geopolitical definition 
of East Asia became manifest in the contestation over the “critical decisions” 
concerning the membership and institution building of the East Asia Summit (EAS) 
in 2005. The original proposal of EAS as APT’s succeeding body with the same 
membership, while preferred by China and Malaysia, was opposed not only by the 
United States but also by other member states.22 At the insistence of Japan, Indonesia 
and Singapore, EAS was eventually established as a parallel body comprised of not 
only APT countries but also India, Australia and New Zealand.23 The need to mitigate 
mistrust among neighboring states led Wen Jiabao to reaffirm at the 2005 APT Summit 
that China “had no intention to seek dominance over regional cooperation”24 At the 
first EAS two days after, however, he expressed Beijing’s opposition to “any regional 
cooperation that was closed, exclusive and targeted at any single party.”25 
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EAS, according to Central Party School researcher Han Airong, marked the 
first “fragmentation” of the East Asian architecture. 26  Although ASEAN kept its 
“driver’s seat” in regional cooperation, capability deficit and internal division 
rendered the Association increasingly incapable of promoting APT’s identity and its 
adaptation to a changing international environment. 27  The global financial crisis 
provided China with an opportunity to exercise institutional leadership in the thirteen-
member institution and reinvigorate East Asian regionalism. As this and the following 
chapter are going to show, however, the impasse and fragmentation of APT reflected 
the intensifying contestation over the geopolitical definition of East Asia. Whereas 
China under Hu Jintao sought to anchor East Asia to APT, the United States, Japan 
and some ASEAN countries sought to balance the rising power’s growing influence 
by incorporating the region into the broader geopolitical constructs of “ASEAN Plus 
Six,” the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific. 
 
4.1.3 Institutional Structure and Modus Operandi 
Comprised of 65 mechanisms across 24 issue-areas, APT is not so much a single 
institution as a complex of mechanisms and bodies. Its foundation consists of the three 
“ASEAN Plus One” frameworks of dialogue relations between ASEAN and China, 
Japan and South Korea. The supreme body is the annual heads of state/government 
summit, which is held in parallel with the three “ASEAN Plus One” summits on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN Summit. Under the summit is a web of meeting mechanisms, 
including sixteen at (vice-)ministerial level, twenty at senior official level, one at 
permanent representative level, two at (deputy-)director-general level, twenty at 
technical levels and five at non-governmental level. 28  The frequency of meeting 
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ranges from three times a year, once a year, once every two years to ad hoc.29 Except 
the heads of state/government summit, which is hosted by the ASEAN chair of the 
year, most of the meetings are co-chaired by one ASEAN country and one of the “Plus 
Three” countries on rotation.30  
 
In addition to the web of meeting mechanisms are a number of functional 
bodies, some of which have acquired independent or quasi-independent status. These 
include Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), ASEAN+3 
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility 
(CGIF) and ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR). Despite the 
number of bodies and mechanisms, APT has a low level of formalization. Since 
Malaysia’s proposal of an APT secretariat was rejected in 2002, the ASEAN 
secretariat has continued to support the institution’s operation.31 
 
Meanwhile, beginning in 1999, the leaders of China, Japan and South Korea 
met on the sidelines of the APT Summits until 2007, when they decided to hold a 
regular trilateral summit separate from APT, with the establishment of a secretariat in 
2011. Given that the “Plus Three” countries have continued to account for more than 
85% of APT’s GDP, ASEAN, in the phrase of China’s foreign policy elites, is a “small 
horse towing a big wagon” [小马拉大车].32  Indeed, geographical proximity and 
economic complementarity mean that the prospect of economic integration between 
the “Plus Three” countries is considered greater than between APT’s thirteen member 
states. Had it not been for the lack of trust between the three countries, Trilateral 
Cooperation, in the views of Chinese scholars, should be the driving force of East 
Asian economic integration.33 On the other hand, the aggregate economic weight of 
the “Plus Three” countries raised the concern of their Southeast Asian neighbors with 
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their marginalization in the integration process.34 This explains ASEAN’s decision to 
abandon the Chinese-backed East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and initiate in its 
stead Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that includes India, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
 
As part of the ASEAN-centric regional architecture, APT enshrines what is 
now known as the “ASEAN way” of regional cooperation. According to Acharya, the 
“ASEAN way” is defined by informality, low degree of institutionalization, 
consensus, respect for differences, precedence of process over outcomes, and equal 
emphasis on bilateralism and multilateralism. 35  These ideas are embodied in 
consensus decision-making, which prevents any member state from dictating 
outcomes. Notwithstanding the establishment of bodies such as CMIM, APT’s lack of 
built-in capabilities means that it is primarily a platform for member states to 
coordinate their action by issuing joint statements, formulating plans or conducting 
research. Functional tasks are distributed among member states, which are 
“encouraged” to “volunteer to be a lead shepherd in areas of cooperation in which they 
are interested or have the capacity to contribute to.”36 The “Plus Three” countries’ 
capability advantage means that cooperation often takes the form whereby they “sell” 
their initiatives to ASEAN countries.37 
 
The “ASEAN way” explains why China’s leadership behavior in the first 
decade after the global financial crisis was confined to supporting and selling. 
Institutional constraints, however, did not stop its power and behavior from 
heightening mistrust among member states, nor did they prevent competition for 
control over the “critical decisions” on APT’s institution building. As China continued 
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to consider “ASEAN Plus Ones” as the “foundation” and APT as the “main body” of 
East Asian cooperation, its quest for institutional leadership was central to its attempt 
to anchor the region to the thirteen-member institution during the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term.38 
 
4.2 The Hu Jintao Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in ASEAN Plus Three, 2007 – 2012 
 
4.2.1 Political and Security Cooperation 
Although APT was launched first and foremost as a response to the Asian financial 
crisis, member states intended from the beginning to extend cooperation to “political-
security area.”39  But while the global financial crisis increased the incentives for 
regional economic cooperation, old and new political and security issues combined to 
fuel competition and dispute in East Asia. As I mentioned in 1.2.3, regional 
stakeholders were alarmed by what they saw as China’s unprecedented “assertiveness” 
in maritime disputes. In response to China’s growing influence, the United States 
embarked on a “rebalance to Asia” by strengthening cooperation with the rising 
power’s neighbors. Meanwhile, the region saw growing non-traditional security 
threats – from security tension on the Korean Peninsula, domestic upheavals in 
Myanmar to “rice crisis” in Southeast Asia – wherein Chinese national interests were 
at stake. 
 
These challenges magnified the ineffectiveness of ASEAN and the ASEAN-
centric regional architecture. In 2008, ASEAN was forced to cancel the APT Summit 
due to political instability in Thailand.40 In 2012, for the first time in the Association’s 
history, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) failed to issue a joint communiqué, 
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as member states could not reach a common position on the South China Sea dispute.41 
Institutional and leadership deficit set off a competition between regional stakeholders 
to sell their blueprints for East Asian order. Whether it was Australia’s “Asia-Pacific 
Community,” Japan’s “East Asian Community, or mega regional free trade proposals 
like the TPP or RCEP, they represented attempts to redefine East Asia and China’s 
role in it. 
 
During the Hu Jintao administration’s second term, structural, political and 
institutional constraints continued to restrict APT’s political and security functions. 
As a result, Chinese institutional leadership was confined largely to the economic 
domain. Whereas other regional stakeholders sold their blueprints for the geopolitical 
reconstruction of East Asia, China sought to anchor the region to APT by maintaining 
the thirteen-member institution’s identity as “the main body” for East Asian 
community building. To do so, Beijing promoted institution and capacity building in 
non-traditional security cooperation through supporting and soft selling. Low level of 
trust, combined with structural and institutional constraints, confined China’s 
leadership activities to small-scale, functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. Despite the shifting balance of power between China and Japan, 
Beijing continued to trail behind Tokyo as a provider of financial aid for non-
traditional security cooperation. 
 
4.2.1.1 The South China Sea Dispute and Community Building 
As I explained in 3.3.4.3 and 3.3.4.4, collective action on tasks with high uncertainty 
and interdependence is contingent on high level of trust between leader and followers. 
Wen Jiabao’s reiteration of the need to strengthen mutual trust between China and 
other member states at the ASEAN-China and the APT summits bespoke its lack 
thereof.42 Nothing heightened mistrust more than the South China Sea dispute, which 
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was rekindled after Malaysia and Vietnam submitted their maritime claims to the UN. 
Beijing’s attempt to prevent the “internationalization” of the dispute eventually failed 
in 2010, when the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared at the ARF 
Ministerial Meeting that “freedom of navigation, open access to the maritime 
commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea” were American 
“national interests.”43 At the 2011 EAS, 16 out of 18 leaders referred to the maritime 
dispute in their remarks.44 As 4.2.2.4 will show, although China sought to deepen 
mutual trust with member states through tourism, education and cultural exchange, the 
inclusion of a controversial watermark national map in its new passports provoked a 
backlash from its neighbors.45 Maritime incidents, meanwhile, sparked off anti-China 
demonstrations in Vietnam and the Philippines.46 
 
Since the ARF and the EAS were the region’s designated platforms for security 
dialogue, and since most action occurred at bilateral or even unilateral level, China 
was primarily defensive in APT. In line with its position that territorial disputes should 
be resolved by the relevant parties through bilateral negotiations, China restricted 
reference to the South China Sea dispute to the ASEAN-China Summits, where Wen 
Jiabao stonewalled by reiterating Beijing’s call for the “active implementation” of the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.47 While disavowing any 
intention to seek hegemony, China opposed great power confrontation, condominium 
or “any form of hegemonic behavior.” Most importantly, “external forces should not 
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interfere on any pretext.”48 The United States’ security presence and the need to 
mitigate mistrust led China to decouple economics from security by calling for 
member states to focus on “common interests,” with development as the “first 
priority.”49 On the other hand, China’s quest for institutional leadership in economic 
cooperation represented its attempt to maintain APT’s identity. 
 
The South China Sea dispute epitomized the pressure the shifting regional 
balance of power could bring to bear on the “East Asian regional bargain.” 
Notwithstanding member states’ routine reaffirmation of APT as “a” – if not “the” – 
“main vehicle” for East Asia community building and ASEAN centrality in the 
process, the ineffectiveness of ASEAN-led regional institutions intensified the 
competition to redefine East Asia.50 In 2008, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd 
proposed the building of an “Asia-Pacific Community”; one year after, Japanese Prime 
Minister Yukio Hatoyama came up with his proposal of an “East Asian 
Community.”51 Repositioning itself as a “Pacific power” with the aim to consolidate 
its “leadership” and rebuild the region’s “economic and security architecture,” the 
United States acceded to the TAC, joined EAS and deepened its ties with regional 
states. 52  While welcoming the United States to play a central role in East Asia, 
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ASEAN sought to retain its “driver’s seat” in regional cooperation by expediting its 
community building project.53 
 
Despite their differences, these initiatives in one way or another threatened 
APT’s identity by incorporating East Asia into the broader geopolitical constructs of 
“ASEAN Plus Six,” the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific. The impasse of APT 
cooperation was manifested in the report of the second East Asia Vision Group 
(EAVG II) in 2012, wherein the vision of the thirteen-member institution shrank from 
the realization of an “East Asia community” as stated in the EAVG I report to an “East 
Asian Economic Community” by 2020.54 
 
Rather than selling an alternative vision, China sought to consolidate the 
existing geopolitical boundaries of East Asia by preserving and promoting APT’s 
identity. Throughout the Hu Jintao administration’s second term, Beijing continued to 
uphold ASEAN centrality in East Asian cooperation and endorsed the “ASEAN Plus 
Ones” as the “foundation,” APT as the “main body” and EAS as an “important 
addition” in the process.55 This was more than an attempt to mitigate mistrust among 
member states, since APT and the ASEAN-centric regional architecture remained the 
closest to China’s vision of East Asian order. Given that ASEAN centrality hinged on 
the success of its community building project, Beijing engaged in supporting by 
contracting projects of ASEAN Integration Initiative and promoting China-ASEAN 
cooperation in areas such as human resources, connectivity and sustainable 
development. 56 
 
While China was unable to exercise institutional leadership in political 
cooperation, it strove to instill common values into the institution. Reaffirming the 
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importance of respecting each other’s sovereignty, independence and choice of 
developmental model, Wen Jiabao called for member states to view “neighboring 
state’s development” as an opportunity rather than a threat.57 China and ASEAN, he 
argued, were both “strategic forces for peace and development” and should therefore 
work together in the building of a “just and reasonable new international political and 
economic order.”58 To other regional stakeholders, China signaled its readiness to 
consider their interests by stressing that APT cooperation should continue to be guided 
by “openness” rather than “protectionism” or “exclusiveness”; the thirteen-member 
institution should be complementary with other platforms including the EAS and the 
ARF, even though their relations needed to be clarified.59 Indeed, China was even to 
some extent “open” to Australia and Japan’s ideas about the future East Asian order.60 
Beijing also proposed to host the 9th East Asia Forum in 2011 to explore with other 
member states the ways to promote regional cooperation.61 
 
4.2.1.2 Non-Traditional Security 
While the South China Sea dispute placed China on the “fault line” of East Asian 
security order, growing non-traditional security challenges generated the need and 
expectations for cooperation. However, besides institutional constraints, China 
refrained from exercising institutional leadership in tasks with high uncertainty. Its 
inactivity was most manifest in North Korea’s nuclear issue and Myanmar’s domestic 
upheavals. As Japan’s senior vice foreign minister Katsuhito Asano recalled, Beijing 
“did not say a single word” regarding Tokyo’s concern with North Korea’s nuclear 
and abduction issues during the APT Summit in January 2007.62 Without China’s 
active participation, the chairman’s statements throughout the Hu Jintao 
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administration’s second term contained nothing but empty rhetoric. While concerned 
with the United States’ rapprochement with Myanmar, Beijing’s policy of 
noninterference and its uneasy relationship with Naypyidaw also restrained it from 
action. Making no reference to Myanmar in his speeches, Wen Jiabao merely 
reiterated China’s support for ASEAN countries to resolve their disputes by 
themselves and its opposition to “external interference” in their internal affairs.”63 
 
During the Hu Jintao administration’s second term, non-traditional security 
cooperation within APT concentrated on institution and capacity building. The most 
significant achievement was the establishment of APTERR in 2011. Originating in the 
East Asia Emergency Rice Reserve (EAERR) Pilot Project in 2002, it served to 
promote food security and poverty reduction.64  The “rice crisis” in 2008 spurred 
member states to extend the pilot project to early 2010 while exploring the possibility 
of transforming it into a “permanent mechanism.” 65  The ASEAN Plus Three 
Emergency Rice Reserve Agreement was signed on 7th October 2011. 
 
China exercised joint leadership with Japan in food security by supporting and 
soft selling. In 2009, China promised to create storage of 300 thousand tons of rice for 
the Reserve, topping Japan’s 250 thousand tons as the largest contribution of all 
member states.66 One year after, it provided one million dollars to support the facility’s 
establishment.67 Besides APTERR, Beijing promoted agricultural capacity building of 
the less developed ASEAN countries by establishing 20 surveillance stations, 20 
breeding experiment stations and three agricultural technology exhibition centers; 
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building one million hectares of demonstration fields; and dispatching 300 experts to 
provide instructions in ASEAN countries and training 1000 local personnel.68  
 
China’s leadership activities in other areas of non-traditional security 
cooperation were more limited. Apart from the conclusion of new agreements and the 
hosting of exchange events on cyber security, disaster relief, health and environment, 
Beijing proposed initiatives from the establishment of a China-ASEAN Reserve of 
Materials for Disaster Relief to the launch of the China-ASEAN Green Ambassadors 
Initiative. 69 Overall, China’s supporting and soft selling in non-traditional security 
cooperation were confined to small-scale, functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. 
 
Notwithstanding the shifting balance of power between China and Japan, 
Beijing trailed behind Tokyo as a provider of financial aid for food security and 
disaster relief cooperation. In 2009, Japan announced that for the following five years 
it would provide through EAS one billion dollars of aid for food security cooperation 
and training for 1200 local personnel. Similarly, it would offer 18 million dollars of 
aid for capacity building in disaster relief and provided training for 300 local experts.70 
 
The above discussion has shown that Chinese institutional leadership in 
security cooperation during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term was highly 
restricted in scope and scale. Apart from the United States’ continued security 
dominance and APT’s functional constraints, low level of trust confined Chinese 
institutional leadership in non-traditional security cooperation to supporting and soft 
selling of small-scale tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
Notwithstanding the shifting balance of power between China and Japan, Beijing was 
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far from displacing Tokyo as a provider of regional public goods. As the next chapter 
will show, the same constraints would continue to restrict China’s leadership activities 
in political and security cooperation during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. 
 
4.2.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation 
While the United States remained the nucleus of the East Asian security order, three 
decades of “reform and opening-up” catapulted China to be the nucleus of the regional 
economic order. The global financial crisis seemed to accelerate the shift in the 
regional balance of economic power (Table 4.1). Not only did China overtake Japan 
as East Asia’s largest economy in 2010; its trade with other member states increased 
at a much higher rate than that of the United States and Japan. (Table 4.2). At a time 
when capital expenditure was crucial to stimulating national and regional economy, 
China’s massive foreign exchange reserves and surplus production capacity gave it 
additional leverage in its quest for institutional leadership in economic cooperation 
(Table 4.3). It is not surprising, therefore, that Beijing’s diplomatic and material 
investment in its quest for institutional leadership in APT was concentrated in the 
economic domain. 
 
As mega regional free trade agreements became the instruments to reinvigorate 
growth and rebuild the international economic order, the geoeconomic definition of 
region became the focal point of leadership competition. For China, the pressure to 
compete for regional economic leadership came not only from a changing 
international environment but also from its domestic developmental challenges. 
Although the Hu Jintao administration managed to stabilize internal demand in the 
short term by implementing a massive stimulus program, structural transformation and 
sustainable development of the Chinese economy could not be achieved without 
stimulating external demand. East Asian economic integration, in short, was essential 











Born out of the Asian financial crisis a decade before and the closest 
embodiment of the Chinese conception of East Asia, APT became the natural platform 
for the rising power to renegotiate the geoeconomic definition of East Asia. Regional 
common interests and member states’ capability deficit provided an opportunity for 
Beijing to exercise institutional leadership and steer APT’s adaptation to a changing 
international environment. During the Hu Jintao administration’s second term, China 
promoted institution and capacity building through supporting and soft selling. Beijing 
found its greatest success in financial cooperation, wherein it exercised joint 
leadership with Tokyo in the development of CMIM and other new bodies. 
Nevertheless, as was the case in political and security cooperation, Chinese 
institutional leadership was confined largely to functional tasks with low uncertainty 
and interdependence. Low level of trust, in particular, prevented Beijing from uniting 
member states as a group behind its preferences in the “critical decision” concerning 
regional free trade. CMIM’s capability deficit and idleness, meanwhile, indicated 
APT’s inability to fully adapt to a changing international environment in spite of 
success in institution building. 
                                                          
71 “GDP (Current US$), The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD; 
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Table 4.1.  Gross Domestic Products of East Asian and Pacific Countries  
(In US Billion Dollars) 
 2007 2012 2017 
United States 14478 16155 19391 
China 3552 8561 12015 
Japan 4515 6203 4872 
South Korea 1123 1223 1538 
Brunei 12 19 13 
Cambodia 9 14 22 
Indonesia 460 918 1015 
Lao PDR 4 10 17 
Malaysia 194 314 314 
Myanmar 20 60 67 
Philippines 149 250 313 
Singapore 180 289 324 
Thailand 263 398 455 
Vietnam 77 156 220 
(Sources: World Bank and IMF71) 
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Table 4.2. Primary Trade Partners of ASEAN Plus Three Countries  
(In US Billion Dollars) 
 Trade Partners 2007 2012 2016 
Japan 
European Union 170.9 164.9 148.9 
China 237.1 332.7 270.4 
United States 217.8 220.3 199.7 
South Korea 
European Union 93.1 100.1 98.3 
China 145.0 215.1 211.4 
United States 83.3 102.5 110.1 
Japan 82.6 103.2 71.8 
Brunei 
European Union 0.2 0.4 0.4 
China 0.3 0.8 0.6 
United States 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Japan 2.6 6.0 1.9 
Cambodia 
European Union 0.8 2.1 4.6 
China 0.6 2.3 5.2 
United States 1.9 1.2 2.3 
Japan 0.2 0.4 1.4 
Indonesia 
European Union 21.1 32.3 25.3 
China 18.2 51.0 47.6 
United States 16.4 26.5 23.5 
Japan 30.2 52.9 29.1 
Laos PDR 
European Union 0.3 0.6 0.4 
China 0.3 1.7 2.3 
United States 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Japan 0.1 0.3 0.2 
Malaysia 
European Union 40.2 41.4 36.0 
China 34.4 58.5 58.1 
United States 43.5 35.6 32.8 
Japan 35.2 47.2 29.0 
Myanmar 
European Union 0.4 0.5 1.0 
China 1.0 3.9 10.2 
United States 0.0 0.1 0.4 
Japan 0.3 1.3 1.9 
Philippines 
European Union 13.9 11.0 13.6 
China 9.8 13.5 22.1 
United States 16.4 15.2 16.4 






Table 4.2. Primary Trade Partners of ASEAN Plus Three Countries  
(In US Billion Dollars) 
 Trade Partners 2007 2012 2016 
Singapore 
European Union 64.8 85.4 68.2 
China 60.8 83.3 82.5 
United States 59.5 61.5 53.0 
Japan 35.9 42.5 34.6 
Thailand 
European Union 33.8 41.6 39.8 
China 31.2 64.0 65.9 
United States 29.1 35.2 36.4 
Japan 46.8 72.3 51.2 
Vietnam 
European Union 14.3 29.2 45.7 
China 16.4 41.2 72.8 
United States 11.8 24.5 48.6 
Japan 12.3 24.7 29.9 
(Source: Asian Development Bank72) 
 
4.2.2.1 Trade 
It is not surprising that the world’s largest developing economy volunteered to be 
APT’s “lead shepherd” in trade and economic cooperation.73 Less than one year after 
its accession to the WTO, China concluded a framework free trade agreement with 
ASEAN. According to Zhang Yunling, who was joint author of the ASEAN-China 
Expert Group’s feasibility study report, the swiftness of the negotiation shocked and 
alarmed Tokyo.74 Perceiving the China-ASEAN agreement as an attempt to “exclude” 
itself, Japan responded by concluding its own framework free trade agreement with 
the Association in 2003.75 Japan’s “sore point,” in Zhang’s view, led Tokyo from then 
on to consider “preventing Chinese dominance” its foremost objective and, as a result, 
hampered East Asian regionalism.76 
 
The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has since become China’s 
instrument to promote regional economic integration in APT. To ensure ACFTA’s 
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76 Zhang, Between Ideal and Reality, 115. 
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establishment as scheduled, Wen Jiabao called for the successful implementation of 
trade in goods and services agreements, and acceleration of negotiations on an 
investment agreement at the ASEAN-China Summit in 2007. Beijing would also 
strengthen cooperation with ASEAN in intellectual property in order to reach an early 
agreement. Apart from ACFTA, China engaged in supporting by participating in 
ASEAN sub-regional cooperation in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and the 
East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), as well as hosting events including the 
China-ASEAN Expo and China-ASEAN Business and Investment Summit.77 
 
Table 4.3 Foreign Exchange Reserves of East Asian and Pacific Countries (In 
US Million Dollars) 
East Asia 2007 2012 2017 
United States 277549 574268 122178 
China 1546365 3387513 3498040 
Japan 973297 1268086 1326357 
South Korea 262533 327724 389267 
Brunei Darussalam 667 3449   
Cambodia 2140 4933   
Indonesia 56936 112798 130196 
Laos 708 1274   
Malaysia 101995 139731 104243 
Myanmar 3284 7353   
Philippines 33740 83789 83311 
Singapore 166161 265910 279900 
Thailand 87472 181481 202609 
Vietnam 23479 25573   
(Sources: World Bank and IMF78) 
 
A regional free trade area, however, remained the long-standing common goal 
of China and other member states. The EAVG report in 2001 recommended the 
“establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and liberalization of trade 
well ahead of the Bogor Goal set by APEC” as integral to the building of an “East 
Asian community.”79 Anxiety about China’s growing influence and mistrust of its 
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purpose fueled a competition for control over the “critical decision” concerning the 
membership of the proposed regional free trade area. 
 
According to Zhang Yunling, who headed EAFTA’s joint expert group at the 
time, China sought to build on the success of ACFTA and “gain the initiative” by 
leading a feasibility study of EAFTA in 2004.80 An expert group was established for 
the task in 2005, and a report was completed for discussion and approval at the APT 
Economic Ministers’ Meeting in September the next year. At the meeting, however, 
Japan “suddenly” expressed its disagreement on the creation of EAFTA on the basis 
of APT, and proposed instead a Close Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA) 
on the basis of EAS. While disagreeing on Japan’s proposal, member states agreed to 
let Tokyo lead a similar feasibility study of CEPEA. Meanwhile, to match the Chinese-
led Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT), Japan funded the establishment of 
the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) under EAS.81 
Subsequently, China and Japan each submitted a concept paper on their respective 
proposals to APT for consideration.82  
 
To Zhang Yunling and Wang Yuzhu, there was no fundamental difference in 
the form of free trade proposed in EAFTA and CEPEA; indeed, the increase in the 
developmental gap between negotiating parties that came with a larger membership 
challenged the rationale for the latter. 83 As was the case with EAS, the disagreement 
remained geopolitical. From Japan’s perspective, China’s commitment to APT 
represented its attempt to establish regional dominance; as a result, Tokyo sought to 
balance Beijing’s influence and expand its geoeconomic space by incorporating East 
Asia into the broader geopolitical construct of “ASEAN Plus Six.” 84  ASEAN 
countries, on the other hand, were preoccupied with revitalizing the Association 
through ASEAN Community building.85 Meanwhile, as I mentioned earlier, the “Plus 
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Three” countries’ economic weight raised the concern of their Southeast Asian 
neighbors with their marginalization in a thirteen-member trade regime.86 ASEAN’s 
ambivalence resulted in the decision to establish working groups to consider China 
and Japan’s reports “in parallel.”87 The lack of progress in the working groups’ work 
means that the two reports were in effect “shelved.” 88 
 
Whereas CEPEA, if adopted, would for the most part redefine only the 
membership of East Asia, the American-led TPP was an attempt to renegotiate not 
only the membership but also the structures and values of the East Asian economic 
order. With the aim to establish “high standards” and rules on state-owned enterprises, 
labor, intellectual property, environment and cyberspace, the TPP would undermine 
APT’s identity by dividing ASEAN and East Asia as a whole. The United States’ 
economic “pivot” spurred East Asian states to expedite regional free trade negotiations. 
Indeed, China and Japan set aside their differences and submitted a joint proposal 
calling for their Southeast Asian counterparts to accelerate the building of a free trade 
area.89 Nevertheless, the imperative of retaining its centrality in regional cooperation, 
however, led ASEAN to adopt the ASEAN Framework for RCEP in lieu of Beijing or 
Tokyo’s proposal. 90  The long stalemate of ASEAN-led East Asian regionalism, 
meanwhile, led China to consider a trilateral free trade agreement with Japan and 
South Korea a response to the TPP and a potential breakthrough in regional economic 
integration, though the lack of political trust between the three countries continued to 
hinder the progress of negotiations. 91 
 
Before ASEAN’s launch of RCEP in 2011, China sought to promote APT’s 
identity and its institutional adaptation by supporting and soft selling, providing 
regional public goods to maintain the original, collectively agreed purposes while 
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introducing new initiatives. At the 2010 APT Summit, Wen Jiabao, while reiterating 
the thirteen-member grouping as the “main channel” for the building of EAFTA, 
announced China’s decision to inject one million dollars to the newly established 
ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Fund to support work related to EAFTA. 92 
Meanwhile, Beijing provided public goods and introduced proposals through 
“ASEAN Plus One” and Trilateral Cooperation. As ACFTA took effect from 1st 
January 2010, China pledged to boost its usage by expanding trade with ASEAN 
countries, simplifying customs procedures, raising the technological standards of 
inspection and quarantine, and improving the effectiveness of dispute resolution 
mechanisms. To deepen industrial cooperation, China proposed to establish one 
economic and trade zone in each ASEAN country within the next five years. Beijing 
also proposed the establishment of a China-ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, 
fostered Chinese investments in Southeast Asia, and offered to expand its participation 
in ASEAN subregional cooperation. The aim was to increase China-ASEAN trade to 
500 billion dollars by 2015.93 In Northeast Asia, China called for greater political 
support for trilateral free trade negotiations between itself, Japan and Korea. The 
parties agreed to complete a joint feasibility study by 2012.94 
 
Low level of trust, however, prevented China from rallying member states as 
a group behind EAFTA, a task with high uncertainty and high interdependence. While 
RCEP seemed to demonstrate ASEAN’s refusal to take side, its inclusion of India, 
Australia and New Zealand reflected the shared concern of ASEAN countries and 
Japan with China’s power and purpose. By launching RCEP, ASEAN in effect 
removed the making of the “critical decision” concerning regional free trade away 
from APT. 
 
The absence of alternatives and the need to maintain APT’s identity led China 
to demonstrate its willingness to accommodate the interests of other member states. In 
his speech at the 2011 APT Summit, Wen Jiabao declared that “China would, on the 
basis of full respect for ASEAN centrality, gradualism and full consideration of 
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each party’s concerns, promote [trade liberalization and investment facilitation] in a 
pragmatic manner, and hope to gain support from different parties.”95 He called for 
effective utilization of the fund initially allocated for EAFTA to accomplish concrete 
progress in the work on RCEP.96 Recognizing the adverse effect of Sino-Japanese 
competition on regional economic cooperation, China and Japan jointly proposed to 
establish working groups on trade in goods, trade in services and investment in order 
to expedite RCEP negotiations.97 Meanwhile, the Hu Jintao administration continued 
to engage in supporting and soft selling through “ASEAN Plus One.” Besides calling 
for effective implementation of ACFTA, China pledged its continued commitment to 
balanced trade by dispatching trade and investment delegations to ASEAN countries; 
it would also increase investments in technological transfer so as to enhance the 
competitiveness of industries in China and Southeast Asia.98  
 
Nevertheless, despite the shifting regional balance of economic power, China 
continued to trail behind Japan, the United States and the EU in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Southeast Asia (Table 4.4). From 2007 to 2012, Japan’s FDI in 
ASEAN countries more than doubled that of China, even though Beijing became the 
biggest source of FDI in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar.99 Similarly, Japan remained 
the dominant provider of official development assistance (ODA) to ASEAN countries. 
In 2012, for instance, Japan’s ODA to Southeast Asia was close to 4.2 billion dollars, 
more than 2.5 times than that of China.100 Thus even though the growth of Chinese 
economic power enabled Beijing to increase its share of regional leadership, it far far 
from displacing Tokyo’s role in the supply of regional financial public goods. 
                                                          
95 Jiabao Wen [温家宝], "Remarks at the Fourteenth ASEAN Plus Three Summit" [在第十四次东盟




97 “Chairman’s Statement of the 14th ASEAN Plus Three Summit,” in ASEAN Plus Three Documents 
Series 2005 – 2010, 5. 
98 Wen, “Remarks at the Fourteenth China-ASEAN Summit cum Commemorative Summit of the 20th 
Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations.” 
99 ASEAN Statistical Yearbook, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016/2017), 152, 154, 156, 
http://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ASYB_2017-rev.pdf  
100 Cited in Barbara Stallings and Eun Mee Kim, “Japan, Korea, and China: Styles of ODA in East 
Asia” in Hiroshi Kato, John Page and Yasutami Shimomura (eds.), Japan’s Development Assistant: 
Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 124. 
150 
 
China’s experience demonstrates the distinction between impact and 
leadership as discussed in chapters one and three. The size of the Chinese economy 
meant that the rising power’s action, be it intentional or not, would always have 
enormous structural impact on the regional economy. Thus notwithstanding the failure 
of EAFTA, China became the driving force of “competitive liberalization” and the 
renegotiation on the geoeconomic definition of the Asia-Pacific. 101 On the other hand, 
even though the rising power was increasingly capable of providing the public goods 
member states needed, it was unable to unite them as a group behind its purpose. As a 
result, Chinese institutional leadership during the Hu Jintao administration’s second 
term remained confined to functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
Although the launch of RCEP removed the “critical decisions” over regional free trade 
away from APT, the importance of regional free trade, if anything, only increased 
during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. Increasing incentives and pressure 
for change led to a shift in China’s leadership behavior from supporting and soft 
selling to hard selling. 
 
4.2.2.2 Finance 
Financial cooperation has since the beginning defined APT’s identity, which was 
launched as member states’ collective response to the Asian financial crisis. As I 
mentioned in 4.1.2, the belief that global financial institutions did not represent the 
interests of non-Western, developing economies manifested itself in the “politics of 
resentment” during the Asian financial crisis. The need for a collective response to 
regional and extraregional challenges resulted in the launch of CMI in 2000 and the 
Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) two years after. Historical memories provided 
the basis for regional cooperation during the global financial crisis a decade after. In 
particular, China’s economic weight and its image as a “responsible great power” 
during the Asian financial crisis led member states to call for its leadership in regional 
financial cooperation. 102  Indeed, the entrenchment of Western-dominated global 
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financial architecture prompted the rising power to reorient its efforts to regional 
institution building.103 On the other hand, as I pointed out at the beginning of 4.2.2, 
China’s quest for institutional leadership in economic cooperation was motivated as 
much by domestic as international imperatives. The need to sustain growth and 
expedite structural economic required Beijing to stimulate external demand. APT and 
member states’ capability deficit provided China with an opportunity to lead by 
supporting and soft selling. 
 
As was the case in trade, the dynamics of cooperation and competition in East 
Asian financial governance revolved around China, Japan and the United States.104 
Having been East Asia’s largest economy in East Asia until 2010, Japan has exercised 
leadership in financial cooperation within the limits of the “East Asian regional 
bargain.” During the Asian financial crisis, it took the New Miyazawa Initiative to 
stabilize the region, even though its proposal of an AMF was aborted due to opposition 
from the United States and the lack of support from other regional stakeholders.105 
Meanwhile, having founded the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1966, Tokyo has 
been the largest provider of regional financial public goods. China’s rise and the global 
financial crisis, however, set off a renegotiation on the American and Japanese-
dominated regional financial order. 
 
APT’s most significant institutional development in adaptation to a changing 
international environment after the global financial crisis was the “multilateralization” 
of CMI. Despite successive capacity building measures after its establishment in 2000, 
CMI remained inadequate as a rescue facility. Comprised of a series of bilateral swap 
agreements, CMI was hamstrung not only by its small size, but also its lack of 
“surveillance or conditionality schemes, a clear disbursement mechanism, and 
credibility as a crisis lending vehicle.”106 Member states, moreover, could draw only 
up to 20% of their respective swap quota without being subject to an IMF program. 
This explains the fact that no member state has hitherto used the facility even when it 
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faced liquidity problems. 107  In the words of Thailand’s former finance minister 
Chalongphob Sussangkam, CMI remained “a significant symbolic initiative” and “a 
work in progress.” 108  On the other hand, the facility’s structure and capacity 
conformed to the parameters of the East Asian regional bargain, which precluded 
exclusive regional cooperation. 
 
In 2007, on the eve of the global financial crisis, member states reached an 
initial agreement to “multilateralize” CMI in the form of “a self-managed reserved 
pooling arrangement governed by a single contractual agreement” despite 
disagreements over the facility’s structure.109 The proposed foreign exchange reserve 
pool would have a starting capital of at least 80 billion dollars; China, Japan and South 
Korea would contribute 80% of the starting capital, while ASEAN would contribute 
the remaining 20%. Member states also agreed on the rules and procedures governing 
the upgraded facility. Its mission, however, remained to “supplement the existing 
international financial arrangements” rather than replace them.110 
 
Historical memories of the Asian financial crisis gave urgency to the CMI’s 
capacity building after the outbreak of the global financial crisis. In 2009, member 
states decided to further increase the capital of CMIM’s foreign exchange reserve pool 
from 80 to 120 billion dollars. Once the facility became operational, they would 
consider raising the “IMF de-linked portion” of a member state’s swap quota above 
20%. Meanwhile, member states would continue to strengthen the existing bilateral 
currency swap arrangements. 111  Two years after the multilateralization of CMI 
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became effective on 24th March 2010, member states decided to further strengthen the 
regional facility’s capacity by doubling the size of the foreign exchange reserve pool 
to 240 billion dollars, increasing the “IMF de-linked portion” to 30%, and introducing 
a new crisis prevention facility “CMIM Precautionary Line (CMIM-PL)” 112 
 
Equally important to APT’s adaptation to a changing international 
environment is the capacity for surveillance and crisis prevention. Soon after the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, member states expanded the ASEAN Plus Three 
Meeting of Finance Ministers into the ASEAN Plus Three Meeting of Finance 
Ministers and Central Bank Governors. Nevertheless, despite the contributions of 
bodies such as the Technical Working Group on Economic and Financial Monitoring 
(ETWG) or the Group of Experts (GOE), a special body was needed to enhance APT’s 
financial surveillance capacity. 113 This result was the establishment of AMRO in 
April 2011. Meanwhile, member states enhanced the function of the Economic 
Review and Policy Dialogue (EPRD) and directed the ASEAN+3 Research Group to 
conduct regular studies on financial and monetary cooperation. 114 
 
Another major initiative to enhance the “resilience” of East Asia’s financial 
system was ABMI, which was launched in 2002. 115  During the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term, member states approved a new ABMI Roadmap, which 
aimed to promote the development of local currency bonds, bond market infrastructure 
and regulatory institutions.116 In 2010, a Credit Guarantee and Investment Facility 
(CGIF) was established under ABMI. With a starting capital of 500 million dollars, 
CGIF would supplement ABMI in promoting the issuance of local currency corporate 
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bonds in East Asia. 117  Two years later, an ABMI Roadmap+ was adopted to 
implement nine priority initiatives including CGIF guarantee programs, the Common 
Bond Issuance Program and the Regional Settlement Intermediary.118  
 
With the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves, capability advantage 
enabled China to exercise institutional leadership by supporting. The bargaining over 
the “critical decisions” on institution building led Beijing to share joint institutional 
leadership with Tokyo in CMIM and other new functional bodies.119  In the final 
agreement, China’s contributions and voting shares, if including Hong Kong’s portion, 
equaled those of Japan, as each side would contribute 32% of the total reserves.120 
Likewise, China and Japan each contributed 200 million dollars as CGIF’s starting 
capital. Sino-Japanese leadership competition also extended to the directorship of 
AMRO. As a result of compromise between Beijing and Tokyo, China’s Wei Benhua 
served as AMRO’s first director in the first year; the remaining office term of two 
years would be taken up by Japan’s Nemoto Yoichi.121 
 
China’s success could be attributed as much to task structure as to the historical 
memories of the Asian financial crisis. Low level of uncertainty and interdependence 
meant that leadership by supporting depended not so much on high level of trust as on 
the leader’s capabilities. Nonetheless, CMIM’s decision-making structure continued 
to constrain China’s leadership behavior. Not only did the distribution of contributions 
and voting shares give ASEAN countries voting power disproportionate to its share of 
East Asia’s GDP; decision-making on “fundamental issues,” moreover, would 
continue to be based on consensus.122 Indeed, despite the tripling of its size, CMIM 
remained a symbolic addition rather than an alternative to the global financial 
architecture. Ironically, China’s concern as a lender with moral hazards led Beijing to 
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be cautious about raising the “IMF-delinked portion” of swap quotas.123 This, on the 
one hand, signified China’s intention to renegotiate the international order without 
overthrowing it; on the other hand, it also explained APT’s inability to fully adapt to 
a changing international environment. 
 
Given CMIM’s capability deficit, bilateral swap agreements became the 
instruments in Sino-Japanese competition in supporting. As part of its strategy to 
promote renminbi internationalization, China signed 80 and 100 billion renminbi 
worth bilateral swap agreements with Malaysia and Indonesia in 2009.124 In what was 
described as a “very aggressive” response, Japan concluded with ASEAN countries 
bilateral swap agreements worth 60 billion US dollars, while guaranteeing their 
issuance of 5 billion dollars of “samurai bonds.”125 From Tokyo’s perspective, Japan 
continued to shoulder the largest share of leadership in East Asian financial 
governance, since the total credit it could extend to APT member states through 
bilateral swap agreements exceeded 40 billion dollars, more than double of what China 
could provide.126 
 
China also sought to promote institution and capacity building by soft selling. 
Beijing’s proposals included expanding CMIM and AMRO’s capacity for crisis 
prevention and surveillance, creating a regional financial safety net, developing a 
centralized system of foreign exchange reserve management, strengthening 
cooperation in legal institution building and oversight, developing new financial 
instruments and diversifying financial services. To facilitate trade and settlement in 
local currencies, Beijing would encourage financial institutions in China and ASEAN 
to establish branches in each other’s countries and interbank cooperation mechanisms 
in local currency clearing. Meanwhile, drawing on the experience in the SCO, the 
National Development Bank of China and National Banks of ASEAN countries, 
established the China-ASEAN Bank Consortium to promote exchange and 
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cooperation. 127  To explore the future direction of cooperation, Beijing called for 
“innovative and strategic study” on areas such as financial instruments and local 




While the concept of “connectivity” would receive global attention with the BRI, it 
already became APT’s collective purpose during the Hu Jintao administration’s 
second term. The importance of infrastructure investment to economic development 
was recognized as far back as the Asian financial crisis.129 In the wake of the global 
financial crisis a decade after, the ADB estimated that Asia would require 8 trillion 
dollars of investment in national infrastructure and 290 billion dollars in regional 
infrastructure to promote sustainable growth.130 The ASEAN Economic Community 
Blueprint also identified infrastructure development as one of the key pillars to 
Southeast Asia’s transformation into a “competitive economic region.”131 Regional 
demand converged with domestic economic imperatives to provide the incentives for 
China to seek institutional leadership in infrastructure development. The need to 
sustain growth and expedite structural economic reform required China to expand 
outbound direct investment, industrial transfer and export of surplus production 
capacity. As was the case in finance, member states’ capability deficit and demand for 
public goods provided an opportunity for China to exercise leadership by supporting 
and soft selling during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. 
 
The prioritization of connectivity in APT’s agenda was integral to ASEAN 
Community building and the Association’s efforts to retain its centrality in East Asian 
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cooperation. As the “Leaders’ Statement on ASEAN Plus Three Partnership on 
Connectivity” emphasized, 
 ASEAN Connectivity is a foundation of the development of enhanced 
connectivity in East Asia and that the enhanced connectivity is one of the key 
elements in building an East Asian community.132  
To establish ASEAN Plus Three partnership in connectivity, member states agreed to 
facilitate the timely implementation of cooperation projects, integrate connectivity 
into the ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan (2013-2017) and explore the 
formulation of a “Connectivity Master Plan Plus” in cooperation with EAS. To support 
project implementation, member states agreed to establish study groups to formulate 
cooperation proposals and explored additional financing mechanisms under APT.133 
They also pledged to strengthen cooperation in capacity building, best practices 
sharing and the implementation of the ASEAN Plus Three Plan of Action on 
Education. The above discussion shows that the core component of the Xi Jinping 
administration’s BRI was proposed by ASEAN in the first place. Likewise, the idea 
of establishing additional infrastructure financing mechanisms, which culminated in 
the establishment of the AIIB, originated in member states’ collectively agreed 
purpose during the Hu Jintao era. 
 
Nonetheless, as was the case in finance, member states’ capability deficit and 
demand for public goods provided China with a leadership opportunity. But whereas 
the Xi Jinping administration would engage in hard selling by redefining and 
accomplishing collective purposes on Chinese terms, the Hu Jintao administration was 
preoccupied with promoting the original collective purposes through supporting and 
soft selling. In transportation, China called for effective implementation of priority 
projects in order to achieve land transport connectivity with ASEAN within ten to 
fifteen years. It also pledged to facilitate planning of the Pan-Asian Railway network, 
technological standardization and other related projects. Meanwhile, China took the 
initiative in air transport liberalization by concluding an agreement with ASEAN in 
November 2010; it also pledged to expedite the creation of a “fully liberalized air 
services regime” that could in the future include Japan and Korea. To enhance 
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maritime connectivity, China proposed the establishment of a China-ASEAN 
Connectivity Cooperation Committee and offered to implement effective measures 
with its Southeast Asian counterparts in the development of freezer cargo ships, cargo 
ships and shipping routes. In telecommunication, China pledged to build a China-
ASEAN Information Highway. To explore the future direction of cooperation, China 
organized an international seminar on connectivity.134 As was the case in other areas 
of cooperation, China’s leadership activities remained confined to functional tasks 
with low uncertainty. 
 
Given ASEAN countries’ capability deficit and demand for development 
financing support, “ASEAN Plus One” provided the ideal platform for China to 
promote the collective purpose by supporting. In 2009, China provided 15 billion US 
dollars of credit – including 6.7 billion dollars of preferential credit – for financing 50 
infrastructure projects in highway, railway, maritime and energy routes, information 
and communication, electricity network, etc., across almost all ASEAN countries. By 
the end of 2010, 10.1 billion dollars were already put to use, including 3.1 billion 
dollars of preferential credit. In 2011, China provided an additional credit of 10 billion 
dollars, including 4 billion dollars of preferential loans. 135  
 
Nevertheless, member states decided after the outbreak of the global financial 
crisis to “explore ideas for new arrangements which would provide development 
assistance to the region, while addressing unexpected liquidity constraints.”136 To 
promote the collective purpose, China sought to use or establish multiple bodies and 
mechanisms to provide regional financial public goods. To finance projects in the 
ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Work Plan (2013-2017), member states established 
in 2009 an ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation Fund with a starting capital of 3 million 
dollars. China, Japan and Korea each contributed 900 thousand dollars, while ASEAN 
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countries together contributed 300 thousand dollars.137 Apart from mechanisms under 
APT, China used financial facilities under its control to finance cooperation projects, 
one of which was the Asian Regional Cooperation Fund. Beijing injected 15 million 
dollars to the Fund in 2007, followed by another 17 million dollars three years later.138 
Another body was the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund, which was 
established in April 2009 and began operation by the end of 2010.139 In 2011, Beijing 
established a China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund of 3 billion renminbi to 
promote cooperation in areas including maritime research, environment, connectivity, 
navigation security and crime prevention.140 
 
The above discussion demonstrated China’s increasing capacity to provide 
regional public goods that other member states needed. However, despite the shifting 
balance of power, China was able to increase its share of institutional leadership but 
did not displace Japan’s role in the supply of regional financial public goods. More 
importantly, the demise of EAFTA attested to China’s inability to rally member states 
as a group behind its purpose, maintain APT’s identity and promote its adaptation to 
a changing international environment. Low level of trust meant that Chinese 
institutional leadership was confined to functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. APT’s leadership deficit, in turn, was a manifestation of China’s 
failure to anchor East Asia to the thirteen-member grouping.  
 
4.2.2.4 Education, Research and Cultural Exchange 
As chapter two and the earlier section of this chapter have shown, there has long been 
a view in China that attributes responsibilities for growing mistrust between the rising 
power and the world to the misunderstanding of some states and the “Cold War 
mindset” of others. Nevertheless, it would be unfair to conclude that Beijing was 
unaware of the problem. Mutual trust is built not only on inter-governmental 
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cooperation but also on mutual understanding between societies. Not surprisingly, 
“people-to-people” diplomacy has been at the center of China’s attempt to build trust 
and collective purpose. Like infrastructure development, agriculture and environment, 
these initiatives were directed primarily at the less developed ASEAN countries. 
Again, China’s leadership activities in social and cultural cooperation were 
incorporated into its efforts to exercise leadership in economic cooperation, as the Hu 
Jintao administration made use of the country’s advantageous capabilities to promote 
member states’ capacity building. 
 
The most important area of engagement was education. Although Thailand 
was the “leading shepherd” in education cooperation within APT, China launched 
many initiatives during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. In 2007, China 
would implement its proposal to train 8000 personnel from ASEAN countries across 
different specialties in the next five years. Three years later, it offered to train another 
15,000 technical and management personnel. Beijing also offered to establish ten 
vocational training centers to provide the human resources needed in ASEAN 
countries’ socio-economic development. Meanwhile, China pledged to implement the 
“Double Hundred Thousand” scheme by increasing the number of international 
students from ASEAN countries to 100 thousands; provide 10 thousands government 
scholarship quota; and invite 10 thousand junior teachers, scholars and students to visit 
China. It would also continue to invite youth from ASEAN countries to visit China 
and host cultural exchange events.141 
 
Apart from calling for the early conclusion of cooperation agreements, China 
proposed the establishment of a China-ASEAN Center for Exchange and Cooperation 
in Traditional Medicine, the launch of partnership programs and organized seminars 
and training projects. In tourism, apart from the formulation of action plans and 
organization of training and exchange events, China proposed that both sides should 
introduce measures to simplify immigration/custom procedures, improve 
transportation, improve service standards, with the aim to reach the goal of 15 million 
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times/person of travel by 2015. 142  These tasks, however, remained small-scale, 
functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
 
Nevertheless, Beijing’s initiatives failed to mitigate the mistrust that hampered 
its quest for institutional leadership. Besides the backlash against China’s maritime 
behavior, the social and environmental impact arising from its growing economic 
presence in member states generated public resentment. For instance, local opposition 
to the construction of the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar led Naypyidaw to suspend the 
China-led project in 2011.143 The growing presence of Chinese tourists and workers, 
if anything, only intensified anxiety and resentment in Southeast Asia.144 Ironically, 
as the interplay of international and domestic developmented increased the pressure 
for China pursue regional economic leadership, Beijing’s expanding diplomatic and 




As Kissinger wrote in the wake of the global financial crisis, 
[w]hat kind of global economic order arises will depend importantly on how 
China and America deal with each other over the next few years. A frustrated 
China may take another look at an exclusive regional Asian structure, for 
which the nucleus already exists in the ASEAN-plus-three concept.145 
The former United States Secretary of State’s observation encapsulates the irony of 
APT’s development during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. Fifteen years 
after it was launched in Kuala Lumpur, the thirteen-member institution remained 
nothing but a nucleus. The global financial crisis, it turned out, did not become another 
“critical juncture” for East Asian regionalism as the Asian financial crisis did a decade 
before. Notwithstanding the issuance of joint statements, the formulation of new work 
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plans and the establishment of new mechanisms, APT continued to suffer from 
leadership deficit and was therefore unable to adapt fully to a changing international 
environment. 
 
The shifting balance of economic power and member states’ capability deficit 
provided China, which projected itself as a “responsible great power” during the Asian 
financial crisis, an opportunity to exercise institutional leadership through supporting 
and soft selling. Although structural, political and institutional constraints limited 
security cooperation in APT to non-traditional security, China played a central role in 
the establishment of the APTERR. Meanwhile, member states’ demand for economic 
public goods allowed China to share leadership with Japan in institution and capacity 
building, as epitomized by the establishment of CMIM, AMRO and CGIF. Still, 
notwithstanding the shifting regional balance of power, Beijing did not displace 
Tokyo’s role in the supply of regional public goods. 
 
On the other hand, although China was increasingly capable of providing the 
regional public goods that other member states needed, it was unable to unite them as 
a group behind its purpose. Besides structural and institutional constraints, low level 
prevented Beijing from mobilizing support for its preference in the “critical decision” 
concerning regional free trade. This explained why Chinese institutional leadership 
remained confined to functional tasks in the economic domain with low uncertainty 
and interdependence. Even though Beijing’s rhetoric and action indicated its 
awareness of the problem, member states’ anxiety about China’s growing influence, 
mistrust of its purpose and negative perception of its behavior would continue to 
hamper the rising power’s quest for leadership during the Xi Jinping administration’s 
first term.  
 
China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT was integral to its attempt to 
renegotiate the geopolitical definition of East Asia. As APT remained the closest 
embodiment of China’s vision of East Asian order, the Hu Jintao administration’s 
efforts represented an attempt to anchor the region to the thirteen-member institution. 
Nevertheless, the United States, Japan, ASEAN and other regional stakeholders 
prevented the rising power from dictating the geopolitical definition of East Asia, as 
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they sought to embed the region in broader geopolitical constructs including ASEAN 
Plus Six, the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific. As the interplay of international and 
domestic developments continued to build up the pressure for change, how would 
China under Xi Jinping seek to steer APT’s development? It is for this question that 
we turn to the next chapter.
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5. The Xi Jinping Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in ASEAN Plus Three, 2012 - 2017 
 
The previous chapter examined China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT 
during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. The pressure for collective action 
and member states’ capability shortage provided an opportunity for the rising power 
to seek leadership by supporting and soft selling. China’s greatest achievement lay in 
financial cooperation, wherein it attained joint institutional leadership with Japan in 
CMIM and other new bodies. Nevertheless, whereas the Asian financial crisis was a 
“critical juncture” for East Asian regionalism with the inception of APT, the global 
financial crisis a decade after did not reinvigorate the thirteen-member institution. 
Notwithstanding the shifting regional balance of power, structural, political and 
institutional constraints confined Chinese institutional leadership to the economic 
domain. Not only did China continue to trail behind Japan in the provision of regional 
public goods; the problem of trust meant that Chinese institutional leadership was 
restricted to functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. In other words, 
while China was increasingly capable of providing what others needed, it was unable 
to promote APT’s identity by uniting them as a group behind its purpose. This 
prevented the rising power from anchoring East Asia to the institution. 
 
From the very beginning, the new administration under Xi Jinping seemed 
determined to make a major change. Speaking at the first Work Forum on Peripheral 
Diplomacy on 25th October 2013, the President exhorted the need to “strive for 
achievement” in the country’s peripheral diplomacy. 1  Indeed, China’s diplomatic 
initiative in Southeast Asia already began with his visit to Indonesia early in the month. 
Addressing the Indonesian Parliament on 3rd October, he pledged to build “a closer 
China – ASEAN community with a shared future.” To do so, china would not only 
upgrade ACFTA; it would build together with its Southeast Asian neighbors a 21st 
Century Maritime Silk Road and establish what is now the AIIB.2 Alluding to the 
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upcoming APEC summit in Bali, Xi Jinping stressed that while “extra-regional” states 
would be welcome to play a “constructive role” in East Asian development, they 
should respect the region’s diversity and “do more things that [would be] conducive 
to regional stability and development.”3 The launch of the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road and the AIIB represented a significant change in the rising power’s institutional 
behavior. What is important, however, is to understand the nature of China’s 
behavioral change and its implications. 
 
This chapter examines China’s leadership behavior in APT during the Xi 
Jinping administration’s first term. While China continued to reaffirm its support for 
the centrality of both ASEAN and APT in East Asian regionalism, growing pressure 
for change led to the precedence of task over relationship in its leadership behavior. 
The rising power’s launch of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the AIIB and other 
initiatives was an attempt at hard selling in economic cooperation by redefining 
collective purposes and initiating structures of cooperation on its own terms. 
Nevertheless, the structural, political and institutional constraints on China’s behavior 
under Hu Jintao continued to confine Chinese institutional leadership under Xi Jinping 
to economic, functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence.  
 
As the precedence of task over relationship shifted the locus of Beijing’s 
activities further from the thirteen-member platform to parallel or subordinate 
channels, China’s hard selling did not maintain APT’s identity by promoting its 
adaptation to a changing international environment, but rather furthered its division 
and fragmentation. China’s behavioral shift represented an important change in the 
rising power’s renegotiation with other regional stakeholders on the geopolitical 
definition of East Asia. Whereas China under Hu Jintao sought to anchor East Asia to 
APT, its quest for institutional leadership under Xi Jinping represented an attempt to 
reintegrate the region into an expanding, Sino-centric geopolitical construct of 
periphery. 
 




5.1 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and East Asian Cooperation 
As chapters one, two and four have shown, international and domestic developments 
generated pressures on China to seek institutional leadership in APT. The pressures 
for change, if anything, only increased during the Xi Jinping administration’s first 
term. The perceived incapacity of both ASEAN and ASEAN-led regional institutions 
in managing China’s rise and other regional challenges intensified the contest over the 
geopolitical definition of East Asia. Under Obama, the United States avowed to 
“sustain” its “leadership” through its “rebalance to Asia.”4 Other stakeholders such as 
Australia, Japan and Indonesia competed to sell alternative blueprints so as to shape 
the course of change in East Asian order. ASEAN struggled to retain its centrality by 
expediting its community building project while launching RCEP. Despite their 
differences, these initiatives prevented China from dictating the geopolitical definition 
of East Asia by embedding the region in the broader geopolitical constructs of 
“ASEAN Plus Six,” the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific. 
 
Maritime disputes and geostrategic competition continued to escalate during 
the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. To uphold freedom of navigation in the 
South China Sea and a “rule-based order,” the United States and its partners enhanced 
their regional security presence.5 Washington, meanwhile, expedited TPP negotiations 
so as to prevent Beijing from “writ[ing] the rules of the global economy.”6 Although 
geostrategic competition increasingly centered on China and the United States, Japan, 
which had been China’s long-time rival for regional leadership, also augmented its 
engagement with Southeast Asia. Competing regionalist initiatives and APT’s 
inability to fully adapt to a changing international environment threatened to paralyze 
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the thirteen-member institution and the process of East Asian regionalism it 
represented. 
 
Although many of China’s foreign policy elites advocated a major geostrategic 
adjustment at the end of the Hu Jintao administration – which I already discussed in 
2.5.2 – East Asia was more important to the rising power than ever. The success of 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics,” as Hu Jintao stated in his report to the 18th 
Party Congress, hinged on the country’s development into a “maritime power.”7 
Meanwhile, the sluggishness of structural economic reform in a “new normal” era 
increased the pressures on Beijing to to stimulate the domestic economy by promoting 
external demand and expanding overseas markets. As Xi Jinping stressed in the 19th 
Politburo group study session in 2014, free trade area provided an “important platform 
for China to participate actively in rule-making in international trade and attain 
institutional power in global economic governance.” 8  China, therefore, needed to 
accelerate implementation of its free trade area strategy in order to build “a web of 
free trade areas originating in the country’s periphery, radiating across ‘one belt one 
road’ and orienting toward the world.”9 
 
Although ASEAN’s launch of RCEP removed control over the “critical 
decision” on regional free trade from APT, the thirteen-member grouping remained 
the closest embodiment of the Chinese conception of East Asia. Meanwhile, as a 
“small horse towing a big wagon,” ASEAN was increasingly incapable of steering 
APT’s institutional development.10 From the perspective of institutional leadership, 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road represented a compromise between relationship 
and task. The BRI’s lack of an integrated institutional component and China’s 
emphasis on the role of existing institutions in its implementation signified its 
intention to renegotiate the existing regional order without overthrowing it. Indeed, 
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the Xi Jinping administration’s new diplomatic lexicon – from “new type of great 
power relations,” “community with a shared future” to “friendship, good faith, mutual 
benefit and inclusiveness” – served to mitigate the problem of trust that had prevented 
Beijing from uniting member states behind its purpose. Increasing pressures for 
change, however, led to a shift in China’s leadership behavior from supporting and 
soft selling under Hu Jintao to hard selling in economic cooperation under Xi Jinping. 
The launch of superimposing, parallel and subordinate initiatives constituted Beijing’s 
attempt to redefine collective purposes and initiate structures of cooperation on its own 
terms. 
 
While political mistrust between the “Plus Three” countries hampered trilateral 
cooperation, China’s call for the building of a “community with a shared future” with 
its Southeast Asian neighbors was an attempt to engage those member states, which, 
at least Beijing believed, would most likely identify with what it defined as their 
collective purposes. Although the geographical scope of the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road extended far beyond Southeast Asia, ASEAN’s geostrategic importance and  
the complementarity of Chinese and ASEAN economies meant that the ten Southeast 
Asian countries – especially the less developed ones – were the prime target partners 
of the BRI.11 This was evident, as Lu Jianren pointed out, when Xi Jinping raised the 
ideas of both the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road and the China-ASEAN Community 
with a Shared Future in his address to the Indonesian parliament.12 Indeed, the “Road” 
and two of the six “economic corridors” – the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic 
Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar-India Economic Corridor – go to the 
heart of Southeast Asia. While China concluded many separate agreements with 
ASEAN countries during the first term of the Xi Jinping administration, the BRI’s 
Action Plan emphasized the need to “strengthen the role of existing multilateral 
cooperation mechanisms” with specific reference to the China-ASEAN framework. 13 
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The Action Plan’s reference to “ASEAN Plus One” rather than APT signified 
an important change in the renegotiation between China and other regional 
stakeholders on the geopolitical definition of East Asia. As chapter four has shown, 
notwithstanding APT’s low level of multilateralism, China under Hu Jintao sought to 
maintain the thirteen-member institution’s identity by engaging member states more 
or less as a group. As task took precedence over relationship, however, China under 
Xi Jinping began to engage member states selectively or individually. Not 
surprisingly, China’s hard selling heightened anxiety about its growing influence and 
escalated Sino-Japanese leadership competition, as Beijing and Tokyo sought to 
outsell each other through parallel mechanisms. Thus even though as many as 230 
projects were concluded under APT between 2014 and 2015, the locus of activities 
shifted from the thirteen-member institution to “ASEAN Plus Ones” and other parallel 
mechanisms.14 
 
China’s hard selling not only did not change APT’s leadership deficit; it further 
the thirteen-member grouping’s fragmentation. Indeed, two Chinese scholars went so 
far as to conclude that APT was already “dead.”15 Nonetheless, China’s behavioral 
change had significant implications for the geopolitical reconstruction of East Asia. 
Whereas China under Hu Jintao sought to anchor East Asia to APT, the launch of the 
BRI and other initiatives represented an attempt to reintegrate the region into an 
expanding, Sino-centric geopolitical construct of periphery. 
 
5.2 The Xi Jinping Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in ASEAN Plus Three, 2012 – 2017 
 
5.2.1 Political and Security Cooperation 
Notwithstanding member states’ routine reaffirmation of their support for the 
centrality of ASEAN and APT in regional cooperation, a worsening regional security 
situation, great power competition and ASEAN’s incapacity threatened to undermine 
                                                          
14 Keqiang Li [李克强], “Remarks at the Eighteenth ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Summit” (在第十八
次东盟与中日韩(10+3)领导人会议上的讲话), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (22nd November 2015), 
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the thirteen-member grouping’s identity. China’s rhetoric of support for ASEAN and 
APT, however, remained significant. As the contest over the geopolitical definition of 
East Asia intensified, Beijing’s reassurance was an attempt to mitigate mistrust among 
neighbors and maintain APT’s identity. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized at 
the APT Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2015, ASEAN Community building was the 
first priority and the basis for the building of both an East Asian Economic Community 
and an “Asian community with a shared future.”16 In addition to political support, 
China provided 50 million renminbi in 2014 in support of ASEAN Community 
building, even though the amount was less than half of the Japan-ASEAN Integration 
Fund 2.0 established in the same year.17 
 
Whereas the Hu Jintao administration sought to preserve the original collective 
purpose of “East Asian community building,” the Xi Jinping administration’s proposal 
of the concept of “community with a shared future” represented an attempt to redefine 
the collective purpose on Chinese terms. If Japan could not be induced to accept if not 
follow Chinese institutional leadership, Beijing would focus its engagement on 
ASEAN countries. One year after Xi Jinping’s speech to the Indonesian parliament, 
Li Keqiang outlined the “2+7 cooperation framework” for building a “China-ASEAN 
community with a shared future.” Cooperation, he stressed, would progress only when 
both sides agreed to “deepen strategic mutual trust” and “focus on economic 
development.” The two “consensuses” would in turn provide the political foundation 
for China and ASEAN to “elevate their relationship to a new height” by advancing 
cooperation in seven areas. They included a China-ASEAN Treaty of Good 
Neighborliness and Cooperation; an upgraded ACFTA; connectivity; finance; 
maritime cooperation; security; and exchange in culture, technology, environment and 
other areas.18 
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The “2+7 cooperation framework” was largely an attempt to resell the Hu 
Jintao administration’s policy toward ASEAN countries. Like its predecessor, the Xi 
Jinping administration recognized the problem of trust in China’s relations with other 
member states. Economic leadership continued to be the means to address security 
issues, unite member states behind China’s purpose and maintain APT’s identity. The 
proposal of a China-ASEAN Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation, 
however, was China’s first attempt to redefine political cooperation on its own terms 
by applying its successful experience in the SCO to Southeast Asia.19 
 
Although ASEAN “welcomed” the “2+7 cooperation framework” and “looked 
forward to working closely with China to implement it” in 2014, the chairman’s 
statements of subsequent ASEAN-China summits merely “noted” the framework 
while emphasizing ASEAN countries’ desire to cooperate with China “on the basis of 
equality, mutual respect, benefit and consensus.”20 Meanwhile, no reference was made 
to the China-ASEAN Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation despite 
Beijing’s repeated calls to conclude the proposed treaty and build a “new platform for 
political-security cooperation.”21 Indeed, China’s growing power and “assertiveness” 
continued to fuel mistrust among some of its neighbors. For instance, Tuong Lai, who 
was advisor to two former Vietnamese prime ministers, viewed China’s maritime 
behavior as nothing but evidence of its expansionist intention. China’s objective, he 
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believed, was to challenge American dominance and turn Vietnam into a “vassal 
state.” 22 He went so far as to advocate an alliance with the United States against China, 
their “present-day enemy.”23 
 
5.2.1.1 The South China Sea Dispute 
As I argued in 4.2.1.1, nothing heightened mistrust of China more than the South 
China Sea dispute. During the Xi Jinping administration’s first term, the dispute 
escalated quickly with the Philippines’ initiation of an arbitration case against China’s 
sovereignty claims in January 2013. The rising power’s maritime behavior, 
meanwhile, continued to spark off violent anti-China protests across Vietnam. 24 
Tension reached its peak on the eve of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in 
favor of Manila in July 2016, though since then the Philippines had begun to mend its 
relations with China. Although institutional design meant that APT was never intended 
to be the principal platform for regional security cooperation, “ASEAN Plus One” 
continued to be an important platform for China to contain the dispute, mitigate 
mistrust and maintain collective purposes. 
 
Like its predecessor, the Xi Jinping administration continued to adopt a 
defensive posture. To uphold the Declaration on the Conduct in the South China Sea 
(DOC), China continued to confine discussion of the dispute largely to “ASEAN Plus 
One,” where Li Keqiang criticized “some extra-regional states” for their “high profile 
intervention” and “dramatization” of the dispute as “a question of peace, stability and 
freedom of navigation.”25 “These actions,” the Premier told his counterparts, “were 
not beneficial to all parties,” especially since East Asia had become “the motor for 
growth” of a lackluster global economy. Escalation of “regional hotspot issues” would 
“affect the confidence of extra-regional investors and the people.”26 He stressed that 
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freedom and safety of navigation in the South China Sea had always been guaranteed 
without being subject to any threats.27 
 
To maintain APT’s identity, the Xi Jinping administration adhered to its 
predecessor’s approach of separating economics from security. Speaking at the APT 
Senior Officials Meeting in June 2014, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin appealed 
to member states “not to forget their original goals” of “development” and “regional 
economic integration”; they should “focus on the big picture” of East Asian 
cooperation without letting “sensitive issues” disrupt cooperation. 28  Indeed, as Li 
Keqiang reminded his Southeast Asian counterparts, it was their countries’ 
commitment to economic development and “improvement of their peoples’ 
livelihood” that had contributed to regional stability; the maritime dispute “would not 
and should not affect the big picture of China-ASEAN relations.” 29 He called for all 
member states to abandon a “zero-sum mindset” and uphold peace and stability, so 
that no “contradictions” and “divergences” would strip East Asia of its “historic 
opportunity for development.”30 
 
Unlike its predecessor, however, the Xi Jinping administration sought to 
govern the South China Sea dispute by interim solutions. In his first attendance at the 
ASEAN-China Summit in 2013, Li Keqiang proposed “joint exploration” before the 
parties were able to resolve the dispute.31 One year after, China and ASEAN agreed 
on a “dual track” approach whereby they would resolve the South China Sea dispute 
through negotiation on the basis of “historical facts,” international law and the DOC, 
while working together to maintain peace and security in the region.32 
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One week after the ruling, China and ASEAN countries’ foreign ministers 
issued a joint statement reaffirming their governments’ commitment to the DOC’s 
“comprehensive and effective implementation.”33 Speaking at the 25th Anniversary 
Summit of the ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations in September, Li Keqiang 
applauded the joint statement for upholding the “effectiveness of the framework of 
regional rules” and the “right track of resolving the [dispute] through consultation and 
negotiation.” He emphasized that only when regional states “held in their own hands 
the key of dispute resolution” – the DOC – would they be able to promote peace and 
stability by working jointly toward the conclusion of a Code of Conduct in the South 
China Sea (COC). The Premier outlined “four points of vision” regarding COC 
negotiation, including formulation of a COC framework by mid-2017. Meanwhile, the 
Summit approved the “Guidelines for Hotline Communications among Senior 
Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of China and ASEAN Member States in 
Response to Maritime Emergencies” and the “Joint Statement on the Application of 
the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea.”34 Despite these 
efforts, low level of trust continued to confine Chinese institutional leadership largely 
to the economic domain. 
 
5.2.1.2 Non-Traditional Security 
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, structural, political and institutional 
constraints have since the beginning limited APT’s security function. Yet, however 
limited the institution’s achievements were, the inclusion of security as one of the 
seven areas of cooperation in the new “2+7 cooperation framework” indicated its 
importance to China. The BRI’s lack of an integrated institutional component 
underscored the role of existing institutional arrangements in providing security 
insurance to Beijing’s grand project. As the only exclusively East Asian institution, 
APT was one of the platforms for the rising power to realize its vision that the “security 
of Asia” would be maintained by “the people of Asia.”35 Nonetheless, as was the case 
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during the Hu Jintao era, structural, political and institutional constraints confined 
China’s leadership activities to small-scale, functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. 
 
Apart from maritime disputes, no issue accounted for the growing regional 
tension during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term more than the North Korean 
nuclear issue. Nevertheless, like his predecessor, Li Keqiang confined himself to 
reiterating China’s position in the APT Summits. 36  On the other hand, taking 
advantage of regional concern with nuclear proliferation, China sought to build trust 
and common purpose by reiterating its willingness to be the first nuclear-weapon state 
to accede to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
(SEANWFZ).37 Beijing’s initiative, however, did not received any response from its 
Southeast Asian neighbors. 
 
The Xi Jinping administration’s efforts in non-traditional security cooperation 
concentrated on institution and capacity building. In defense, Beijing held the first 
China-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal Meeting in 2015. Meanwhile, it proposed 
to conduct joint exercise and establish a “China-ASEAN defense hotline.”38 In law 
enforcement, Beijing likewise held the first China-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on 
Law Enforcement and Security Cooperation in 2015. It also proposed to establish 
dialogue and meeting mechanisms between maritime law enforcement agencies, 
establish a law enforcement college and train 2000 personnel from ASEAN countries 
between 2016 and 2020. 39  Like its offer to accede to SEANWFZ, China took 
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advantage of the terrorist attack in Davao City, the Philippines in 2016 by offering to 
establish jointly with its Southeast Asian neighbors a “special committee on long-term 
counter-terrorism.”40 
 
China also undertook initiatives in other areas of non-traditional security 
cooperation by supporting and soft selling. Having exercised joint leadership with 
Tokyo in the establishment of the APTERR, Beijing provided an additional one 
million dollars for its development.41 Apart from organizing roundtable, forums and 
training sessions, China commenced the building of a “modern agricultural 
cooperation demonstration base” and an “East Asian exchange platform of animal 
husbandry products,” while pledging to establish agricultural technology 
demonstration centers in ASEAN countries.42 In disaster relief, China provided 50 
million renminbi of aid for cooperation; it also financed cooperation initiatives in 
maritime rescue through the three-billion-renminbi China-ASEAN Maritime 
Cooperation Fund. 43  In environment, Beijing launched the building of a China-
ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Center and proposed the establishment of other 
exchange mechanisms.44 In public health, the Xi Jinping administration launched the 
“hundred talents program.” 45  These initiatives, however, remained small-scale, 
functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
 
Notwithstanding its expanding material investment in supporting and soft 
selling, China continued to trail behind Japan in the provision of financial aid in 
selected areas of non-traditional security cooperation. In disaster relief, for instance, 
Tokyo provided ASEAN countries with 2.7 billion US dollars of aid and training of 
                                                          
40 Li, “Remarks at the 19th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit cum China-ASEAN 25th Anniversary 
Commemorative Summit.” 
41 Keqiang Li [李克强], “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 16th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) 
Summit” [李克强总理在第 16 次东盟与中日韩(10+3)领导人会议上的讲话], Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, (10th October 2013), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/lhg_682542/zyjh_682552/t1087131.sh
tml  
42 Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 16th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit”; Li, “Premier Li 
Keqiang’s Remarks at the Seventeenth China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit”; Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s 
Remarks at the 18th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit”; Li, “Remarks at the Eighteenth ASEAN Plus 
Three (10+3) Summit”; Li, “Remarks at the 19th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Summit.” 
43 Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 16th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit.” 
44 Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 18th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit.” 
45 Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the Seventeenth China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit.” 
177 
 
1000 local personnel in 2015. In public health, it would employ from its 800-million-
dollar contributions to the G7 Global Fund to support public health capacity building 
in Southeast Asian countries.46 
 
The above discussion shows that structural, political and institutional 
constraints continued to restrict the scope and scale of political and security 
cooperation in APT. Although China sought to engage in hard selling in political 
cooperation by redefining collective purpose, the problem of trust arising from the 
South China Sea dispute continued to confine China’s leadership activities to 
functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
 
5.2.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation 
As 4.2.2 has shown, China’s leadership activities were concentrated in the economic 
domain during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. The launch of the BRI and 
other Chinese initiatives, however, represented a significant expansion of diplomatic 
and material investment in the rising power’s pursuit of institutional leadership in 
economic cooperation during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. Driven by 
international and domestic pressures, the Hu Jintao administration sought to 
consolidate East Asia’s geopolitical boundaries with EAFTA. To balance China’s 
growing influence, the United States, Japan and ASEAN sought to integrate the region 
into the broader constructs of “ASEAN Plus Six” or the Asia-Pacific with CEPEA, 
RCEP and TPP. Low level of trust prevented China from uniting member states behind 
its purpose and promoting APT’s adaptation to a changing international environment. 
 
Before Donald Trump decided to withdraw the United States from the TPP, 
Washington seemed to have gained the upper hand in the geoeconomic competition in 
East Asia, as it reached an agreement with other negotiating parties on the mega trade 
deal on 4th October 2015. 47  By removing trade barriers and setting “highest-
enforceable standards” on intellectual properties, labor rights and environmental 
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protection across the Asia-Pacific, the TPP in effect would prevent the resurgence of 
exclusive regionalism and separate China from the new regional economic order.48 It 
is not surprising, as 2.5.2 showed, that the TPP was perceived by China’s foreign 
policy elites as an attempt to contain the rising power. ASEAN, meanwhile, removed 
control over the “critical decisions” concerning regional free trade from APT and 
prevented China from dictating the geoeconomic definition of East Asia by including 
India, Australia and New Zealand in RCEP. Although China joined and supported 
RCEP, negotiations on the sixteen-member free trade agreement was stalled by the 
Association’s incapacity, the vast developmental gap among member states and 
anxiety about Chinese dominance.49  
 
The struggle for “survival space” in its periphery led to a shift in China’s 
leadership behavior from supporting and soft selling to hard selling.50 Although APT 
has since its inception exhibited a low level of multilateralism, the Hu Jintao 
administration more or less engaged member states as a group. As task took 
precedence over relationship, and as APT became increasingly divided, the Xi Jinping 
administration engaged in hard selling by redefining collective purposes and initiate 
structures of cooperation on its own terms. This was manifested in the concentration 
of Beijing’s diplomatic and material investment in the six of the seven key areas of 
cooperation under the “2+7 cooperation framework.” The need to mitigate mistrust 
and demonstrate China’s commitment to the status quo led Beijing to reaffirm 
ASEAN’s role in East Asian cooperation and emphasize the centrality of the ASEAN-
China framework in the BRI’s implementation. Nevertheless, the emphasis on control 
over task implementation led China to engage member states selectively rather than 
as a group; as a result, the locus of its activities shifted from the thirteen-member 
platform to parallel or subordinate mechanisms.  
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Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the TPP was considered 
by many a “serious mistake” that enabled China to fill the void in regional leadership.51 
Indeed, not only did China and other member states of APT continue to share a 
collective purpose of building an East Asian Economic Community by 2020; member 
states’ capability deficit and demand for public goods continued to provide China with 
a leadership opportunity. China’s projection of itself as a developing country further 
bolstered its ability to build collective purposes with the less developed ASEAN 
countries, the prime target followers of its institutional leadership. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that China offered to be APT’s “lead shepherd” in connectivity, trade and 
investment and poverty relief.52 
 
Nevertheless, with the exception of the “upgrading” of ACFTA, low level of 
trust continued to confine Chinese institutional leadership largely to functional tasks 
with low uncertainty and interdependence. While individual member states welcomed 
the BRI, there was little reference to the Chinese initiative in the chairman’s statements 
of both APT and ASEAN-China Summits.53 Moreover, the launch of the BRI, the 
AIIB and other Chinese-led initiatives heightened anxiety about China’s growing 
influence and escalated Sino-Japanese leadership competition. As Beijing and Tokyo 
sought to “outsell” each other, the locus of activities shifted from the thirteen-member 
platform to parallel or subordinate channels. Despite the shifting balance of power and 
Beijing’s expansion of material investment, China remained far from displacing 
Japan’s role in the supply of regional public goods. 
 
From this perspective, China’s hard selling did not maintain APT’s identity 
and promote its adaptation to a changing international environment, but rather 
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furthered its division and fragmentation. This represented an important change in the 
dynamics of China’s renegotiation with other regional stakeholders on the geopolitical 
definition of East Asia. Whereas the Hu Jintao administration sought to anchor East 
Asia to APT, the launch of the BRI, AIIB and other Chinese-led initiatives constituted 





5.2.2.2.1 ASEAN-China Free Trade Area 
As the previous chapter has shown, the Hu Jintao administration’s attempt to exercise 
institutional leadership in free trade through supporting and soft selling failed with the 
demise of EAFTA. Nevertheless, intensifying strategic competition and mounting 
pressures to “rebalance” the Chinese economy only heightened the importance of 
institutional leadership in regional free trade. As Li Keqiang pointed out at the 2016 
APT Summit, although trade between the thirteen countries reached 1300 billion 
dollars by 2015, it only constituted fifteen percent of the thirteen member states’ total 
foreign trade.54 The impasse of negotiations on both RCEP and the China-Japan-South 
Korea Free Trade Area led China to maintain APT’s collective purpose of building an 
East Asian Economic Community by focusing its engagement on ASEAN countries. 
As Xi Jinping unveiled the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, the AIIB and the China-
ASEAN community with a shared future to the Indonesia Parliament, he proposed to 
“upgrade” ACFTA with the aim of increasing China-ASEAN trade to over 1000 
billion dollars by 2020.55 
 
As one of the seven key areas of cooperation in the “2+7 cooperation 
framework,” the upgrading of ACFTA was among the greatest achievements of 
Chinese institutional leadership during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. As 
the first of the five free trade agreements concluded between ASEAN and its dialogue 
partners and the one with the highest usage, ACFTA provided the basis of trust for 
China to separate economics from security and accomplish a task with relatively high 
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uncertainty and interdependence. 56  One year after Xi Jinping’s address to the 
Indonesian Parliament, Li Keqiang affirmed China’s commitment to completing 
negotiations by the end of 2015. To expedite the process, Beijing would adopt an 
“open attitude” in exploring with its Southeast Asian counterparts the possibility of 
negotiating an investment treaty with pre-establishment national treatment and a 
negative list. 57 The protocol to upgrade ACFTA was signed on 21st November 2015.  
At the ASEAN-China Summit the next day, the Premier called for accelerating the 
protocol’s implementation by simplifying custom procedures as well as upgrading 
country of origin rules and other operational procedures.58 The protocol went into 
force in May the year after.  
 
Meanwhile, China continued to promote trade and investment facilitation with 
ASEAN countries on its own terms. In addition to existing initiatives such as the 
China-ASEAN Expo, Beijing provided 30 million renminbi to support economic and 
technological cooperation from 2014 to 2017; proposed the establishment of cross-
border economic cooperation zones and industrial parks; strengthened cooperation in 
areas including regulation, industrial connectivity, small-and-medium enterprises, 
agriculture, fisheries and forestry. 59 
 
5.2.2.2.2 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and East Asian 
Economic Integration 
Although the East Asia Vision Group II report declared the building of an East Asian 
Economic Community by 2020 as APT’s collective purpose, leadership deficit 
undermined the thirteen-member institution’s identity and hindered its adaptation to a 
changing international environment. Although ASEAN maintained its centrality and 
prevented China from dictating the geoeconomic definition of East Asia by launching 
RCEP, it was increasingly incapable of steering regional economic integration. 
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As the “critical decision” on regional free trade was removed from APT, the 
Xi Jinping administration confined itself largely to reiterating its support for ASEAN’s 
initiative and its call for accelerating East Asian economic integration. On the other 
hand, even though RCEP became the only framework available, Beijing continued to 
uphold APT as the “main channel” of regional cooperation. 60  At the 2014 APT 
Summit, Li Keqiang, while reiterating his call for member states to complete RCEP 
negotiations by the end of next year, emphasized that given the high degree of 
integration between member states’ economies, APT should “play a leading role in 
the making of regional free trade arrangements.”61 Since tension between the highly 
overlapping APT and EAS began to undermine the former’s identity, he stressed the 
need to clarify the relationship between the thirteen-member institution and other 
ASEAN-led platforms.62 
 
Nevertheless, RCEP negotiations did not progress as expected. Although 
China successfully concluded a bilateral free trade agreement with South Korea in 
June 2015, the deadlock in RCEP negotiations and the successful conclusion of the 
TPP in October seemed to give the United States at the time the upper hand in the 
geoeconomic competition in East Asia. 63  In response, Li Keqiang once again 
expressed China’s willingness to work together with other member states with the goal 
of completing negotiations by the end of 2016.64 Meanwhile, for the first time he stated 
the Xi Jinping administration’s position on the TPP. “China,” he said,  
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adopted an “open” attitude toward the TPP and believed that the TPP, RCEP 
and other regional free trade agreements could promote each other’s 
development, contributing together to the common goal of establishing a Free 
Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).65 
Nevertheless, continued stalemate in RCEP negotiations seemed to lead Beijing to 
shift its focus away from ASEAN’s regional free trade scheme. At the 2016 APT 
summit, Li Keqiang only reiterated China’s support for ASEAN’s central role in 
RCEP negotiations and its hope that member states could accelerate and complete 
negotiations “as soon as possible.”66 
 
The shift of the institutional locus of the renegotiation on East Asian free trade 
from APT “upward” to EAS and “downward” to “ASEAN Plus Ones” indicated not 
only the thirteen-member grouping’s institutional deficit, but also China’s inability to 
exercise institutional leadership by instilling the “values” and “competence” into APT 
in order to promote its adaption to a changing international environment. Indeed, other 
than expressing its willingness to cooperate with member states in areas such as e-
commerce and logistics, Beijing only proposed and supported small-scale, functional 
tasks including an East Asian Investment Summit, an East Asian Commercial Forum 
or an APT Service Alliance of Small and Medium Enterprises.67 
 
5.2.2.2 Finance 
With major institution and capacity building initiatives including CMIM, AMRO and 
CGIF, finance was the area wherein APT cooperation and China’s quest for 
institutional leadership achieved the greatest progress during the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term. Nevertheless, CMIM’s idleness was a manifestation of 
APT’s institutional and leadership deficit.68 Thus even though East Asia demonstrated 
a much higher level of resilience in the global financial crisis than the Asian financial 
crisis a decade before, there was continuing concern with the vulnerability of 
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individual member states and the region as a whole. Notwithstanding the common 
purpose of member states to strengthen regional financial institutions, the Xi Jinping 
administration’s first term did not see comparable progress in cooperation.  
 
ASEAN’s prioritization of connectivity, together with China and Japan’s grand 
initiatives in infrastructure investment, shifted the focus of financial cooperation to 
infrastructure finance. The establishment of the AIIB and other Chinese-controlled 
facilities represented the Xi Jinping administration’s attempt at hard selling by 
redefining collective purpose and initiating structures of cooperation on its own terms. 
Beijing’s hard selling, however, not only did not change APT’s leadership deficit but 
escalated Sino-Japanese competition and hence furthered the thirteen-member 
grouping’s fragmentation. Even though the rising power took a greater share of 
leadership, it did not displace Japan’s role in the supply of regional financial public 
goods. 
 
5.2.2.3.1 Infrastructure Finance 
The AIIB symbolized China’s attempt at hard selling by redefining collective purpose 
and initiating structures of cooperation on its own terms. As the previous chapter has 
shown, China and other member states had been searching for “new arrangements” 
for development financing since the global financial crisis. 69  Establishment of 
facilities such as the APT Cooperation Fund, however, continued to fall short of 
meeting the needs of infrastructure finance in Asia, which the ADB estimated required 
as much as 8 trillion dollars. 
 
Soon after it took office, the Xi Jinping administration proposed the idea of an 
“ASEAN Plus Three Infrastructure Bond.” 70  Similar to the various funds its 
predecessor established or supported, an infrastructure bond could not match up to the 
Japanese-led ADB, which was planning at the time to expand the lending capacity of 
its newly-established Asian Infrastructure Fund (AIF).71 In subsequent ministerial and 
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senior officials meetings, however, China’s proposal changed to a vague “financing 
platform.” 72  It soon became clear that ASEAN countries were the prime target 
followers, as manifested in China’s invitation to its Southeast Asian neighbors to 
“jointly explore the building of an Asian investment and financing platform” that 
could “ensure liquidity for their [ASEAN countries’] infrastructure investment.”73  
 
China’s proposal finally took the form of a regional multilateral development 
bank when Xi Jinping addressed the Indonesian Parliament in October.74 Barely seven 
days later, Li Keqiang raised the idea again at the ASEAN-China Summit. The AIIB, 
he said, would “serve primarily to provide a financing platform for connectivity 
projects in ASEAN countries and the region.75 Interestingly, he did not raise the idea 
at the APT Summit the next day.76 China’s success in redefining collective purpose 
and mobilize member states behind it was manifested in the fact that all APT countries 
except Japan joined the AIIB as founding members in 2015. From then on, Li Keqiang 
continued to stress that China would give priority to providing infrastructure finance 
to ASEAN countries.77 Of the 20 projects the AIIB approved during the Xi Jinping 
administration’s first term, 6 were in or aimed at ASEAN countries, which made 
Southeast Asia the second largest aid destination behind South Asia.78  
The AIIB symbolized a change not only in China’s leadership behavior, but 
also in its approach toward the geopolitical econstruction of East Asia. Whereas the 
Hu Jintao administration sought to anchor East Asia to APT, the AIIB represented the 
Xi Jinping administration’s attempt to reintegrate the region into an expanding, Sino-
centric geopolitical construct of periphery. The need to mitigate mistrust, however, 
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meant that the new multilateral development bank was presented as a complement 
rather than a challenge to the status quo. As Xi Jinping stressed, the AIIB should  
uphold open regionalism, play a complementary role with existing 
multilateral development banks, revitalize the existing multilateral system 
with its advantages and characteristics, [and] promote the common 
development of multilateral institutions.79 
 
While some such as Tay argued that ASEAN countries joined the AIIB in order 
to gain leverage over its operation and hence prevent it from becoming an instrument 
of Chinese dominance, Beijing’s success in mobilizing their support was attributed 
largely to the nature of the task. 80 As a channel of public goods, the AIIB performs 
tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence that did not require member states to 
give China “discretion over outcomes previously controlled by themselves.”81  
 
Besides the AIIB, China established or utilized other facilities for hard selling. 
The three billion-renminbi China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, which was 
established in 2011, financed 17 projects in economic cooperation, connectivity, 
maritime rescue and environmental conservation by the end of 2013.82 In 2014, the 
second phase of capitalization for the China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund 
began. The China Development Bank, meanwhile, would provide a “special loan” of 
10 billion dollars for infrastructure development in ASEAN countries.83. The 40-
billion-renminbi Silk Road Fund would also give priority to financing connectivity 
projects. Together these facilities formed a new structure of cooperation through 
which China promoted ASEAN countries’ capacity building. 
 
Regardless of China’s objective, the BRI and the AIIB challenged Japan’s 
regional leadership in infrastructure finance. Tokyo, which expanded its engagement 
                                                          
79 Jinping Xi [习近平], “Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank” [在亚洲基础设施投资银行开业仪式上的致辞], People’s Daily [人民日报], (16th January 
2016), http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0116/c64094-28060298.html  
80 Simon Tay, “A New Bank for Asia, not China,” The Jakarta Post, (18th October 2014), Factiva. 
81 Hoffman, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” 385. 
82 Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 16th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit.” 
83 Li, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the Seventeenth China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit”; Li, 
“Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 18th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit”; “Premier Li Attends 




with Southeast Asia even before China embarked on the BRI, responded by launching 
the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI).84 Implemented through 
bodies and mechanisms including the Japan Bank for International Cooperation 
(JBIC), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japan Oil, Gas and 
Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) and the Nippon Export and Investment 
Insurance (NEXI), the EPQI aimed to provide 200 billion dollars to finance 
infrastructure development in Southeast Asia and the world from 2016 to 2020.85 In 
addition, Tokyo expanded the ADB’s lending capacity by 50%.86 What distinguished 
the EPQI from the BRI, however, was Tokyo’s emphasis on the need for development 
finance to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law.87 The Sino-Japanese 
competition to outsell each other intensified the contest over the geopolitical definition 
of East Asia.  
 
Notwithstanding Beijing’s new initiatives, Chinese institutional leadership 
remained limited. As Miller pointed out, the AIIB’s paid-up capital was much smaller 
than its authorized capital of 100 billion dollars; even its plan to provide annual 
financial aid of two billion dollars from 2016 to 2020 still fell short of the amount 
provided by other multilateral development banks. 88 As China and Japan sought to 
outsell each other, the locus of collective action shifted further from the multilateral 
APT to “ASEAN Plus Ones” and other parallel platforms. As a result, China’s 
initiatives, rather than promoting APT’s identity, furthered its division and 
fragmentation. 
 
5.2.2.3.2 Development Assistance 
As the previous chapter has shown, China’s activities of supporting during the Hu 
Jintao administration’s second term aimed primarily at promoting capacity building 
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of the less developed ASEAN countries. Given the importance of closing the regional 
development gap as one of APT’s collective purposes and China’s self-projection as 
the representative of developing countries, it is not surprising that Beijing offered to 
be the “lead shepherd” in poverty alleviation.89 Yet, unlike its predecessor, the Xi 
Jinping administration sought to engage in hard selling by making “critical decisions” 
on institution building on its own terms. 
 
The launch of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) in 2014 represented 
China’s another success in redefining collective purpose and initiating structure of 
cooperation on its own terms. Comprised of China and the five riparian ASEAN 
countries of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam, LMC redefined and 
accomplished the collective purpose originating in Thailand’s call to enhance 
cooperation two years before on Chinese terms. In the first heads of state/government 
meeting in March 2016, China and member states agreed that political-security, 
economic and sustainable development, and socio-cultural cooperation would form 
the three “pillars” of cooperation, with connectivity, production capacity, cross-border 
economy, water resources, agriculture and poverty reduction as five priority areas. 
Beijing proposed a range of cooperation initiatives and concluded 45 “early harvest 
projects” like the Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Center with its 
counterparts. The Lancang-Mekong Project Fund, meanwhile, was established to 
support exchange and cooperation projects.90 Aiming to build a “Lancang-Mekong 
community with a shared future,” LMC represented China’s attempt to prevent the 
United States and Japan from dictating the geopolitical definition of the subregion 
through the Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), Japan-Mekong Cooperation (JMC) and 
the ADB-led Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) program. 
 
Whereas LMC engaged a geographically specific group of member states, the 
East Asian Cooperation Initiative on Poverty Reduction was directed at all of APT’s 
less developed member states. In 2014, China would provide 100 million renminbi for 
“demonstration sites” and other projects for village poverty reduction. 91 One year 
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later, it pledged to provide another three billion renminbi of gratuitous aid and 
concluded cooperation agreements with member states in small infrastructure 
building, public services and knowledge exchange.92 In 2016, China and Laos jointly 
proposed that the APT Summit issued a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in 
Sustainable Development. Li Keqiang also called for cooperation between the “Plus 
Three” countries in using their capability advantage to promote sustainable 
development in ASEAN countries.93 
 
5.2.2.3.3 Other Areas of Financial Cooperation 
Although China under Xi Jinping concentrated its efforts on the AIIB, Beijing also 
sought institutional leadership in other areas of financial cooperation by soft selling, 
though the scale of its activities were highly limited. In his first attendance at the 
ASEAN-China and the APT Summit, Li Keqiang called for member states to explore 
the possibility of formulating a “future roadmap for regional financial cooperation” 
that would lead to the establishment of an “Asian monetary stabilization system,” an 
“Asian credit system” and an “Asia investment financing cooperation system.”94 As 
“certain country’s policy of quantitative easing” and other global financial risks began 
to affect regional economic and financial stability, the Premier emphasized at the APT 
Summit two years later that “the building of an Asian financial system was 
unavoidable.”95 To promote cooperation, he proposed that member states issued a 
“joint declaration on the promotion of economic growth and financial stability”, 
formulated a “blueprint of East Asian Economic Community” and established an 
Association of Asian Financial Cooperation.96 
 
Nevertheless, other than AMRO’s elevation as an international organization 
and CGIF’s capital expansion, no comparable progress was achieved in the building 
of a “regional financial security net” as it was in infrastructure finance. Throughout 
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the Xi Jinping administration’s first term, China’s efforts were confined to general 
calls for strengthening existing mechanisms. To enhance CMIM’s utility, China 
recommended improving the foreign exchange reserve pool’s operating procedures, 
promoting usage of the new preventive loan facilities and conducting interim 
assessment.97 Likewise, Beijing stressed the need to improve AMRO’s governance 
structure and develop its institutional linkages with other regional mechanisms. 98 To 
build a more robust, less dollar-dependent regional financial system, it continued to 
call for strengthening clearing institutions, expanding the arrangements for local 
currency swap and settlement, and exploring the inclusion of local currencies in 
foreign exchange reserves. 99 To promote the development of an Asian bond market, 
China offered to introduce preferential measures for ASEAN countries’ monetary 
authorities and investment institutions when they invest in China’s bond market.100 
High level of uncertainty and interdependence of some of the proposed tasks, together 
with low level of trust between China and member states, mean that many of these 
proposals were yet to be implemented. 
 
5.2.2.3 Infrastructure 
As the previous chapter has shown, connectivity became a priority in APT’s agenda 
after the global financial crisis. Under Hu Jintao, China promoted the collective 
purpose defined by ASEAN through supporting and soft selling. Under Xi Jinping, 
however, China not only offered to be the “lead shepherd” in connectivity; it redefined 
the collective purpose and initiated structures of cooperation on its own terms with the 
BRI, the AIIB and other initiatives. China’s hard selling shifted the locus of its 
activities further from APT to “ASEAN Plus One” and other parallel platforms. 
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During the Xi Jinping administration’s first term, China sought to promote 
strategic planning and capacity building on its own terms. Apart from reiterating the 
need to more fully utilize existing mechanisms, Li Keqiang suggested concluding 
cooperation agreements in transportation, technology and information and 
communication.101 While supporting the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 
and offering to integrate the BRI with ASEAN countries’ development strategies, he 
called for member states to aim at the formulation of a “master plan on East Asia 
connectivity.102 Meanwhile, China employed its advantageous capabilities to promote 
member states’ capacity building. For instance, Beijing provided 30 million renminbi 
for the establishment of a platform for East Asian maritime cooperation. 103  To 
promote information connectivity, it proposed to establish a China-ASEAN 
Cooperation Mechanism for Computational Emergency Response and a China-
ASEAN Informational Port.104 
 
China’s domestic economic challenges and ASEAN countries’ capability 
deficit provided the incentives for the Xi Jinping administration to export the country’s 
surplus production capacity by hard selling. As Li Keqiang said at the 2015 China-
ASEAN Summit, China was willing to consider Southeast Asia an “important 
destination” for production capacity cooperation.105 To support capacity building in 
less developed ASEAN countries, China proposed cooperation and production transfer 
in areas including infrastructure, machinery, electricity, construction materials, 
communication and industrial parks.106 Beijing’s efforts to engage ASEAN countries 
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led to the issuance of a China-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Production 
Capacity at the 2016 ASEAN-China Summit.107  
 
Meanwhile, as China, Japan and South Korea strengthened production 
capacity cooperation in manufacturing and service industries,108 Beijing proposed to 
work with Tokyo and Seoul in supporting logistics and supply chain development in 
ASEAN countries in order to expedite regional economic integration.109 Nevertheless, 
to mitigate member states’ mistrust of China, the Xi Jinping administration repeatedly 
emphasized that production capacity cooperation was ASEAN-centric and mutually 
beneficial. As Li Keqiang stated at the 2016 APT Summit, China would cooperate 
with member states “on the basis of voluntariness, equality and mutual benefit,” with 
the aim to “connect [its development] with the demands of ASEAN countries,” 
promote their industrialization and upgrade their industries.110 
 
Nevertheless, despite China’s growing capabilities, the Xi Jinping 
administration faced the same problem of implementation that had impeded the 
development of East Asian regionalism. The “ASEAN Way,” in particular, means that 
China’s control over task implementation remained severely limited. The most notable 
example of ineffectiveness is the construction of the Pan Asian Railway, which was 
first agreed in 2006. 111  Although construction of the China-Thai railway was 
announced in 2014, the project did not proceed until the end of 2016, when the first 
contract was granted for the construction of a section of only 3.5km.112 The progress 
since then had been less than satisfactory. Likewise, despite repeated calls from China, 
the China-Laos railway did not begin construction until the end of 2016. 113  The 
                                                          
107 Li Keqiang, “Remarks at the 19th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit cum China-ASEAN 25th 
Anniversary Commemorative Summit.” 
108 Li Keqiang, “Remarks at the 18th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Summit.” 
109 Li Keqiang, “Remarks at the 19th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Summit.” 
110 Li Keqiang, “Remarks at the 18th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Summit”; Li Keqiang, “Remarks at 
the 19th ASEAN Plus Three (10+3) Summit.” 
111 James Kynge, Michael Peel and Ben Bland, “China’s Railway Diplomacy Hits the Buffers,” 
Financial Times, (17th July 2017),  https://www.ft.com/content/9a4aab54-624d-11e7-8814-
0ac7eb84e5f1  
112 Michael Peel and Lucy Hornby, “China Regional Rail Venture Struggles to Gather Steam,” 
Financial Times, (25th September 2016),  https://www.ft.com/content/76806da6-8190-11e6-8e50-
8ec15fb462f4 
113 Li Keqiang, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 16th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit.”; Li 
Keqiang, “Premier Li Keqiang’s Remarks at the 18th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit.” 
193 
 
Jakarta-Bandung high-speed rail, another “flagship project,” was in abeyance five 
days after it was formally launched due to concerns over China’s position on sovereign 
guarantee, as Beijing “snatched” the deal from Tokyo by offering to undertake the 
project without financial guarantee from Jakarta.114 
 
Some of these projects involved problems of implementation; yet more of them 
were not implemented as expected due to negative perception of China’s growing 
influence, poor record in delivery and business practices.115 Certainly the problem of 
implementation could be attributed to the domestic problems of individual partner 
countries; nevertheless, it also revealed the limitations of hard selling. While seeking 
to define and accomplish collective purposes on its own terms, China could not 
enforce cooperation by directing. Moreover, even though hard selling indicates the 
precedence of task over relationship, the problem of implementation indicates the 
indispensability of trust to effective leadership. 
 
As I discussed earlier in 5.2.2.3.1, China’s expansion of diplomatic and 
material investment through hard selling escalated Sino-Japanese competition within 
APT and great power competition in East Asia. Having long exercised institutional 
leadership over regional infrastructure development through the ADB, Japan launched 
the EPQI in response to the BRI. Speaking at the Banquet of the 21st International 
Conference on the Future of Asia, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made an thinly 
veiled criticism of China’s geoeconomic initiative when he argued that countries 
should strive for “quality as well as quantity” in infrastructure development.116 Indeed, 
China’s influence should not be overstated. Notwithstanding the shifting regional 
balance of economic power, China continued to trail behind Japan, the United States 
and the EU in FDI. Between 2013 and 2016, Japan’s FDI remained more than double 
that of China. While China surpassed Japan in FDI in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
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Vietnam, Chinese FDI was less than South Korean FDI by more than five billion 
dollars.117 
 
In response to Japan’s initiative, Foreign Minister Wang Yi stressed that 
China had no intention to compete with others. Yet certain countries, without 
any intention to engage in genuine cooperation, always sought to challenge 
China. This was ungentlemanly. Each country should utilize its own advantage 
and work practically on its own tasks.118 
As was the case in Sino-Japanese competition over the “critical decisions” concerning 
regional free trade and finance during the Hu Jintao era, ASEAN did not take side with 
China or Japan, but instead taking advantage of their leadership competition to 
maintain its centrality. The Chairman’s Statements of the APT Summits in 2015 and 
2016 “welcomed” both the AIIB and the EPQI in promoting infrastructure 
development in the region.119 Wang Yi’s words corresponded with the views of many 
in China’s foreign policy elites, as discussed in Chapter two, that it’s not China’s 
action but the misperception of other countries that generated tension and competition. 
 
5.2.2.4 Social and Cultural Cooperation 
As the previous chapter has shown, socio-cultural cooperation was critical area of 
cooperation for China. The shifting distribution of power, China’s behavior in 
maritime disputes and the expansion of diplomatic efforts with the launch of the BRI 
exacerbated the mistrust of the rising power among its neighbors. Beijing’s awareness 
of the problem of trust was manifested in the emphasis of connectivity in people-to-
people ties in the Xi Jinping administration’s grand project. The importance of soft 
power diplomacy led China to be the “lead shepherd” in APT cooperation in public 
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broadcasting.120 If the Hu Jintao administration devoted major efforts to its quest for 
institutional leadership in tourism, cultural exchange, education and research, the Xi 
Jinping administration did anything but strengthened those efforts. 
 
Calling for the conclusion of agreements and establishment of 
intergovernmental mechanisms, China proposed the goal to increase the number of 
tourists to 30 million by 2020. 121  Meanwhile, the Xi Jinping administration launched 
multiple initiatives to promote cultural exchange. In his first attendance of the China-
ASEAN Summit, Li Keqiang announced China’s injection of 200 million renminbi 
for cultural exchange and cooperation in capacity building.122 At the APT Summit one 
year after, the Premier expressed China’s willingness to allot 65 million renminbi from 
the Asian Regional Cooperation Fund in support of exchange and cooperation projects 
in the region.123 
 
Education and Research continued to be integral to China’s efforts to exercise 
institutional leadership in economic cooperation. In 2013, Li Keqiang offered to 
provide fifteen thousand scholarships in the next three to five years and built more 
education centers oriented to ASEAN countries. One year after, China launched 
construction of the second batch of China-ASEAN Education Training Centers and 
supported 100 youth scientists from ASEAN countries to conduct research in China 
in the next three years.124 Since then Beijing has introduced other scholarship schemes 
including the “Upgraded China-ASEAN Exchange Plan of Double Hundred 
Thousand” and the China-ASEAN Maritime Silk Road Scholarships.125 The aim was 
to increase the number of student exchange to 300 thousands by 2025. To promote 
cooperation in technology, China would build a China-ASEAN Center for 
Technological Innovation and continue to implement the China-ASEAN 
Technological Partnership Scheme.126 
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Nevertheless, this explains the challenge China faced in balancing relationship and 
task in its attempt to exercise leadership. Indeed, this and the previous chapter have 
shown that while the growth of Chinese power enabled Beijing to provide the public 
goods that other states needed, success in selling an initiative, especially a task with 
high uncertainty and interdependence, depends on high degree of trust. China’s 
“assertiveness” in maritime disputes, negative perception of China’s growing 
economic influence in Southeast Asia, and deep-seated suspicion of the rising power’s 
intentions prevented Beijing from uniting member states behind its purpose. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT during 
the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. The launch of the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road, the AIIB and other mechanisms represented a shift in China’s leadership 
behavior from supporting and soft selling to hard selling. As task took precedence over 
relationship, Beijing, while continuing to reaffirm ASEAN centrality in East Asian 
cooperation, sought to redefine collective purposes and initiate structures of 
cooperation on its own terms. Yet, notwithstanding its growing capacity to provide 
what member states needed, China was far from displacing Japan’s role in the supply 
of regional public goods. Most importantly, the Xi Jinping administration was unable 
to overcome the problem of trust that hampered its predecessor’s pursuit of 
institutional leadership in APT after the global financial crisis. Anxiety about China’s 
growing influence, mistrust of its purpose and negative perception of its behavior 
prevented the rising power from initiating high-level political, security and economic 
cooperation. Except the upgrading of ACFTA, the tasks that the Xi Jinping 
administration accomplished, including the establishment of the AIIB, remained 
functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
 
China’s expanding diplomatic and material investment did not promote APT’s 
development but rather furthered its fragmentation. Even if the thirteen-member 
institution was not “dead,” it was unable to adapt fully to a changing international 
environment. Sino-Japanese leadership competition and the shift of the locus of 
activities to parallel mechanisms undermined the collective purposes that held member 
states together. On the other hand, China’s hard selling and APT’s fragmentation 
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represented a change in the rising power’s approach toward the geopolitical 
reconstruction of East Asia. The launch of the BRI, the AIIB and other Chinese-led 
mechanisms meant that Beijing, rather than anchoring the region to APT, sought to 
reintegrate it into an expanding, Sino-centric geopolitical construct of periphery. 
 
Chapters four and five demonstrated that the shift in the regional balance of 
power did not end but opened the questions of what China wanted to do and could do 
with its newfound capabilities. While the rising power intended to renegotiate the 
international order, it was yet capable of fully turning its power into leadership for 
change. If structural, political and institutional constraints hampered China’s quest for 
institutional leadership in the ASEAN-led institution, would Beijing find a more 
favorable leadership opportunity in an institution it founded, and in a region where the 
penetration of American power and the liberal international order was far more 
limited? It is for this question that we turn to the study of China’s leadership behavior 
in the SCO in the next two chapters.
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6. The Hu Jintao Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
2007-2012 
 
The previous two chapters examined China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT 
in the first decade after the global financial crisis. Increasing pressures for change led 
to a shift in its leadership behavior from supporting and soft selling under Hu Jintao 
to hard selling under Xi Jinping. Although China demonstrated increasing capacity for 
providing regional public goods, structural, political and institutional constraints 
prevented it from mobilizing member states as a group behind its purpose. In particular, 
low level of trust confined Chinese institutional leadership to economic, functional 
tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. China’s hard selling under Xi Jinping 
not only failed to maintain APT’s identity and promote its adaptation to a changing 
international environment; it furthered the thirteen-member grouping’s fragmentation. 
Nonetheless, China’s behavioral change had important implications for the 
geopolitical reconstruction of East Asia. Whereas the Hu Jintao administration sought 
to anchor East Asia to APT, the Xi Jinping administration’s launch of the BRI, AIIB 
and other initiatives represented an attempt to reintegrate the region into an expanding, 
Sino-centric geopolitical construct of periphery. 
 
Though historically conceived as part of East Asia, China has what Cohen calls 
a “continental-maritime split personality.” 1  In the East, it boasts a long Pacific 
coastline; in the West, its vast territory extends to the Eurasian “heartland.” This has 
led strategic thinkers from Mackinder to Brzezinski to argue that China could one day 
mount a challenge for global dominance. 2  This also explains the geostrategic 
imaginations of the SCO in the West as the “NATO in the East” or even the “most 
dangerous organization Americans have never heard of.”3 If East Asia imposed severe 
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constraints on China’s action, Central Asia seemed to be, in General Liu Yazhou’s 
words, “the thickest piece of cake” the heavens have ever given to the rising power.4  
 
Indeed, China’s economic preponderance was more apparent in Central than 
East Asia, especially since the penetration of American power and the liberal 
international order has been far more limited in the former than the latter. Moreover, 
not only did China and other founding SCO member states successfully resolved all 
border disputes; they have continued to share similar political values and culture.5 The 
signing of the Treaty of Long-Term Good Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation 
among SCO Member States at the 2007 Bishkek Summit, according to Hu Jintao, 
“instill[ed] a powerful momentum to the organization’s development.”6 Nevertheless, 
to many Central Asian experts, the same year saw the beginning of the SCO’s “growth 
crisis.”7 Nevertheless, if external crisis were the catalyst for cooperation and change, 
would China be able to promote the SCO’s adaptation to a changing international 
environment after the global financial crisis? 
 
This and the next chapter examine China’s leadership behavior in the SCO. 
Despite the differences between the SCO and APT, China’s experience in the two 
regional institutions was highly similar. Although the SCO was established first and 
foremost for security cooperation, structural, political and institutional constraints 
severely restricted its security functions. While limiting its leadership activities in 
security cooperation to small-scale institution and capacity building, China under Hu 
Jintao invested most of its efforts in promoting economic cooperation in the SCO by 
supporting and soft selling. Nevertheless, as was the case in APT, low level of trust 
prevented China from uniting member states behind its preferences in the “critical 
decisions” concerning the SCO’s institutional development. In particular, Russia’s 
leadership aspirations led Moscow to block its proposals of a free trade area, a 
                                                          
4 Edward Wong, “China Quietly Extends Footprints into Central Asia,” The New York Times, (2nd 
January 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/asia/03china.html  
5 Interviewee 12, Beijing, 8th April 2016. 
6 Jintao Hu [胡锦涛], “Strengthen Neighborliness and Mutual Trust, Promote Peaceful Development 
– Remarks at the Seventh Heads of State Council Meeting of SCO Member States” [加强睦邻互信、
推动和平发展—在上海合作组织成员国元首理事会第七次会议上的讲话]，Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, (16th August 2007), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zyjh_674906/t352274.shtml 
7 Marlene Laruelle and Sebastian Peyrouse, The Chinese Question in Central Asia: Domestic Order, 
Social Change and the Chinese Factor, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 164. 
200 
 
development fund and a development bank, while pushing for India’s accession to the 
organization as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence in Central Asia. 
Chinese institutional leadership, as a result, was confined to functional tasks with low 
uncertainty and interdependence. 
  
6.1 Origins, Structure and Operation 
 
6.1.1 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Rebuilding of 
Regional Order in Central Asia 
Like APT, the SCO embodies a critical juncture in Central Asian regionalism. Hailed 
by Chinese scholars as a “miracle” in the country’s diplomacy, the SCO has its origins 
in China’s initiative to stabilize its Northwest at the end of the Cold War.8 The collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the independence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan posed the problem of order to China, itself also in a beleaguered position 
after the Tiananmen Incident. As 2.5.2 has shown, China’s geostrategic orientation 
toward East Asia and the imperative of “biding its time and hiding its capabilities” 
rendered the promotion of a peaceful and stable Central Asia its foremost objective. 
China adhered to the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” as the basis of its 
relations with Moscow; meanwhile, it undertook initiatives to reassure its newly 
independent neighbors, for instance by pledging not to use nuclear weapons against 
Kazakhstan.9 
 
Resolution of border disputes, however, was the key to relationship 
development. While resuming border negotiations with Russia that began prior to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, China started border talks with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. These bilateral negotiations led to the signing of the Agreement on 
Confidence-Building in the Military Field along in the Border Areas (关于在边境地
区加强军事领域信任的协定) in 1996 and the Agreement on the Mutual Reduction 
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of Military Forces in the Border Areas (关於在邊境地區相互裁減軍事力量的协定
) one year after. By codifying shared rules and norms, the two landmark agreements 
set off what Tang Shiping calls the “institutionalization of regional peace” that paved 
the way for the eventual settlement of border issues.10 
 
China’s efforts in supporting, brokering and soft selling were crucial to the 
development of a dialogue and meeting mechanism into an intergovernmental 
organization.11 As the SCO’s first Secretary-General Zhang Deguang recalled, after 
the signing of the two agreements, the need for another summit the year after was 
called into question. Citing domestic reasons, Russian President Boris Yeltsin would 
only dispatch Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov to the proposed Almaty Summit. 
To sustain the momentum of cooperation, Jiang Zemin set aside diplomatic protocol 
to attend the summit.12 Jiang’s decision proved to be significant, since not only did the 
five states agree to regularize the meetings and extend cooperation from security to 
other areas; the format of meetings would also change thereafter from bilateral to 
multilateral.13 Success of the “Shanghai Five” process and the growing threats of the 
“three forces” of “terrorism, separatism and extremism” led Beijing to propose the 
establishment of a regional organization, mobilize the support of its partners and 
broker the agreement on Uzbekistan’s participation prior to the 2001 Shanghai 
Summit.14 With the accession of India and Pakistan in 2017, the SCO has become the 
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world’s largest regional organization, accounting for 44% of world population, 21% 
of world GDP and 13% of world trade; four of the eight member states, meanwhile, 
are nuclear powers.15 
 
The establishment of the SCO embodied the role of Chinese institutional 
leadership at a “critical juncture” for Central Asian regionalism. Nevertheless, the 
institutional bargain did not end the contest over the region’s membership, structures 
and values. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of over a 
century of Russian rule, Moscow’s influence continued to manifest itself in the region 
in many dimensions. 16  Though no longer harboring irredentist ambitions, Russia 
sought to reestablish its preeminence in the post-Soviet space.17 Multilateralism was 
as much an instrument for Russia as for China to renegotiate the geopolitical definition 
of Central Asia. While the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) turned out to 
be a failure, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC), both of which overlap with the SCO in 
membership and function, would constrain the possibilities of both the Chinese-led 
organization and Chinese institutional leadership. As this and the following chapter 
will show, Russia’s regional security presence, its leadership aspirations  and lingering 
mistrust of China resulted in an ongoing negotiation between Beijing and Moscow on 
the “critical decisions” regarding the SCO’s membership, institution building and 
external relations. 
 
As Russia sought to reestablish its preeminence in Central Asia, external forces 
attemped to embed their interests in the newly independent region through different 
forms of institutional linkages. Although the United States and the EU began to extend 
the liberal international order to Central Asia soon after the end of the Cold War, the 
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2001 war in Afghanistan changed the dynamics of renegotiation on the geopolitical 
definition of the region. American military presence, Western control of energy 
resources and promotion of democracy and human rights constituted an attempt to 
integrate Central Asia into the liberal international order. As the following discussion 
will show, even though China strove to preserve the SCO’s identity as “non-alliance, 
non-confrontational and not targeted at third party,” the penetration of American 
power into Central Asia was perceived by Beijing and other member states as a major 
security threat.18 Great power competition has revived the geopolitical imagination of 
the region as the arena of a new “great game.”19 
 
Although the “great game” has continued to dominate the international 
discourse on international relations in Central Asia, it would be wrong to overlook the 
agency of the Central Asian states in the grand renegotiation. As early as 1994, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan established the Central Asian Union (CAU) 
– subsequently renamed the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU) and then the 
Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO) – in order to strengthen regional 
cooperation and integration. In particular, Kazakhstan has projected a vision of 
Eurasianism that would position itself and Central Asia in the heart of Eurasia. 
Astana’s leadership aspirations found their embodiments in its multilateral initiatives, 
from President Nursultan Nazabayev’s idea of a Eurasian Union to the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA).20 In this regard, the 
geopolitical definition of Central Asia was no less contested than that of East Asia.  
 
On the other hand, the fragility of Central Asian states not only made them 
vulnerable to political instability, but also turned the region into a breeding ground for 
non-traditional security threats from terrorism, transnational crime to drug-trafficking. 
Nevertheless, how to address non-traditional security threats would become the focal 
point of the renegotiation on Central Asian regional order. As the following discussion 
will show, although the SCO was established first and foremost for security 
                                                          
18 “Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” [上海合作组织成立
宣言], The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (15th June 2001), http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/  
19 See, for example, Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in 
Central Asia, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
20 Annette Bohr, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old Regional Order,” International 
Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 3, (2004), 486-9. 
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cooperation, structural, political and institutional constraints severely restricted the 
organization’s function. 
 
6.1.2 The Shanghai Spirit 
While many inside and outside China, as I mentioned in chapters one and two, argue 
that the rising power lacks a comprehensive, clear vision of international order, the 
“Shanghai Spirit” (上海精神) of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, 
respect for diverse civilizations, seeking common development” (互信、互利、平等
、协商、尊重多样文明、谋求共同发展) embodied China’s attempt to put its 
embryonic ideas into practice.21 As the wording suggests, the “Shanghai Spirit” is 
highly consistent with the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and “New Security 
Concept.”22 On the other hand, it is a testament to China’s flexibility in applying 
successful experience in one region to another, as Beijing first proposed the “New 
Security Concept” at the 1997 ARF Ministerial Meeting. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the Xi Jinping administration, in turn, sought to apply its experience 
in Central Asia to East Asia by proposing the signing of a China-ASEAN Treaty of 
Good Neighborliness and Cooperation. 
 
According to Pan Guang and Zhou Guojian, who participated in the drafting 
of the “Shanghai Spirit,” “mutual trust” can be built when states transcend ideological, 
political and social differences, abstain from portraying another state as a threat or an 
enemy “for certain purpose,” and comply with international law. 23  States could 
achieve “mutual benefit” when they could respect the interests and security of others.24 
“Equality” underlies opposition to hegemony and power politics, as all states are 
equally entitled to peace, stability and the right to safeguard their national interests.25 
States should resolve disputes and conflicts through “consultation,” which accords 
                                                          
21 “Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 
22 Jianhua Yu [余建华], “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the New Security Concept” [上
海合作组织与新安全观], Studies on Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Theories [毛泽东邓小平理论研
究], No. 3, (2005), 76-9, 85. 
23 Guang Pan [潘光] and Guojian Zhou [周国建], “Successful Implementation and Innovative 
Development of the Five Principles on Peaceful Co-existence: the Shanghai Cooperation and the 
‘Shanghai Spirit’” [和平共处五项原则的成功实践和创新发展: 上海合作组织及‘上海精神’], 





with an approach toward international relations that is “non-alliance, non-
confrontational and not targeted at third party.”26 Peaceful co-existence requires not 
only “equality” and “consultation” but also “respect for diverse civilizations,” which 
is embodied in the recognition of each nation’s tradition, social system and autonomy 
to choose its development path.27 On the basis of these principles, states will be able 
to achieve “common development” and “prosperity” through cooperation.28 
 
The “Shanghai Spirit” embodies Chinese institutional leadership in instilling 
“values” into the SCO.29 It should be noted, however, that the norms enshrined in the 
“Shanghai Spirit” are the least demanding in terms of their constraints on member 
states’ action. If they exercise any effects, they serve not so much to instill common 
values into the organization as to signal China’s self-restraint.  
 
6.1.3 Institutional Design  
The supremacy of sovereignty and equality means that the SCO, like APT, is defined 
by informality. The governing body is the Heads of State Council (国家元首会议), 
which approves the organization’s development, policy and operation. 30 The Heads 
of Government (Premiers) Council ( 政府首 脑 (总理 )会 议 ) approves the 
organization’s budget and its work, particularly economic cooperation. The Foreign 
Ministers Council (外交部长会议) meets to discuss the organization’s current work 
and is responsible for organizing the annual heads of state summit. All three Councils 
meet annually. Chairmanship is one-year and rotational, held by representative of the 
chairing state for the year. Regular meetings of heads of ministries and agencies (各
部门领导人会议) were established for most government portfolios from defense, 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Pan and Zhou, “Successful Implementation and Innovative Development of the Five Principles on 
Peaceful Co-existence,” 46-7. 
28 Pan and Zhou, “Successful Implementation and Innovative Development of the Five Principles on 
Peaceful Co-existence,” 47. 
29 Stephen Aris, Eurasian Regionalism: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2011); Guang Pan, “The Spirit of the Silk Road: The SCO and China’s 
Relations with Central Asia” in Michael Fredholm (ed.), The Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges, (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 
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30 This section draws primarily upon the SCO Charter, unless noted otherwise. “The SCO Charter” 




commerce to culture to study issues of cooperation. A Committee of Senior Treasury 
and Commerce Officials (高官委員會 ) was established under the meetings of 
Ministers of Treasury, Commerce and Transportation to manage practical issues in 
economic cooperation.31 Meanwhile, permanent or ad hoc expert working groups (專
業工作組) were created to support cooperation. 
 
The SCO’s operation is supported by the National Coordinators Council (国
家协调员理事会 ) and the organization’s permanent bodies, which include the 
Secretariat (秘书处) and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) (地区反恐怖
机构). The National Coordinators Council meets at least three times annually to 
coordinate and manage the SCO’s daily operation. Chairmanship is held by the 
national coordinator of the chairing state for the year. The Beijing-based Secretariat 
provides logistical support and makes recommendations on the organization’s annual 
budget. The Secretariat is led by a Secretary-General (秘书长), who is appointed by 
the Heads of State Council upon nomination by the Foreign Ministers Council. The 
Secretary-Generalship is rotational, with a term of three years; no reappointment is 
allowed. The Deputy Secretary-General ( 副秘书长 ), who is appointed upon 
nomination by the Council of National Coordinators, cannot come from the same 
member state as the Secretary-General. Staff positions and budget contribution are 
allocated to member states according to a quota system.32 Before India and Pakistan’s 
accession, China and Russia each contributed 23.5%, while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were, respectively, responsible for 20%, 15%, 12% and 6% 
of the budget. 33 
 
                                                          
31 Xing and Sun, A Study on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 102. 
32 Tongkai Xu [须同凯] (ed.) Development and Prospect of Regional Economic Cooperation under 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [上海合作组织区域经济合作发展历程与前景展望], 
(Beijing: People’s Press, 2010), 17. 
33 “Official Reply of the State Council on Approving the Agreement on Order of Formation and 
Administration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Budget and the Protocol on Amending the 
Agreement on Order of Formation and Administration of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
Budget Signed on May 29, 2003” [国务院关于核准《上海合作组织预算编制和执行协定》和
《关于修改二〇〇三年 五月二十九日签署的 <上海合作组织预算编制和执行协定> 的议定书》
的批复], The State Council, (10th September 2005), 16-7. 
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The Tashkent-based Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is comprised 
of the Council (理事会 ) and the Executive Committee (执行委员会 ). As the 
governing body, the Council passes resolutions on issues including the RATS’ budget, 
submits annual report to the Council of Heads of States, and nominates Director and 
Deputy Director of the Executive Committee.34 Comprised of heads or representatives 
of member states’ counter-terrorist agencies, the Council elects its chairman; 
chairmanship is one-year and rotational.35 To support its operation, member states 
dispatch permanent representatives to the RATS. 36  The Executive Committee 
analyzes intelligence and advises member states, prepares legal documents, 
coordinates joint operation and liaises with relevant international organizations.37 The 
Committee is led by a Director and three Deputy Directors. The term of directorship 
is three years; no reappointment is allowed.38 Upon approval from the Council, the 
Director can appoint committee members according to each member state’s budget 
contribution.39 Beginning with a staff of 30, the Committee underwent enlargement in 
2007.40 
 
The Interbank Consortium (银行联合体) and the SCO Business Council (实
业家委员会) were established in 2005 and 2006 respectively to promote economic 
cooperation. The Interbank Consortium facilitates exchange and cooperation among 
member banks, and provides “funding and banking services” for government-run 
infrastructure projects. The consortium is governed by the Council of Representatives, 
which meets on ad hoc basis upon consensus. 41  The Business Council promotes 
exchange among business and financial communities of member states, facilitates 
implementation of the “Program for Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation 
among SCO Member States” (the “Program,” 上海合作组织成员国多边经贸合作
                                                          




38 Xing and Sun, A Study on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 68. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Xing and Sun, A Study on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 67; “Joint Communiqué of the 
Heads of Government (Premiers) Council Meeting of SCO Member States” [上海合作组织成员国政
府首脑（总理）理事会会议联合公报], The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (2nd November 
2007), http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/ 
41 “Organizational Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” [上海合作组织机构], The 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (9th December 2015), http://chn.sectsco.org/structure/#12 
208 
 
纲要 ), and provides expert assessments on cooperation projects. Comprised of 
member states’ business councils and governed by the Annual Session (年度总会), 
the Business Council operates through its secretariat in Moscow.42 To promote the 
SCO’s development, the Council of Heads of State established the SCO Forum (上海
合作组织论坛) in 2006. Comprised of SCO research centers and institutes of member 
states, the Forum facilitates exchange among researchers, undertakes research and 
makes recommendations on the organization’s future development.43 
 
In addition to full members, the SCO grants observer (观察员) or dialogue 
partner (对话伙伴) status to states or organizations that subscribe to its “mission, 
principles and work.”44 Decision on application is made by the Council of Heads of 
State upon recommendation from the Council of Foreign Ministers. Observers and 
dialogue partners could attend specified meetings, take part in discussion, circulate 
written statements and receive the organization’s documents, but could not participate 
in decision-making and the drafting and signing of documents. Cooperation between 
the SCO and dialogue partner takes the form of meetings of “member states plus 
dialogue partner” at ministerial or other levels.45 By 2018, observers include Mongolia, 
Iran, Afghanistan and Belarus. Dialogue partners include Turkey, Sri Lanka, 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal. 
 
According to Regulations on the Procedures for Admitting New Members 
(“Regulations”) approved in 2010, a state is eligible for membership if it is located in 
Eurasia, has diplomatic and economic relations with all current member states, is 
                                                          
42 “Organizational Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 
43 Min Cheng [程敏] and Ning Zhang [张宁], “Civil Bodies of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization” [上海合作组织的民间机构] in Guangcheng Xing, Hongwei Wu and Ning Zhang 
(eds.), Annual Report on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2009) [上海合作组织发展报告
(2009)], (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009), 173. 
44 “Regulations on Observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” [上海合作组织观察员条例
], The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (15th June 2004), http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/; 
“Regulations on Dialogue Partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization” [上海合作组织对话
伙伴条例], The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (8th August 2008), 
http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/ 
45 “Regulations on Dialogue Partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 
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already an observer, and is not subjected to sanctions from the UN.46 As 6.2.3 will 
show, the “Regulations” were the outcome of the bargain between China, Russia and 
the Central Asian countries on the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s 
membership and external relations. 
 
6.1.4 Modus Operandi 
Institutional design explains the similarity in China’s leadership behavior in the SCO 
and APT. Based on consensus through consultation,  the decision-making structure 
maximizes constraints on institutional leadership by giving member states de facto 
veto over each other’s initiatives.47 Given its modest budget and lack of operational 
capacity, the SCO functions primarily through coordinated action by member states.48 
As was the case in APT, the supremacy of sovereignty results in a low level of 
multilateralism. According to Article Sixteen of the SCO Charter,  
if one or several member states are not interested in the cooperation between 
others, their non-participation does not obstruct those involved in such 
cooperation, nor will this preclude them from future participation.49 
 
This raises the question about the significance of the SCO as an international 
institution. As Lukin pointed out, many of the cooperation initiatives were attributed 
to the SCO only because they involved its members; in fact, they either were not 
implemented by the SCO, or could still be undertaken had the organization not existed 
in the first place.50 Given China’s stakes in the success of its brainchild, there has been 
                                                          
46 Alexander Lukin, “Should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be Enlarged?” Russia in Global 
Affairs, No. 2, (22nd June 2011), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Should-the-Shanghai-Cooperation-
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47 “The SCO Charter,” Article 17. 
48 According to Lukin, the SCO’s annual budget was four million dollars in 2007. Notwithstanding 
Beijing’s injection of 10 million dollars to the Secretariat’s operational budget, the Organization 
continues to sugger from the lack of operational capacity. Alexander Lukin, “The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization: What Next?” Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2, (July – September 2007), 
http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9132; Jinping Xi [习近平], “Unite and Cooperate, Be Open and 
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a tendency for Beijing and the Chinese foreign policy elites to categorize 
indiscriminately the country’s cooperation with other member states as cooperation 
“under the SCO framework.”51  
 
Given the SCO’s mode of operation, it is not surprising that the organization has 
been criticized for its ineffectiveness and lack of concrete achievements.52 As Zhao 
Huasheng pointed out, the SCO’s work has been marked by “three excesses” – large 
numbers of declarations and agreements, institutional structures and planned projects 
that have failed to yield corresponding outcomes.53 Others from outside China even 
went further to conclude that the organization was nothing but a “geopolitical bluff” 
or a “talk shop.”54 
 
The SCO’s modus operandi is crucial in explaining why Chinese institutional 
leadership was confined primarily to functional tasks, why Beijing was not successful 
in steering the organization’s adaptation to a changing international environment, and 
why increasing incentives and pressures for change led to a shift in China’s leadership 
behavior from supporting and soft selling under Hu Jintao to hard selling under Xi 
Jinping. As the following discussion will show, the challenges China faced in its quest 
for institutional leadership went beyond those in a classic “suasion game.”55 While the 
SCO was the only platform for China to engage in the renegotiation on the geopolitical 
definition of Central Asia and Eurasia, it was only one of the options for Russia and 
the Central Asian countries. 56  Member states’ mistrust of China and Russia’s 
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52 See, for example, Huasheng Zhao [赵华胜], “Opportunities and Challenges for the Shanghai 
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leadership aspirations prevented Beijing from making the “critical decisions” 
necessary to maintain the SCO’s identity and steer its evolution. 
 
6.2 The Hu Jintao Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2007 – 2012 
 
6.2.1 Political and Security Cooperation 
The SCO was established first and foremost for security cooperation.57 Although the 
Soviet Union’s disintegration relieved China of military pressures from the Northwest, 
what Hu Jian called the “sequel of imperialism” – which has continued to haunt China 
and other member states today – was manifested in the rise of non-traditional security 
challenges including the “three forces” of “terrorism, separatism and extremism”; 
transnational crime; and drug and arms trafficking.58 Nevertheless, the SCO’s identity 
as “non-alliance, non-confrontational and not directed at third party” has limited from 
the outset the possibilities of cooperation to non-traditional security. Russia’s regional 
security presence and China’s adherence to a policy of non-alliance and non-
interference led to a “tacit bargain” wherein Beijing deferred leadership 
responsibilities in security cooperation to Moscow. 59 The tacit bargain was embodied 
in the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s institutional design and its relations 
with the CSTO, which overlaps with the former in membership and function but has 
the capacity for action with its Collective Rapid Reaction Force. Indeed, during the 
Hu Jintao era, many of the security cooperation initiatives in the SCO came not from 
China but Russia. 
 
To China’s foreign policy elites, September 11 and the penetration of 
American power into Central Asia constituted both a challenge and an opportunity to 
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the rising power. On the one hand, not only would the United States’ military presence 
and its strategic initiatives weaken the SCO’s internal cohesiveness and its role in 
regional affairs; Washington’s promotion of democracy and human rights also 
threatened the political security of China and other member states. 60  61  As Shi 
Yinhong argued, the objective underlying the United States’ war on terrorism and its 
activities in Central Asia was to “encircle,” “contain,” “Westernize” and “divide” 
China.62 
 
On the other hand, September 11 was seen as heralding “a period of important 
strategic opportunity” for China to develop a more cooperative relationship with the 
United States, especially in addressing common security challenges. Thus while many 
recognized the SCO’s role in uniting member states in their resistance to external 
interference, opposition against American hegemony was not the organization’s 
mission.63  China’s security posture in Central Asia, therefore, remained first and 
foremost defensive – maintaining “strategic stability,” safeguarding its core interests 
and making as many friends and as few enemies as possible. 64  As the following 
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discussion will show, one of the challenges China faced in its quest for institutional 
leadership was to maintain the SCO’s identity as “non-alliance, non-confrontation and 
not targeted at third party“ by preventing Russia from turning the organization into an 
anti-West coalition. 
 
Given the structural, political and institutional constraints on the SCO’s 
function, China’s leadership activities in political and security cooperation were 
highly restricted in scope and scale. Beijing introduced less concrete proposals in 
political and security than economic cooperation; indeed, many of the major initiatives 
to combat the “three forces,” drug-trafficking, transnational crime and illegal 
immigration were proposed by Russia. 65  Apart from calling for expediting the 
implementation of cooperation initiatives, China promoted capacity building by 
supporting, providing aid, holding the annual joint anti-terrorist exercise and 
undertaking joint operation.  
 
6.2.1.1 Combating the “Three Forces,” Drug-Trafficking and Transnational 
Crime 
Combating the “three forces” has been central to security cooperation under the 
SCO.66 Notwithstanding the death of Osama bin Laden, Islamic extremist groups such 
as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Jund al-Khilafa and Turkistan 
Islamic Party continued to organize terrorist attacks in member states, including the 
attack in Urumqi, Xinjiang on 5th July 2009. 67  The Taliban’s resurgence in 
Afghanistan, meanwhile, threatened to exacerbate security situation in the war-torn 
country, as the United States would begin withdrawal in 2011.68 Domestic problems 
in member states, exacerbated by the impact of the global financial crisis and the Arab 
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Spring, provided fertile soil for not only the “three forces” but also drug-trafficking 
and transnational crime.69 
 
The SCO’s modus operandi meant that legal institution building continued to 
be the organization’s preoccupation during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. 
To consolidate the legal foundation for anti-terrorist cooperation, which had by then 
been embodied in the “Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and 
Extremism,” member states signed the “SCO Convention on Anti-Terrorism” (上海
合作組織反恐怖主義公約) in 2009.70 The Conventions were complemented by 
agreements on specific areas of cooperation including information security, arms-
trafficking and the training of anti-terrorist professionals.71 
 
Law-making was accompanied by institutionalization of cooperation in 
defense, public security and anti-drug-trafficking. Since 2007, a framework for 
combating the “three forces” has been drawn up for approval by the Heads of State 
Council every three years. At ministerial level, member states’ defense ministers 
concluded a working plan and a number of agreements on joint exercise and inter-
departmental cooperation.72 Likewise, member states’ ministers of public security and 
internal affairs passed a series of resolutions on meeting arrangements, combating 
transnational crime and maintaining pipeline security in 2009. 73  In view of the 
growing threat of drug-trafficking to member states’ societies of member states, the 
Heads of State Council approved a five-year anti-drug strategy and its action plan in 
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2011. The heads of anti-drug agencies also passed the working rules for meetings of 
senior officials one year after.74 
 
Central to anti-terrorist cooperation at operational level is RATS. In 2007, the 
Heads of Government Council strengthened the anti-terrorist body’s capacity by 
creating new bodies and staff positions under its Executive Committee.75 During the 
Hu Jintao era, RATS compiled a list of about a thousand persons and forty groups that 
were involved in terrorism.76 By 2013, it had passed over 300 resolutions on anti-
terrorist cooperation.77 Yet, notwithstanding the annual joint exercise and other small-
scale bilateral initiatives, China did not exercise institutional leadership in combatting 
the “three force,” drug-trafficking and transnational crime. As mentioned above, many 
of the major initiatives came from Russia, even though they could not have been 
adopted without China’s support. Indeed, an analysis of Hu Jintao’s speeches at the 
heads of state summits shows that China did not propose any major initiatives. In 2008, 
the President recommended continuation of the public security cooperation 
mechanism for major events by institutionalizing those practices that proved to be 
mature and effective during the Beijing Olympics.78 One year later, he recommended 
extending those arrangements to observers by including them in the consultation 
mechanism.79 While strengthening cooperation in the pursuit, arrest and extradition of 
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terrorists, member states should explore the possibility of concluding an agreement on 
combating organized crime. 80  Other than these, the President mainly called for 
expediting the implementation of agreements and enhancing cooperation under 
existing mechanisms. 
 
Ironically, despite its repeated emphasis that the SCO is not an alliance, China 
initiated the joint anti-terrorist military exercise with member states in 2002. Since 
then, it has hosted or joined every annual exercise. As an epitome of the tacit bargain 
between Beijing and Moscow, the SCO and the CSTO, following an agreement in 
2005, began to conduct jointly what is now codenamed “Peace Mission.”81 While 
these exercises went beyond typical anti-terrorist exercises in scale, they were, as 
Laruelle and Peyrouse pointed out, not so much “joint exercises” as “parallel 
maneuvers” with low degree of force integration.82 At the same time, China also 
provided military aid and conducted joint exercise with member states at bilateral level, 
though these initiatives remained small-scale.83 
 
The above discussion has shown that China’s activities in combatting the 
“three forces,” drug-trafficking and transnational crime were highly limited in scope 
and scale. Interestingly, in the view of the country’s foreign policy elites, the SCO 
achieved great success in the suppression of the “three forces.”84 Terrorist activities 
had in general been confined to small scale; terrorists groups were prevented from 
launching mass attacks and developing into the same capacity as the Taliban.85 The 
public security cooperation mechanism was invoked for the first time during the 
Beijing Olympics; as a result, no single act of terrorism from Central Asia had 
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occurred. 86  Between 2004 and 2011, RATS was reported to have successfully 
prevented over 500 incidents of terrorist attacks.87 
 
6.2.1.2 Political Security 
Notwithstanding China’s emphasis that the SCO is “not targeted at third party,” 
neutralizing the threat of American hegemony, shielding member states from external 
interference and coordinating their position on international affairs remained implicit 
yet vital functions of the organization. The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and the 
Andijan Incident in Uzbekistan in 2005 brought the threat of American presence in 
Central Asia closer than ever to China and other member states.88 Upon Russia and 
Uzbekistan’s proposals, the SCO demanded in the 2005 Astana Declaration that the 
United States should set the deadline for withdrawal from military facilities in member 
states. 89 The American military’s eviction from Uzbekistan, however, did not end the 
competition between the United States and Russia for military bases in Central Asia.90 
Indeed, the American military continued to lease the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan 
until 2014. 
 
The events in 2005 exposed the SCO’s incapacity to respond to emergencies. 
The signing of the SCO Treaty of Political and Diplomatic Measures for Responding 
to Threats to Regional Peace, Security and Stability (“the Treaty”) (上合組織關於應
對威脅本地區和平、安全與穩定事態的政治外交措施及機制條例) in 2009 did 
not solve the problem. Indeed, the political bargain between China, Russia and the 
Central Asian states on the SCO’s institutional design precluded the development of 
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such function and capacity. Structural, political and institutional constraints led to 
Beijing’s inactivity in political security cooperation.  
 
The SCO’s leadership deficit and its incapacity to fully adapt to a changing 
international environment was exposed once again during the Second Kyrgyz 
Revolution in 2010. During the crisis, the organization only issued statements, with 
Kyrgyz Secretary-General Muratbek Imanaliyev paying a visit to the country.91 The 
call of some such as Nazabayev to review the organization’s position on non-
interference resulted only in the revision of the Treaty two years later.92 Like Russia, 
other SCO member states, the United States and the EU, China refrained from 
intervention. Apart from diplomatic mediation, Beijing provided within four months 
of the unrest over 120 million renminbi of aid to Kyrgyzstan, including 8 million 
renminbi of food, medicine and medical equipment.93 
 
The SCO’s ineffectiveness triggered a debate among China’s foreign policy 
elites on the country’s long-standing position on non-interference.94  Nevertheless, 
perhaps still trying to grapple with the dilemma between the supremacy of sovereignty 
and the need to protect its regional interests, Beijing did not take any major initiatives. 
In 2011, Hu Jintao called for strengthening the SCO’s capacity for action and fast 
response to “real threats”; but this, he stressed, should be based on respect for member 
states’ independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the will of the people.95 The 
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President only reiterated the same position in the heads of state summit one year 
after.96 
 
China’s inactivity, however, did not instill trust among Central Asian states in 
its ability to provide regional security public goods. As Laruelle and Peyrouse’s survey 
showed, most of the experts in Central Asia dismissed the SCO’s role in regional 
security cooperation.97 Indeed, half of the Kazakh experts surveyed still considered 
Russia as their country’s most important regional security partner, while close to half 
of them did not expect China to develop the capacity to intervene in contingencies in 
the short term.98 On the other hand, China’s self-constraint did not eliminate deep-
seated fear of its future security presence in the region.99 Notwithstanding resolution 
of border disputes and the signing of the Treaty of Long-Term Good-Neighborly 
Friendship and Cooperation among SCO Member States, some in Kyrgyzstan 
remained resentful of their country’s cession of territory to China and apprehensive 
about the future validity of the border agreement.100 Negative perception of Beijing’s 
handling of the Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang further reinforced mistrust of the rising 
power in Central Asia.101 
 
Though deferring responsibilities of regional security leadership to Russia, 
China strove to preserve the SCO’s identity by preventing Moscow from turning the 
organization into an anti-West alliance. The Russo-Georgian war in 2008 presented 
China with such a dilemma. On the one hand, it was under pressure to support its 
fellow SCO member and strategic partner; on the other hand, Russia’s action 
challenged the supremacy China and other member states had always given to 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.102 Beijing’s ambivalence manifested itself in the 
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2008 Dushanbe Declaration, which expressed member states’ concern over the 
situation and urged all parties to resolve the conflict through peaceful dialogue.  The 
declaration also welcomed the six-point peace plan concluded in Moscow on conflict 
resolution in South Ossetia and supported Russia’s efforts in promoting peace and 
cooperation in the region.103 In this way, Beijing and other member states offered 
limited support to Moscow without endorsing its action. 
 
6.2.1.3 Afghanistan 
Regional security in Central Asia was inextricably linked with the situation in 
Afghanistan, as the war-torn country had become a foothold for not only external great 
powers, but also terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. As was the case in 
political security, both China and the SCO’s activities were negligible. Indeed, 
Feigenbaum, who served as the United States’ Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
South and Central Asian Affairs between 2006 and 2009, criticized China and other 
SCO member states for free riding on the United States’ provision of regional security 
public goods.104 
 
The Hu Jintao administration’s second term saw the institutionalization of 
cooperation between the SCO and Afghanistan. Following the establishment of the 
SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group in 2005, Afghan President Hamid Karzai was 
invited to the 2007 Bishkek Summit as a guest for the first time. Upon Russia’s 
proposal, the SCO held a Special International Conference on Afghanistan in Moscow 
in 2009, which resulted in the formulation of the Action Plan of SCO Member States 
and Afghanistan on Combating Terrorism, Drug-trafficking and Organized Crime. 
According to the Action Plan, the two sides would cooperate in joint operation, 
intelligence exchange and law enforcement personnel training.105 Meanwhile, they 
would explore the possibility of upgrading the diplomatic rank of head of the Contact 
Group to the level of Deputy Director-General, formulate cooperation plan with the 
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CSTO’s Working Group on Afghanistan, and push forward cooperation on the 
creation and consolidation of a regional “anti-narcotics and financial security belt”.106 
In 2012, one year after the United States began withdrawal, Afghanistan was granted 
observer status.107 Nonetheless, the lack of progress in cooperation was demonstrated 
by the fact that the Contact Group ceased meeting after 2009.108 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that China’s activities were limited. Indeed, all 
of the major initiatives came from Russia. 109  While supporting Afghanistan’s 
inclusion in multilateral cooperation under the SCO, China engaged in supporting 
primarily at bilateral level. In the first decade after the SCO’s establishment, Beijing 
cooperated with Kabul in intelligence exchange and law enforcement, as well as 
provided different forms of aid including credit, debt relief, infrastructure investment 
and the training of over a thousand personnel.110 In 2009, China promised to provide 
75 million dollars of aid to Afghanistan in the next five years.111 It followed up with 
another 150 million dollars and other assistance in the country’s reconstruction two 
years later.112 
 
China’s self-constraint was attributed as much to its ambiguity over the role 
itself and the SCO should play as to American presence or the organization’s 
incapacity. The SCO’s approach to the Afghan issue, in Yu Jianhua’s words, should 
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be “intervention without entrapment.” 113  While the organization had neither the 
obligation nor the ability to shoulder full responsibility for the resolution of the Afghan 
issue, loss of control over the situation could lead to civil war, which the organization 
would be incapable of containing.114 In the end, American military presence would 
lose its “rationale” when the situation in Afghanistan became stable; any demand for 
American withdrawal when the situation remained grave would not be “convincing 
and well-received by relevant states.”115 The SCO’s mission should be to promote 
Afghanistan’s peaceful transition and reconstruction through political, social, 
economic and cultural means.116 
 
6.2.1.4 Energy and Other Areas of Non-Traditional Security Cooperation 
Energy security is one of the driving factors of Chinese diplomacy in Central Asia. 
Indeed, Beijing’s energy diplomacy began long before the SCO’s establishment.117 Of 
the 127 projects specified in the Action Plan of The Program for Multilateral 
Economic and Trade Cooperation, 19 involved energy cooperation.118 Yet energy 
cooperation truly became a priority in the SCO’s agenda when Russian President 
Vladimir Putin raised the idea of establishing an “energy club” at the 2006 Shanghai 
Summit.119 This was followed by Nazabayev’s proposal of an energy exchange one 
year after.120 Nevertheless, differing interests between producing countries, as well as 
between producing and consuming countries, hampered the implementation of these 
ideas. Thus at the time only ministerial meetings and expert working groups were set 
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up to strengthen consultation and explore the prospect of future cooperation. It was 
not until 2013 that member states concluded the Memorandum on the Establishment 
of SCO Energy Club.121 
 
As a net energy importer, China had little leverage over the “critical decisions” 
concerning institution building in energy cooperation. Indeed, neither Hu Jintao nor 
Wen Jiabao put forward any concrete proposals on energy cooperation in the SCO 
during their second term. On the other hand, as one of the world’s fastest growing 
energy importers China promoted the original collective purpose of energy 
cooperation through supporting. Beijing participated in every one of the 19 energy 
cooperation projects in the Action Plan, even though more than half of them concerned 
research, planning, information exchange and tendering.122 
 
China was more successful in tapping Central Asia’s vast oil and gas reserves 
through bilateral or minilateral diplomacy, from importation, pipeline construction to 
joint ventures in oil exploration and refinement.123 The Hu Jintao administration’s 
greatest achievement was the construction of the China-Central Asia Pipeline from 
Turkmenistan via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to China. As the first pipeline that did 
not transit Russian territory, the China-Central Asia Pipeline precluded Russia from 
drawing and consolidating a geopolitical boundary separating China and the post-
Soviet space.124 
 
China’s influence, however, should not be overestimated. Although Chinese-
owned operations constituted up to 30% of Kazakhstan’s total oil production in 2012, 
China’s share in the Central Asian state’s oil sector remained significantly lower than 
that of the United States at the peak of its presence, when it controlled close to 70% 
                                                          
121 Qiang “Assessing the Prospect of the SCO Energy Club from the Perspective of Public Goods,” 
48.  
122 See the table in Yongxiang Sun [孙永祥], “Energy Cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Orgnization” [上海合作组织的能源合作], in Guangcheng Xing, Hongwei Wu and Ning Zhang 
(eds.), Annual Report on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2009), (Beijing: Social Sciences 
Academic Press, 2009), 124-6. 
123 Sun, “Progress and Problems in Energy Cooperation under the SCO,” 23-4; Elzbieta Maria Pron, 
“China’s Energy Diplomacy via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” in Yao Shujie and Maria 
Jesus Herrerias (eds.), Energy Security and Sustainable Economic Growth in China, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave McMillan, 2014), 52-70. 
124 Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules, 94. 
224 
 
of Kazakhstan’s total oil production.125 Moreover, China faced intense competition 
from other great powers in its scramble for Central Asia’s energy resources. Russia 
sought to ensure that the region’s energy resources would continue to be transmitted 
and exported to the world through its pipelines.126 Indeed, only until 2009 did Moscow 
begin to change its reservations about Beijing’s idea of constructing oil and gas 
pipelines between the two countries.127 Meanwhile, the United States, India and Japan 
all engaged in the scramble for oil and gas in Central Asia.128 
 
In addition to energy, China engaged in supporting and soft selling in other 
areas of non-traditional security. Beijing called for expediting the establishment of 
cooperation and emergency mechanisms in areas including food security, disaster 
relief, technology and public health. Moreover, it promoted capacity building through 
capital investment, including a high-tech development zone, a center for disaster relief, 
agricultural technology demonstration centers, seeds bank, a center for environmental 
protection and satellite services.129 These initiatives, however, remained small-scale, 
functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
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The above discussion has shown that even though the SCO was established 
first and foremost for security cooperation, structural, political and institutional 
constraints resulted in leadership deficit and prevented the organization from adapting 
to a changing international environment. China’s adherence to a policy of non-alliance 
and non-interference, as well as its tacit bargain with Russia, meant that Beijing’s 
leadership activities were limited, confined to supporting and soft selling in functional 
tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. This is indeed all the more surprising, 
as most in China’s foreign policy elites considered security cooperation under the SCO 
more successful than economic cooperation.  
 
Nevertheless, the SCO’s leadership deficit and it incapacity to adapt to a 
changing international environment raised questions about its importance to regional 
security in Central Asia. While scholars such as Aris argues that the SCO’s primary 
function and achievement lay in the promotion of regime security of Central Asian 
countries, its relative inactivity during the Second Kyrgyz Revolution or over the 
Afghan question raises questions about the organization’s importance to “autocratic 
survival.”130 
 
6.2.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation 
While security cooperation has continued to define the SCO’s external image, the 
organization was intended from its inception to promote cooperation in other areas.131 
Indeed, it was China that initiated economic cooperation under the organization.132 
The Program for Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation (the “Program”), 
which was approved by the Heads of Government Council in 2003, laid out a three-
stage strategy. In the short-term, member states would strive to facilitate trade and 
investment. To fulfil the mid-term objective, they would establish “clear, transparent 
rules and procedures” for extensive multilateral cooperation by 2010. These efforts 
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would contribute to the long-term objective of achieving free movement of goods, 
capital, services and skills by 2020.133 In 2004, the Heads of Government Council 
approved the Action Plan of the Program (“Action Plan”), which included a total of 
127 projects in eleven areas and specified the mechanisms for their implementation at 
different stages.134 
 
To China’s foreign policy elites, however, economic cooperation remained 
“the most difficult and most unsatisfactory.”135 Indeed, Hu Jintao pointed out at the 
2009 Yekaterinburg Summit that the progress of economic cooperation fell 
significantly short of member states’ expectations and the organization’s development 
goals.136 Implementation of the “concrete measures” of economic cooperation did not 
begin until 2007. 137  Moreover, according to Xu Tongkai, who served as Inspector and 
Deputy Director-General of the Department of European Affairs of China’s Ministry 
of Commercie, by 2010 only four to five out of the 127 projects in the Action Plan 
were implemented.138 
 
As was the case in East Asia, the global financial crisis presented a potential 
“critical juncture” for Central Asian regionalism. Increasing pressures for collective 
crisis response led member states to conclude the SCO Joint Initiative on Increasing 
Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Field of Tackling the Consequences of the 
Global Financial Economic Crisis (“Joint Initiative”) in 2009. The agreement, 
however, was marked by its hollowness. Agreed measures included monitoring the 
Action Plan’s implementation; accelerating the implementation of pilot projects; 
expediting work on an international road transportation facilitation agreement as well 
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as the basic principles regarding the establishment and management of a SCO 
development fund (special account); and promoting cooperation in customs, finance 
and agriculture.139 Later in the same year, member states’ Treasury Ministers and 
Governors of Central Banks reaffirmed the need to facilitate implementation of the 
Action Plan and the Joint Initiative, study the possibility of expanding local currency 
settlement and expedite negotiations on the establishment of a SCO development fund 
(special account).140  
 
While China was already the largest economy in the SCO, the global financial 
crisis further cemented its economic influence in Central Asia (Table 6.1). 
Notwithstanding the impact of the crisis on regional economies, trade between China 
and member states rose from 86.8 in 2008 to 123.7 billion dollars in 2012.141 China 
became the largest or second largest trade partner of all member states except 
Tajikistan, as well as an increasingly important source of capital (Table 6.2 / 6.3). The 
rising power would normally be expected to exercise enormous influence over 
regional economic integration. 
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Table 6.1 Regional States’ Gross Domestic Products (In Current US$ Billions) 
Central Asia 2007 2012 2017 
China 3552 8561 12015 
Russia 1300 2210 1527 
Kazakhstan 105 208 161 
Kyrgyz Republic 4 7 7 
Tajikistan 4 8 7 
Turkmenistan 13 35 38 
Uzbekistan 22 52 48 
(Sources: World Bank and IMF142) 
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International and domestic developments, as I discussed in 4.2.2, generated 
pressures on the Hu Jintao administration to stimulate external demand by promoting 
economic integration in China’s peripheral regions. At the 2007 Bishkek Summit, Hu 
Jintao emphasized the importance of “joint development.” While engaging in 
extensive international cooperation, member states should strive to achieve “self-help, 
independence and self-strengthening” under the SCO.143 As the global financial crisis 
went full-blown one year after, the President reiterated that “resolution of regional 
problems depend[ed] fundamentally on the unity of member states in self-
strengthening.”144 His repeated emphasis on “joint development” reflected China’s 
endeavor to identify its interests with those of other member states.  
 
As was the case of APT, although member states’ capability deficit and 
demand for regional public goods provided an opportunity for China to engage in 
supporting, low level of trust thwarted Beijing’s soft selling of its proposals of a free 
trade area, a development fund and a development bank. As a result, Chinese 
institutional leadership was confined to functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. China’s inability to steer the SCO’s adaptation to a changing 
international environment after the global financial crisis represented a deadlock in the 
renegotioation on the geopolitical reconstruction of Central Asia. 
 
6.2.2.1 Trade  
As I mentioned earlier, the Program laid out a roadmap for regional trade liberalization, 
with the goals of establishing “clear, transparent rules and procedures” by 2010 and 
ultimately achieving free movement of goods, capital, services and skills a decade 
after. While China had promoted economic cooperation in the SCO since the 
beginning, the global financial crisis rendered regional economic integration more 
important than ever in sustaining national and regional growth. During the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term, China sought to advance trade and investment 
liberalization by supporting and soft selling. To promote the collective purposes as 
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2007 2012 2016 
Kazakhstan 
China 9146.86 23982.1 7895.44 
Russia 16286 23857.7 12733.5 
EU 27632.2 53975.8 24375.5 
Italy 8905.34 16426.2 8317.39 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
China 488.68 1271.62 1544.66 
Russia 1185.06 2003.74 945.03 
EU 305.84 607.63 318.73 
Kazakhstan 413.65 923.65 786.7 
Tajikistan 
China 283.6 923.61 487.93 
Russia 911 1260.42 1251.66 
EU 875.64 336.55 356.82 
Turkey 550.5 575.88 295.78 
Turkmenistan 
China 366.77 9369.74 5609.8 
Russia 472.43 1456.57 917.27 









China 1154.71 2920.46 3698.61 
Russia 3213.73 3775.8 2799.21 
EU 2893.45 1980.89 2085.26 
Kazakhstan 1432.1 2195.28 1535.23 
Russia 
China 40305.5 87416.9 66117.6 
EU 284901.0 410266.0 199907.0 
Germany 52899.7 73298.9 40416.1 
Nethelands 46683.7 82867.4 32268.4 
(Sources: IMF and ADB145) 
 
stated in the Joint Initiative, China dispatched trade delegations to member states, 
supported the establishment of cross-border special economic zones and the 
identification of new pilot projects, proposed the creation of an electronic commerce 
platform, and developing the Eurasian Economic Forum and China-Eurasia Expo into 
platforms for regional economic cooperation.146 
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Table 6.3 Regional States’ Foreign Exchange Reserves (In Current US$ 
Millions) 
Central Asia 2007 2012 2017 
China 1546365 3387513 3498040 
Russia 478822 537816 509394 
Kazakhstan 17641 28299 43242 
Kyrgyz Republic 1177 2067 2377 
Tajikistan 85 631  
Turkmenistan       
Uzbekistan       
(Sources: World Bank and IMF147) 
 
Nevertheless, the central task remained the establishment of a free trade area. 
In the same year when he sold EAFTA to other APT countries, Wen Jiabao proposed 
a SCO free trade area. As I explained in 4.2.2, a changing international environment 
and domestic economic challenges after the global financial crisis increased the 
pressures on China to expedite regional economic integration. Nevertheless, as was 
the case in East Asia, member states’ mistrust of China prevented Beijing from uniting 
them behind its preferences in the “critical decision” on regional free trade. Central 
Asian states viewed the rising power’s economic diplomacy as driven above all by 
self-interests and were thus apprehensive of becoming its “vassal states.”148 Indeed, 
Lukin saw China’s “aggressive and selfish manner” in advancing its economic 
interests one of the main reasons for the stalemate of economic cooperation under the 
SCO. 149  Such perception, moreover, was exacerbated by deeply entrenched 
Sinophobia. 150  As a result, member states remained ambivalent about economic 
integration with China. 
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In particular, the shifting regional balance of economic power, Russia’s 
mistrust of China and its leadership aspirations led Moscow to block the “critical 
decisions” necessary to the SCO’s institutional adaptation while accelerating its own 
regionalist initiative. Partly inspired by Nazabayev’s proposal of a Eurasian Union in 
1994, Russia established the EurAsEc with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan in 2000. As Russia contested China’s preferences in the “critical decision” 
on regional free trade in the SCO, it formed with Belarus and Kazakhstan a Eurasian 
Customs Union (CU) in 2007, which was subsequently upgraded into a Single 
Economic Space (SES) two years after. 151 With a much higher degree of integration 
and formalization than Beijing’s proposal, Moscow’s project aimed to reorganize the 
Post-Soviet space and consolidate its boundary separating itself and China.  
 
Seeking to reorganize the Post-Soviet space on its own terms, Russia adopted 
the position that negotiations on a free trade area should begin only after all member 
states joined the WTO. 152  The overlap of the EurAsEc and the SCO in their 
membership and functions have led some to worry about “institutional competition” 
and the SCO’s marginalization in the future.153 While most of China’s foreign policy 
elites believed that the SCO and the Russian-led institutions could coexist, cooperate 
or even integrate,154 Russia’s recession after the global financial crisis raised questions 
about Moscow’s attitude toward inter-institutional cooperation.155 
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As was the case of APT, SCO member states’ capability deficit provided China with 
an opportunity to employ various instruments of economic leadership – production 
capacity, market and capital – in supporting and soft selling. Of all the initiatives, 
supply of credit was the most important, since stalemate in economic cooperation was 
attributed first and foremost to its shortage.156 In 2007, Hu Jintao promised to provide 
financing support for major projects in transportation, communication, energy and 
other areas.157 A group of infrastructure projects was duly chosen a year after for 
financing support.158  Meanwhile, China would consider providing starting capital 
once a SCO development fund (special account) was established.159 
 
To stimulate growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, Hu Jintao 
announced in 2009 the provision of 10 billion dollars of credit to finance cooperation 
projects. 160  By 2011, the amount of credit China agreed or promised to provide 
reached 45 billion dollars, including 25 and 15 billion dollars to, respectively, Russia 
and Kazakhstan.161 In 2012, China promised to offer another 10 billion dollars of 
credit and explore the possibility of establishing an economic-technological 
cooperation fund.162 The Interbank Consortium was another channel for Beijing to 
provide financial support to member states. By 2012, the credit extended by the 
National Development Bank of China amounted to 38.5 billion dollars.163  
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The global financial crisis also entailed the need to strengthen the mechanisms 
of financial and monetary cooperation under the SCO. In 2009, China supported the 
holding of meetings of Treasury Ministers and Governors of Central Banks, as well as 
recommended the establishment of dialogue mechanism in financial and monetary 
affairs.164 One year after, Hu Jintao called for expediting the launch of economic 
development and oversight mechanism.165 Nevertheless, development of a “multi-
level, multi-channel system of financing” remained necessary; the key to the creation 
of such system would be a development bank. The proposal of a SCO Development 
Bank was put forward by Wen Jiabao at the 2010 Heads of Government Council 
meeting.166 
 
Nevertheless, as was the case in trade, member states’ mistrust of China and 
Russia’s leadership aspirations prevented Beijing from mobilizing them behind its 
preferences in the “critical decisions” on financial institution building. As far back as 
the 2004 Tashkent Summit, member states agreed that work should begin to establish 
a SCO development fund (special account). 167  One year after, they pledged to 
complete preparatory work on the procedures for establishing the fund as well as the 
rules and regulations governing its operation by the first quarter of 2006.168 In their 
2007 Joint Communique, however, the heads of member states’ governments only 
reiterated the need to accelerate research on the creation a development fund. Since 
then no reference had been made regarding the project.169 
 
After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, China proposed the 
establishment of a SCO Anti-Crisis Fund as a short-term liquidity facility for the 
region. Nevertheless, not only did Russia reject the idea; it introduced its own financial 
aid initiatives in the EurAsEC. China put forward a revised proposal at the 2009 
                                                          
164 Hu, “Hold Our Hands Together to Respond to the Global Financial Crisis, Jointly Create a 
Harmonious and Bright Future.” 
165 Hu, “Deepen Concrete Cooperation, Maintain Peace and Stability.” 
166 “Wen Jiabao Attended and Spoke at the Tenth Heads of Government Meeting of SCO Member 
States.” 
167 Li, “The International Institutional Basis for the Rise of the Renminbi,” 24. 
168 “Joint Communiqué of the Heads of Government (Premiers) Council Meeting of SCO Member 
States” [上海合作组织成员国政府首脑（总理）理事会会议联合公报], The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, (26th October 2005), http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/ 
169 “Joint Communiqué of the Heads of Government (Premiers) Council Meeting of SCO Member 
States,” (2nd November 2007). 
234 
 
Yekaterinburg Summit, according to which Beijing and Moscow would each 
contribute five billion dollars as the fund’s starting capital and exercise joint 
management. Yet China’s proposal was once again rejected by Russia. This eventually 
led Beijing to establish the fund itself.170  
 
 As I mentioned above, a multilateral development bank was central to the 
establish of a robust regional financial system. Under Wen Jiabao’s proposal in 2010, 
China would contribute 8 billion to the Bank’s start-up capital of 10 billion, while 
other SCO member states will provide the remaining 2 billion. China’s proposal, 
however, did not obtain Russia’s consent.171  In response to Beijing’s proposal to 
establish a SCO Development Bank in 2010, Moscow suggested that the proposed 
bank be founded on the basis of the Russian-led Eurasian Development Bank (EDB), 
with China becoming the EDB’s shareholder.172 
 
Although China rose to be the largest provider of financial public goods in 
Central Asia, we should not overstate China’s influence and the scale of regional 
financial cooperation. For instance, China under Hu Jintao concluded bilateral 
agreements with Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on local currency settlement. 
Nevertheless, as Li Wei argued, except for the 2011 Sino-Russian agreement, which 
extended beyond border trade to cover trade in other areas and sectors, the size of these 
agreements remained considerably limited. The Sino-Uzbek currency swap agreement, 
for instance, had a maximum drawable amount of only 700 million renminbi.173 
 
6.2.2.3 Social and Cultural Cooperation 
As I demonstrated in the case of APT, China was not unaware of the problem of trust 
in its quest for institutional leadership. The Hu Jintao administration sought to deepen 
mutual understanding with member states and promote their capacity building by 
supporting and soft selling in social and cultural cooperation. In 2007, Beijing 
established the SCO China scholarship, providing 100 scholarships for students from 
member states to study in China. It would also organize student exchange and support 
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the teaching of Chinese in member states.174  In 2012, China promised to further 
provide 30 thousands scholarships and invite 10 thousands students at Confucius 
Institutes in member states to study in China in the following decade.175 Apart from 
education, China supported member states in public administration training. In 2009, 
Beijing recommended the institutionalization of the Forum of Presidents of National 
Administrative Academy.176 Three years later, it promised to train 1500 experts from 
member states in the next three years.177 
  
Nevertheless, despite the signing of the Treaty of Long-Term Good 
Neighborly Friendship and Cooperation among SCO Member States, the impasse of 
cooperation reflected member states’ lingering mistrust of China. As was the case in 
East Asia, China’s policy in Xinjiang and the social, cultural and environmental 
ramifications of its growing regional economic presence have fueled deep-seated 
Sinophobia in Central Asian states.178 Even though the global financial crisis, member 
states’ demand for regional public goods and the SCO’s ineffectiveness presented 
China with a leadership opportunity, low level of trust prevented Beijing from 
mobilizing member states to accomplish the tasks that were necessary to the SCO’s 
adaptation to a changing international environment.  
 
6.2.3 Enlargement 
How to promote regional economic integration under the SCO was not the only 
conundrum facing the Hu Jintao administration. Institution building was anything but 
complete when the organization was established in 2001. Instead of following a 
blueprint, institution building proceeded “extemporarily.”179 Ambivalence over the 
SCO’s geopolitical identity was manifested most clearly in the question of 
enlargement. 180  While Russia strongly supported India’s accession, China, 
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Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were more cautious.181 As I pointed out in chapter three, 
membership is one of the “critical decisions” that shape an institution’s identity; 
control over membership, therefore, is central to the exercise of institutional leadership.  
 
Nevertheless, during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term, China 
remained ambivalent on the question of enlargement. Beijing, according to Zhao 
Huasheng, was not opposed to enlargement but believed that it should be implemented 
in a cautious way.182 Indeed, improvement of the SCO’s effectiveness remained a 
higher priority than enlargement, which could “dilute” the organization’s agenda, 
spawn factionalism and complicate the original plan for organizational 
development. 183  Li Xing and Niu Yichen also warned against overexpansion, 
especially admission of the United States or countries that are “vociferously anti-
American.”184 China’s reservations about India’s accession, meanwhile, arose from 
their unresolved border dispute and New Delhi’s continuing provision of refuge to the 
Dalai Lama and his exiled group.185 
 
As it did on other controversial issues, China “watered down” Russia’s 
proposal to safeguard its core interests without provoking open conflict with Moscow. 
While Beijing acquiesced to enlargement, it took advantage of the SCO’s decision-
making process by postponing and managing the issue. Disagreement among member 
states on the issue led to the imposition of a moratorium on enlargement in 2006.186 
Meanwhile, as a partial solution to the question, the organization introduced observer 
and dialogue partner statuses.  
 
It was until 2010 – nine years after the organization’s establishment – that the 
organization approved the Regulations on the Procedures for Admitting New 
Members and the SCO Rules of Procedure.187 According to the Regulations, a state is 
                                                          
181 Zhao, “Development Path of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 44-5; Interviewee 12. 
182 Zhao, “Development Path of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 46. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Li and Niu, “Why is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization incapable of sustaining China’s 
Security Strategy in its Periphery in the North West,” 114. 
185 Zhao, “Development Path of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 45. 
186 Lukin, “Should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be Enlarged?”  
187 “Press Release of the Foreign Ministers Council Meeting of SCO Member States” [上海合作组织




eligible for membership if it is located in Eurasia, has diplomatic and active economic 
relations with all current member states, is already a dialogue partner or observer state, 
and is currently not subjected to sanctions from the UN.188 These conditions raise the 
threshold of membership, prolong the accession process, and prevent any attempt to 
turn the SCO into an anti-American alliance. 
 
Although the SCO did not accept any new member states during the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term, it granted observer status to Afghanistan and dialogue 
partner status to Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka.189 Meanwhile, China continued to call 
for strengthening cooperation with observers. In 2008, Beijing recommended 
including observers in intergovernmental cooperation in security, trade, energy, 
transportation, customs, and culture.  Of these, transportation and cultural cooperation 
could become demonstration areas in the organization’s cooperation with observers.190 
Rather than making the “critical decision” on enlargement, China adopted an 
ambivalent and cautious attitude partly in order to postpone enlargement without 
antagonizing Russia.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined China’s leadership behavior in the SCO during the Hu 
Jintao administration’s second term. As the first intergovernmental organization 
named after a Chinese city, the SCO embodies the potentials and limits of China’s 
quest for leadership. While Chinese institutional leadership was crucial to the 
development of a dialogue and meeting mechanism into an intergovernmental 
organization, Beijing was unable to promote the organization’s identity and its 
adaptation to a changing international environment after the global financial crisis.  
Though security cooperation was, and has continued to be, the SCO’s defining 
purpose, its security function remained severely limited by structural, political and 
institutional constraints. China engaged in small-scale activities of supporting and soft 
                                                          
188 Lukin, “Should the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Be Enlarged?” 
189 “Press Release of the Heads of State Council Meeting of SCO Member States” [上海合作组织成
员国元首理事会会议新闻公报], The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, (6th – 7th June 2012), 
http://chn.sectsco.org/documents/ 
190 Hu, “Strengthen Neighborliness and Mutual Trust, Promote Peaceful Development”; Hu, “Holding 
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Jiabao Attended and Spoke at the Tenth Heads of Government Meeting of SCO Member States.” 
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selling; nevertheless, lingering suspicion among member states and its policy of non-
alliance and non-interference led Beijing to defer responsibilities for regional security 
leadership to Moscow. Meanwhile, economic cooperation, in which the Hu Jintao 
administration invested most of its efforts, was unsatisfactory. Growing time pressure 
for collective action and member states’ capability deficit provided an opportunity for 
China to exercise leadership through supporting and soft selling. Nevertheless, 
member states’ anxiety about China’s growing influence and Russia’s leadership 
aspirations prevented Beijing from securing support for its preferences in the “critical 
decisions” concerning the establishment of a free trade area, a development fund and 
a development bank. As was the case in APT, low level of trust confined Chinese 
institutional leadership to tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. Russia’s 
efforts to turn the SCO into an anti-West alliance and push for India’s accession further 
hampered China’s efforts to maintain and promote the SCO’s identity. 
 
A comparison with China’s activities in APT, as discussed in Chapter 4, shows 
that although the SCO and APT differ in some ways, the leadership challenge China 
faced in both institutions was highly similar. In both regions, there exists a regional 
order – or remnant of it – that was established by the dominant or previously dominant 
power without China’s participation in the first place. The malfunctioning of the 
existing order in the light of the shifting regional balance of power set off a leadership 
competition among regional stakeholders to redefine the region – its membership, 
structure and rules. As this and chapter four have shown, even though China was 
increasingly capable of providing the public goods that other member states needed, 
the problem of trust prevented the rising power from uniting them as a group behind 
its preferences in the “critical decisions” concerning the membership, institution 
building and external relations of the two regional institutions. 
 
A changing international environment and domestic economic balancing would 
put pressure on China to make a major strategic adjustment that would significantly 
increase the importance of Central Asia. How would the Xi Jinping administration 
promote the organization’s identity and its adaptation to a changing international 
environment? How would China leadership behavior shape the geopolitical 
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7. The Xi Jinping Administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
2012-2017 
 
The previous chapter has examined China’s leadership behavior in the SCO during the 
Hu Jintao administration’s second term. Notwithstanding the differences between the 
SCO and APT, the rising power was no less hamstrung in its quest for institutional 
leadership in the former than the latter. Although Chinese institutional leadership was 
crucial to the development of the “Shanghai Five” mechanism into the SCO, structural, 
political and institutional constraints prevented China from steering the organization’s 
adaptation to a changing international environment after the global financial crisis. 
Russia’s leadership aspirations and mistrust of China manifested themselves in the 
ongoing bargaining on the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s membership, 
institution building and external relations. Thus even though the SCO was established 
first and foremost for security cooperation, its security function and China’s leadership 
activities were severely limited in scope and scale. While the global financial crisis 
and member states’ capability shortage provided an opportunity for China to exercise 
leadership through supporting and soft selling, anxiety about the rising power’s 
growing economic influence not only led Moscow to block Beijing’s proposals of a 
free trade area, an anti-crisis fund and a development bank, but also to support India’s 
accession to the organization. As a result, Chinese institutional leadership under Hu 
Jintao was confined primarily to functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. The SCO’s stalemate reflected a contested process of renegotiation 
on the geopolitical definition of Central Asia. 
 
As chapters two and five have shown, a changing international environment 
and domestic economic imperatives generated pressures on China to “strive for 
achievement” by embarking on the BRI. While unveiling its maritime arm in the 
largest country in Southeast Asia, Xi Jinping launched its continental arm in 
Kazakhstan, the largest and most important country in Central Asia. Speaking at 
Nazabayev University in Astana on 8th September 2013, 1  the President, while 
                                                          
1 Xi, “Promote Friendship Between Our People and Work Together to Build a Bright Future.” 
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disavowing any intention on China’s part to “dominate regional affairs or establish 
any sphere of influence,” proposed the idea of “jointly building an ‘economic belt 
along the Silk Road’” that could potentially become “the biggest market in the world 
with unparalleled potential.”2 Whereas APT is, at least nominally, led by the ASEAN, 
the SCO is a Chinese-led initiative. Yet given China’s struggle to exercise institutional 
leadership under Hu Jintao, how would the launch of the BRI influence its institutional 
behavior? 
 
This chapter examines China’s leadership behavior in the SCO during the Xi 
Jinping administration’s first term. As was the case of APT, China’s leadership 
behavior underwent a shift from supporting and soft selling to hard selling in economic 
cooperation. Chinese institutional leadership, however, was subject to very much the 
same structural, political and institutional constraints as it was under Hu Jintao. 
Member states’ mistrust of China and Russia’s leadership aspirations prevented 
Beijing from uniting them behind its preferences in the “critical decisions” concerning 
the SCO’s membership, institutional development and external relations. While the 
United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan compelled China to step up its diplomatic 
investment with regard to the Afghan issue, its leadership activities in political and 
security cooperation remained confined to small-scale supporting and soft selling of 
institution and capacity building. Meanwhile, Moscow’s opposition to Beijing’s 
proposals of a free trade area, a development fund and a development bank meant that 
Chinese institutional leadership in economic cooperation was restricted to functional 
tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence.  Although the Sino-Russian 
agreement on the cooperation between the BRI and the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU) signified Russia’s recognition of China’s interests in Eurasia, it also 
prevented Beijing from marginalizing Moscow and dictating the geopolitical 
definition of Central Asia. India and Pakistan’s accession as full members, moreover, 
could further hamper China’s quest for institutional leadership. As was the case of 
APT, Beijing’s hard selling did not break the stalemate of the SCO but rather further 
its fragmentation.  
 




China’s failure to promote the SCO’s adaptation to a changing international 
environment showed that the negotiation on the geopolitical definition of Central Asia 
remained in a holding pattern. While the SCO contributed to the consolidation of 
China’s presence and the post-Soviet regional order in Central Asia, the launch of the 
BRI represented its attempt to reintegrate Central Asia into an expanding, Sino-centric 
geopolitical construct of periphery. This, however, came into direct conflict with 
Russia’s vision of greater Eurasia. As long as Beijing had no intention to overthrow 
the status quo, the geopolitical definition of Central Asia would remain contested. 
 
7.1 The Silk Road Economic Belt and the Remaking of Eurasia  
As I discussed in chapter two, although China recognized the strategic significance of 
Central Asia long before the launch of the BRI, its geostrategic posture remained for 
a long time oriented toward East Asia. Nevertheless, as I discussed in 2.5.2, a changing 
strategic environment after the global financial crisis triggered a debate at the end of 
the Hu Jintao administration on the rising power’s need for its own “pivot.” As Wang 
Jisi argued in his now famous article, given the increasingly zero-sum competition 
with the United States in East Asia, China should expand its “strategic maneuvering 
space” by expanding its diplomatic investment in the “West.”3 The Peking University 
professor’s view was representative of China’s expanding conception of its Western 
periphery as extending beyond Central Asia to the broader Eurasia.4  A changing 
international environment, together with the domestic economic imperatives to sustain 
growth and expedite structural economic reform, led the rising power to embark on its 
most ambitious geoeconomic initiative. 
 
Like Southeast Asia, Central Asia is pivotal to the implementation and success 
of the BRI. Four of the six “economic corridors” – the China-Mongolia-Russia 
Economic Corridor, the New Eurasia Land Bridge, the China-Central Asia-West Asia 
Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – go through the 
region and involve the SCO’s members, observers or dialogue partners. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the organization became the central platform for the 
                                                          
3 Wang, “‘March West.’” 
4 It should be noted, however, that Wang Jisi was not the first scholar who conceived of Eurasia as 
China’s hinterland. See, for instance, Feng, “Strategic Orientation and Development Direction of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” 
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implementation of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB). 5  Nevertheless, as the 
previous chapter has shown, low level of trust confined Chinese institutional 
leadership to functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. The Xi 
Jinping administration was not unaware of the problem, as manifested in the 
President’s denial of any intention on China’s part to seek regional dominance, 
Beijing’s emphasis on the BRI’s collaborative nature, and its initiatives to promote 
social and cultural exchange. 
 
The BRI expanded the geopolitical contest from Central Asia to the broader 
region of Eurasia. In response, Russia expedited its regionalist project by upgrading 
EurAsEc and SES into the EAEU in January 2015. A geoeconomic initiative like the 
BRI but with a higher degree of integration among member states, the EAEU 
represented Moscow’s attempt to consolidate the post-Soviet space. 6 As the following 
discussion will show, Russia’s mistrust of China and Moscow’s leadership aspirations 
manifested themselves in the ongoing bargaining between the two great powers over 
the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s membership, institution building and 
external relations. 
 
If the start of the United States’ war in Afghanistan changed the dynamics of 
renegotiation on the geopolitical definition of Central Asia, so did its end. While the 
contest increasingly centered on China and Russia, external forces sought to embed 
their interests in the region through different forms of linkages. Although the United 
States completed withdrawal of combat troops from Afghanistan in 2014, it sought to 
maintain its ties with regional stakeholders through the “C5+1” dialogue and 
multinational energy infrastructure projects. In addition to India and Pakistan’s 
                                                          
5 Xiaoding Chen [陈小鼎] and Ru Ma [马茹], “The Role of and Development Options for the 
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6 For an overview of different geopolitical conceptions of Eurasia, see Anna Kuznetsova, “Greater 
Eurasia: Perceptions from Russia, the European Union, and China,” The Russian International Affairs 




accession to the SCO in 2017, the Iranian nuclear deal opened the way for Tehran to 
reengage the region.7 The rise of the Islamic State (IS), meanwhile, aggravated the 
threat of Islamic radicalism to regional security. These developments tested the SCO’s 
ability to adapt to a changing external environment. 
 
7.2 The Xi Jinping administration and Chinese Institutional 
Leadership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 2012 – 2017 
 
7.2.1 Political and Security Cooperation 
“Security,” Xi Jinping stressed at the 2014 Dushanbe Summit, was the “precondition 
of development.” 8  Despite the increasing prominence of economic cooperation, 
security cooperation continued to be fundamental to the organization’s identity. 
Indeed, the Xi Jinping administration’s first term saw deterioration of security in 
Central Asia. Though relieving member states of political security threats, Western 
disengagement from Afghanistan exacerbated the threats of terrorism, drug-trafficking 
and transnational crime to the region.9 Meanwhile, geographical proximity, ethno-
cultural linkages and socio-political problems rendered Central Asia vulnerable to the 
spread of radicalism from the Middle East, which was epitomized by the cross-border 
activities of the Islamic State (IS) and other terrorist groups.10 Though the presence of 
IS was largely confined to Afghanistan, its potential threat to the region began to 
                                                          
7 Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky and Paul Stronski, “U.S. Policy toward Central Asia 3.0,” 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (January 2016), 14-5, 
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the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Development to a New Stage – Remarks at the Fourteenth 
Heads of State Council Meeting of SCO Member States” [凝心聚力精诚协作推动上海合作组织再
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Affairs, (12th September 2014), 
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9 Xinming Chen [陈新明] and Yuanzheng Li [李源正], “American Withdrawal from Afghanistan and 
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面临的挑战及应对], Contemporary International Relations [现代国际关系], No. 3, (2015), 24-8. 
10 Haiyun Wang [王海运], “The Rise of Islamic Radicalism and its Challenges to Security in Eurasia” 
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刊], No. 2, (2016), 6-8; Ning Zhang [张宁] and Wencheng Ma [马文琤], “Development of IS around 
China’s Periphery in the West” [IS 在中国西部周边的发展态势], Academic Journal of Russian 
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manifest itself in the growing number of incidents involving its supporters.11 Various 
sources suggest that the number of Central Asians who had joined IS at the time ranged 
from 2000 to 4000.12 The group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, referred to China in 
his speech as a target for infiltration.13 
 
The SCO’s inability to respond to external challenges made the building of its 
capacity to “maintain stability” a principal task.14 “The common concern of member 
states,” Xi Jinping pointed out at the 2015 Ufa Summit, was to “prevent regional 
situation from lapsing into chaos, prevent the spread of terrorism and religious 
extremist ideas, and prevent the forces with ulterior motives from undermining 
regional peace and stability.”15 This required continuing efforts to improve existing 
mechanisms in security and law enforcement cooperation, strengthen policy 
coordination, and study the possibility of instituting response measures to safeguard 
member states’ “regime, system, societal security and stability.”16 
 
Nevertheless, the bargain between China, Russia and the Central Asian states 
on the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s institutional development and its 
relations with the Moscow-led CSTO continued to block the organization’s adaptation 
to a changing international environment. The SCO Development Strategy toward 2025 
approved at the 2015 Ufa Summit reaffirmed that the organization “does not aim to 
develop into a military-political alliance with supranational institutions.”17 Meanwhile, 
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17 “Development Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Toward 2025” [上海合作组织




the SCO would strengthen contact with other institutions including the Russian-led 
CSTO and CIS. 
 
Structural, political and institutional constraints led China under Xi Jinping to 
adopt essentially the same approach to political and security cooperation as his 
predecessor. China sought to exercise institutional leadership by supporting and soft 
selling in selected tasks; its activities, however, were confined to small-scale tasks 
with low uncertainty and interdependence. American withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
however, led Beijing to significantly augment its efforts with regard to the Afghan 
issue. 
 
7.2.1.1 Combatting the “Three Forces,” Drug-trafficking and Transnational 
Crime 
The SCO Development Strategy toward 2025 reflected the fear of some member states 
– particularly Uzbekistan – over the organization’s transformation into a military-
political alliance. 18  Apart from the routines of formulating regular “strategies,” 
“frameworks” or “action plans,” anti-terrorist cooperation during the Xi Jinping 
administration’s first term continued to take the form of law making, policy 
coordination and joint operation. To combat cross-border terrorism and the trafficking 
of drugs, weapons and humans, member states signed the Cooperation Agreement of 
SCO Member States on Border Security in 2015 and the SCO Convention on 
Combating Extremism two years later.19 
 
The growing threat arising from the dissemination of radical ideas in 
cyberspace placed information security at the center of the SCO’s security agenda. As 
Xi Jinping suggested at the 2014 Dushanbe Summit, security cooperation should focus 
on combating “religious extremism and cyber terrorism.”20 Member states repeatedly 
                                                          
18 Roger McDermott, “Uzbekistan Snubs SCO Peace Mission 2012,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 9, 
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reaffirmed their support for the creation of a “peaceful, safe, just and open cyber 
space”; commitment to preventing the spread of “terrorist, extremist, separatist, 
radical, fascist and chauvinist ideas”; and opposition against “the use of information 
technology to undermine member states’ political, economic and public security.”21 
To promote the formulation of standard principles governing international relations in 
cyberspace, member states circulated their jointly drafted “International Code of 
Conduct on Information Security Practice” and its amended version as formal 
documents of the United Nations in 2014 and 2015.22 
 
Another growing concern was the convergence of terrorism and drug-
trafficking. While member states recognized the need to establish effective 
mechanisms and cooperate with other stakeholders in addressing the threats of drug-
trafficking and drug abuse, they upheld the existing international anti-drug regime 
founded upon the three United Nations Conventions and opposed any attempt to 
undermine it. 23 Meanwhile, member states agreed to coordinate their position in the 
UN Special Meeting on Drug-trafficking.24 They also began work on the 2017-2022 
Anti-Drug Strategy of SCO Member States in 2015.25 To enhance cooperation in 
combatting transnational crime, member states pledged to promote information 
exchange, adopt threat prevention measures, conduct joint operation and strengthen 
law enforcement coordination.26 
 
Security cooperation at operational level continued to take the forms of 
exchange, military exercise and joint operation. During the Xi Jinping administration’s 
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first term, member states continued to hold the annual anti-terrorist military exercise, 
including the first internet anti-terrorist exercise in Xiamen, China in 2015.27 They 
also took initiatives to develop RATS’s operational capacity and enhance coordination. 
In 2013, RATS established a joint expert team with representatives from all member 
states to address the threat of cyber terrorism. 28  It also held a roundtable on 
cooperation in combating the “three forces” in the same year.29  Furthermore, the 
public security cooperation mechanism for major events, which was invoked for the 
first time in the 2008 Beijing Olympics, was invoked again during the Sochi Winter 
Olympics and the Astana Expo in 2017.30  
 
Notwithstanding Russia’s declining capacity to provide regional security 
public goods, Beijing’s “tacit bargain” with Moscow, its policy of non-alliance and 
non-interference and low level of trust led the Xi Jinping administration to continue to 
defer leadership responsibility in security cooperation to Russia. As a result, its 
activities of supporting and soft selling remained highly limited in scope and scale. 
While calling for member states to expedite cooperation in law making,  the President 
advanced various proposals for building up the organization’s operational capacity, 
including a law enforcement cooperation network and operational mechanisms for 
combating cyber terrorism.31 Specifically, he repeatedly called for giving RATS anti-
drug function and the establishment of a Center for Response to Security Threats and 
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Challenges. 32  Member states’ agencies, meanwhile, should establish regular 
communication channels and explore the possibility of conducting joint operation.33 
While continuing to play the central role as the host and the participant of the annual 
anti-terrorist joint exercise, China undertook operational cooperation with other 
participant states of the SCO primarily through bilateral and mini-multilateral 
channels. To support member states’ capacity building, Beijing also established a 
“China National Institute for SCO International Exchange and Judicial Cooperation” 
in Shanghai  34 
 
7.2.1.2 Political Security 
Although the SCO’s incapacity became manifest during the Kyrgyz Revolution in 
2010, Western disengagement from Afghanistan significantly reduced political 
security threats to Central Asian states. As was the case during the Hu Jintao era, the 
SCO served primarily as a “talk shop” for member states to coordinate their position 
on major international and regional issues and provide political cover for each other. 
Given China and Russia’s involvement in the Syrian peace process as well as the 
negotiations on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues, the SCO offered political 
support for the two great powers’ diplomacy.35 Meanwhile, Beijing strove to preserve 
the organization’s identity as “non-alliance, non-confrontational and not targeted at 
third party.” 
 
Of the greatest importance during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term 
was the Iranian nuclear issue, not only because China and Russia participated in the 
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six-party talks, but also because Iran was an observer of the SCO and had long 
indicated its interest in full membership. In the 2013 Bishkek Declaration, member 
states stressed that “any attempt by individual state to threaten military action or 
unilateral sanction against Iran would be unacceptable.”36 The issue could only be 
resolved on the basis of equality and a “step-by-step approach.”37 They supported 
“constructive dialogue” between the “P5+1” group and Iran, and welcomed the “Joint 
Action Plan” concluded by the foreign ministers of the six parties in 2013.38 With the 
conclusion of a historic deal in 2015, the heads of state praised the resolution and gave 
positive recognition of the prospect of Iran’s accession to the organization.39 
 
Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine posed a diplomatic challenge to 
China in the same way as the Russo-Georgian war did in 2007. Nevertheless, 
ambivalence toward Russia’s action and alarm about the SCO’s transformation into 
an anti-West coalition led China and other member states to provide limited political 
support without approving Moscow’s military action. 40  In the 2014 Dushanbe 
Declaration, the heads of states expressed their wish for the restoration of peace to 
Ukraine and support for continued negotiations.41 They welcomed the minute signed 
by the trilateral contact group on the implementation of the peace plans put forward 
by the two sides.42 From then on, member states continued to reiterate their support 
for the political resolution of the conflict on the basis of the Minsk Agreement in 
2015.43 Nonetheless, scant reference was made to the crisis in comparison with the 
Syrian peace process or the Iranian nuclear issue throughout the Xi Jinping 
administration’s first term. 
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American withdrawal from Afghanistan brought the SCO to the forefront in 
addressing the situation in the war-torn country. Nevertheless, there remained 
disagreement between member states as well as among China’s foreign policy elites 
over the extent and form of the organization’s involvement. Whereas Putin continued 
to call for the SCO to play a more active role in the Afghan issue, the late Uzbek 
President Islam Karimov argued that the organization should avoid military and 
political involvement.44 Apart from the country’s “complicated situation” and the 
“lessons of recent history,” the SCO’s involvement could be misinterpreted by the 
world as its preparedness to take full responsibility for the Afghan issue.45 
 
Not surprisingly, disagreement led to inaction. Member states repeatedly 
reaffirmed their support for the rebuilding of Afghanistan to be a country of 
“independence,” “neutrality,” “peace,” “prosperity” and “free of terrorism and drug-
trafficking.” 46  The Afghan people should play the central role in the national 
reconciliation process; the international community, meanwhile, should respect the 
country’s “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.” 47 The United Nations 
should play a leading role in the Afghan issue, while regional stakeholders should 
jointly address the problem of drug-trafficking through bilateral and multilateral 
frameworks.48 
 
China sought to exercise greater leadership in capacity building by supporting, 
even though it attempted to enhance its control over task implementation by initiating 
structures of cooperation at bilateral or mini-multilateral levels. Of particular 
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significance was the establishment of a Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination 
Mechanism in Counter Terrorism by the armed forces of China, Afghanistan, 
Tajikistan and Pakistan in 2016.49 China’s initiative raised suspicion in Russia, even 
though some – such as Moscow’s special envoy to Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov – 
believed that Beijing’s primary purpose was border control cooperation, and that it 
had no intention to employ military forces. 50  Despite China’s denial that the 
mechanism was a military alliance, Russia, reportedly in response to the Chinese 
initiative, subsequently held a large military exercise with Tajikistan. 51  Russia’s 
response reflected its lingering mistrust of the rising power and explained Beijing’s 
recalcitrance to exercise institutional leadership in security cooperation. 
 
Apart from the quadrilateral anti-terrorist cooperation mechanism, Beijing had 
since 2013 established a web of dialogue mechanisms to strengthen coordination with 
other members, observers and dialogue partners on the Afghan issue. They included 
the China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, China-Russia India 
Senior Security Representatives Meeting on the Afghan Issue and the China-Pakistan-
Russia Trilateral Dialogue on Afghanistan.52 Beijing also hosted meetings of the “6+1” 
Dialogue and the Istanbul Process.53 
 
                                                          
49 Hang Yin [尹航] and Xu Ren [任旭], “The Inaugural High-Level Defense Officials’ Meeting of the 
‘Afghanistan-China-Pakistan-Tajikistan’ Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism in 
Counter Terrorism Took Place” [首届‘阿中巴塔’四国军队反恐合作协调机制高级领导人会议举
行], Ministry of National Defense, (3rd August 2016), http://www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2016-
08/03/content_4707671.htm 
50 Joshua Kucera, “China Proposes New Central Asian Military Alliance,” Eurasianet, (21st March 
2016), https://www.eurasianet.org/china-proposes-new-central-asian-military-alliance  
51 Kucera, “China Proposes New Central Asian Military Alliance”; Joshua Kucera, “Don’t Worry, 
Russia: China’s Not Starting a ‘Central Asian NATO,’” Eurasianet, (6th April 2016), 
https://www.eurasianet.org/dont-worry-russia-chinas-not-starting-a-central-asian-nato  
52 Changhong Sun [孙昌洪], “SCO Member States’ Response to the United States’ Imminent 
Withdrawal from Afghanistan” [上合组织成员国对美军即将撤离阿富汗的反应], in Jinfeng Li [李
进峰], Hongwei Wu [吴宏伟] and Wei Li [李伟] (eds.), Annual Report on the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (2014) [上海合作组织发展报告 (2014)], (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 
2014), 57. 
53 “China and Russia Co-host 6+1 Dialogue on Afghanistan Issue,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, (7th March 2014),  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1136653.shtml; “The Fourth Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 
of the Istanbul Process on the Afghan Question Took Place in Beijing” [阿富汗问题伊斯坦布尔进程




Meanwhile, China promoted Afghanistan’s capacity building by supporting. 
Beijing promised to provide 327 million dollars of foreign aid when Afghan President 
Ashraf Ghani visited China for the first time in 2014; it also invited a delegation from 
the Taliban to visit China at the end of the year. 54 During General Fang’s visit to Kabul 
in 2016, China promised to provide Afghanistan with 70 million dollars of military 
aid.55 
 
7.2.1.4 Energy and Other Areas of Non-Traditional Security Cooperation 
China also sought to exercise institutional leadership in selected areas of non-
traditional security cooperation by supporting and soft selling. Most of the tasks, 
however, remained functional tasks with low uncertainty and interdependence. As I 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the signing of the Memorandum on the 
Establishment of SCO Energy Club in 2013 seemed at first to represent the eventual 
realization of an idea that was first raised in 2005. Nevertheless, the scant reference to 
the Energy Club and energy cooperation in the organization’s statements since then 
indicates continuing disagreement between member states.  
 
China had expressed its support for the establishment of an Energy Club since 
the Hu Jintao era. The importance of energy cooperation led Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang 
to raise the idea again at the first annual meetings of the SCO they attended as national 
leaders.56 Since then, however, scant reference had been made to the subject. Beijing 
called for maximizing the use of the Energy Club as a platform to strengthen dialogue, 
policy coordination and cooperation.57 Meanwhile, member states should strengthen 
cooperation in the production, transmission and refinement of both conventional and 
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new energy such as including nuclear power.58  To encourage cooperation, China 
expressed its willingness to provide support in technology, equipment and capital.59  
 
Despite its market power, China was unable to exercise institutional leadership 
in energy cooperation. Yet, as was the case during the Hu Jintao era, stalemate in 
multilateral cooperation did not stop the rising power from stepping up its search for 
energy supply through bilateral and mini-lateral channels. With the launch of the BRI, 
China’s hard selling in infrastructure development included energy projects such as 
the Southern Kazakhstan-China gas pipeline. The Xi Jinping administration’s greatest 
achievement was the conclusion of mega energy deals with Russia. In 2016, the 
Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank Corporation provided 
10.6 billion and 1.5 billion dollars of credit to Yamal LNG to finance the largest 
natural gas production project in the Arctic. 60  The China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) and the Chinese-led Silk Road Fund also held 20% and 9.9% of 
the shares of a nearby gas field with a reserve of 926 billion cubic meters.61 Another 
ambitious project is the so-called “Power of Siberia,” which consists in the 
construction of a 3000-long network of pipelines.62 In 2014, Gazprom and CNPC 
concluded a 30-year agreement on supplying 38 billion cubic meters of gas to China 
from the Yakutia and Irkutsk gas production centers through the “Power of Siberia” 
pipelines.63 The two corporations subsequently concluded another agreement to build 
an underwater pipeline across the Amur River.64 
 
China promoted capacity building through supporting and soft selling in other 
areas of non-traditional security. In agriculture and food security, Beijing proposed 
the establishment of a unified information exchange platform, and offered to provide 
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50 million dollars for technological development and professional training.65 The new 
administration also proposed the establishment of cooperation mechanisms for food 
security cooperation. In health, China proposed to develop Xinjiang into an 
international medical service center and establish research institutes of Chinese 
Medicine with member states.66 In 2013, the heads of government signed the Proposal 
on Reporting the Spread of Epidemics among SCO Member States.67 
 
 Another major concern was environmental conservation. Beijing called for 
member states to formulate a cooperation strategy for environmental cooperation 
under the SCO. 68 To facilitate exchange and capacity building, the administration 
proposed expediting the building of an information exchange platform upon the basis 
of the China-SCO Environmental Cooperation Center; Li Keqiang announced in 2015 
that the platform would soon begin operation.69 Meanwhile, the new administration 
introduced a SCO Technological Partnership Scheme and a Green Silk Road 
Ambassador Scheme. 
 
The above discussion shows that structural, political and institutional 
constraints restricted the scope and scale of Chinese institutional leadership under Xi 
Jinping in very much the same way as they did under his predecessor. China engaged 
in supporting and soft selling of small-scale, functional tasks with low uncertainty and 
interdependence. American withdrawal from Afghanistan, however, compelled 
Beijing to exercise greater control over task implementation by initiating new 
structures of cooperation. Nevertheless, China’s adherence to a policy of non-alliance 
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and non-intervention, together with the bargain between China, Russia and the Central 
Asian countries on the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s institution building, 
meant that the SCO continued to suffer from leadership deficit and was thus incapable 
of adapting to a changing international environment. 
 
7.2.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation 
With the launch of the SREB, the first term of the Xi Jinping administration saw the 
growing prominence of economic over security cooperation under the SCO. Beijing 
embarked on its ambitious geoeconomic initiative at a time when the domestic 
imperative to “rebalance” the Chinese economy converged with member states’ 
struggle to resuscitate theirs. Russia achieved only 0.7% of growth in 2014, while 
Kazakhstan’s growth slowed down from 4.3% in 2014 to 1.2% in 2015. 70 Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan also underwent various degrees of growth slowdown in 
the same period. The slump in oil price and commodity demand resulted in a decline 
in exports. In 2015, Kazakhstan’s and Tajikistan’s exports dropped 37.1% and 18% 
respectively from the previous year, while Kyrgyzstan’s exports from January to 
November in 2015 dropped 23.7% from the same period in the previous year.71 
Economic dependence on Russia meant that Central Asian states were severely 
affected when it was plunged into recession by structural economic problems and 
Western sanctions over the Ukrainian crisis. In particular, the Ruble’s plummet 
brought Central Asian currencies down. On 20th August 2015, when the Kazakh 
government lifted currency controls, the Tenge dropped immediately from 188.36 to 
255.56 to 1 US dollar within the same day; the fall continued to 375 to 1 US dollar on 
27th January 2016.72 
 
Economic downturn reversed the rapid growth in China’s trade with member 
states during the Hu Jintao era (Table 6.2). Throughout the Xi Jinping administration’s 
first term, China fell back to parity with Russia and trailed significantly behind the EU 
in its total volume of trade with Central Asia. Trade decline, however, slowed down 
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but did not stop the rising power’s growing economic presence in the region. China 
remained a top three trading partner with all member states. With the launch of the 
SREB, the volume of containers transiting from China to Europe through Kazakhstan 
rose from 1,200 in 2011 to 200,000 in 2017.73 Of the 433 newly registered foreign 
enterprises in Uzbekistan in 2014, 110 were from China. 74  Beijing became 
Tajikistan’s largest creditor of, holding 42% of the country’s debt.75 Similarly, the 
Export-Import Bank of China was Kyrgyzstan’s largest creditor, having provided up 
to 1.116 billion dollars of loan to the country by 2014.76 
 
The need to promote sustainable development and global economic 
governance reform, as the joint communiqué of heads of government in 2015 
suggested, seemed to provide a new impetus for member states to unite behind a 
common purpose. 77  As China embarked on the BRI, other member states also 
launched their new national development strategies, such as Kazakhstan’s “Nurly Zhol” 
(“Bright Path”) New Economic Policy, Uzbekistan’s “Vision-2030” and Tajikistan’s 
“National Development Strategy for the Period up to 2030.” Member states’ demand 
for public goods on the one hand, and the national economic imperatives to expand 
foreign investment, industrial transfer and export of surplus production capacity on 
the other, provided the incentives for China to seek institutional leadership. 
Nevertheless, while China under Xi Jinping demonstrated increasing capacity to 
provide the public goods that member states needed, it remained unable to unite them 
as a group behind its purpose in promoting the SCO’s adaptation to a changing 
international environment. 
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7.2.2.1 Trade and “Strategic Convergence” 
As 4.2.2 and 6.2.2 have shown, member states’ mistrust of China and great power 
rivalries prevented Beijing from consolidating the geoeconomic boundaries of its 
peripheral regions. As EAFTA was rejected by Japan and ASEAN countries, Beijing’s 
proposal of a SCO free trade area was “shelved” due to Russia’s opposition. China’s 
dissatisfaction with the progress of economic cooperation under the SCO was 
expressed in Xi Jinping’s call for member states to “take a bigger stride in undertaking 
trade and investment facilitation.”78 As was the case from the beginning, economic 
cooperation continued to take the form of the formulation of “frameworks” and 
“measures lists.” Throughout the Xi Jinping administration’s first term, member states 
repeatedly called for the implementation of projects in the 2012-2016 Measures List 
for Further Promoting Project Cooperation under the SCO while preparing a measures 
list of 38 projects in seven areas for the period of 2017-2021.79 
 
From the beginning of its first term, the Xi Jinping administration strove to 
renegotiate the “critical decisions” concerning institution building in trade and 
investment. In his first attendance of the heads of state summit in 2013, Xi Jinping 
suggested that member states should begin negotiations on a trade and investment 
facilitation agreement.80 Later in the same year, Li Keqiang called for simplification 
of customs and quarantine procedures, reduction of duties and removal of trade barrier 
so as to “create the conditions for free trade under the SCO framework.”81 One year 
after, the President went further by recommending member states to “grant each other 
most-favored nation status, promote regional economic integration and construct a 
unified regional space for trade, investment and logistics.”82 
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China did not refer to its proposal of a SCO free trade area again until the end 
of 2016. While expressing Beijing’s willingness to strengthen cooperation with 
member states in customs, quarantine and certification and accreditation, Li Keqiang 
stated at the meeting of the Heads of Government Council that China 
adopts an open attitude to initiatives such as a SCO free trade area and is 
willing to conduct free trade area feasibility study with all parties. Taking into 
full consideration the concerns of all parties and regional characteristics, 
[China] will actively explore [with all parties] a more comprehensive, compact 
and effective framework of regional economic cooperation.83 
The passivity of the Premier’s statement, however, reflected the lack of progress in 
China’s attempt to mobilize member states as a group to accomplish a task with high 
uncertainty and interdependence. It was at the last heads of state summit in his first 
term that Xi Jinping proposed a SCO trade facilitation agreement.84 
 
As was the case during the Hu Jintao era, political and institutional constraints 
prevented China from exercising institutional leadership by renegotiating the “critical 
decision” on regional free trade. Indeed, the SCO Development Strategy toward 2025 
stated clearly that the organization “does not aim to develop into an economic bloc 
with supranational institutions.”85 Meanwhile, the document made no reference to the 
development of a free trade area as the objective of economic cooperation.86 Given 
that supranational integration is the aim of the Russian-led EAEU, the Strategy reflects 
Moscow’s attempt to maintain the SCO’s existing institutional bargain, constrain 
Chinese institutional leadership and prevent its own marginalization. Thus 
notwithstanding member states’ agreements on customs, technology and tourism as 
well as their instruction to commerce ministers to make “feasible proposals” for trade 
and investment facilitation, the idea of a free trade area remained “shelved.”87 
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Like the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in Southeast Asia, the SREB 
represented a shift in China’s leadership behavior in economic cooperation to hard 
selling. As Beijing sought to enhance its control over collective action, it redefined 
collective purposes and initiated structures of cooperation on its own terms. This was 
manifested in the reference to the SREB in Strategy as the means to promote regional 
economic cooperation under the SCO. 88  Engaging member states selectively and 
individually rather than as a group, China’s hard selling further shifted the locus of its 
activities to Chinese-led channels. To promote balanced trade with member states in 
agriculture, China proposed to increase its beef and lamb imports and strengthen 
cooperation in agricultural production and processing. To reduce trade and investment 
barriers, China would improve customs efficiency and simplify the application process 
for visa, labor permit and stay. Beijing would also provide logistical services in 
Lianyun harbor in order to facilitate Central Asian states’ exports to the world. To 
strengthen member states’ capacity, China offered to train 1000 trade facilitation 
experts, build customs facilities and establish an e-commerce association.89 
 
China’s behavioral change was also driven by the pressure to expedite 
domestic economic rebalancing through exports of its surplus production capacity. In 
2014, Li Keqiang expressed China’s willingness to establish cooperation parks in each 
member state. 90  The Xi Jinping administration’s greatest achievement was the 
conclusion of agreement with Kazakhstan in 2015, which included a total of 52 “early 
harvest projects.” 91  At the Heads of Government Council meeting, Li Keqiang 
expressed China’s willingness to extend the Chinese-Kazakh experience to other 
member states and jointly select pilot projects for cooperation.92 Since then, China has 
concluded agreements on investment and production capacity cooperation with Russia 
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and Kyrgyzstan. Other notable projects included industrial parks in Belarus and 
Uzbekistan, oil refineries in Kyrgyzstan and cement factories in Tajikistan.93 
 
While the need to mitigate mistrust and signal its commitment to the status quo 
resulted in the BRI’s lack of any integrated institutional component and China’s 
emphasis on the centrality of the SCO in its implementation, Beijing engaged in hard 
selling by initiating parallel structures of cooperation at mini-lateral and bilateral 
levels on its own terms. Indeed, all of the SREB’s six “economic corridors” involved 
the organization’s members, observers or dialogue partners. The Xi Jinping 
administration’s first term saw the greatest progress in the China-Pakistan and the 
China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridors. First proposed by Li Keqiang in 2013, 
China and Pakistan embarked on the initiative with 5 projects on electricity and 51 
agreements and memoranda worth 46 billion dollars.94 One year later, Xi Jinping 
proposed the building of a China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor in his meeting 
with Putin and Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj prior to the 2014 Dushanbe 
Summit.95 In 2015, the three states concluded a “mid-term roadmap” for trilateral 
cooperation, a memorandum on formulating a development framework and 
cooperation agreements in trade and border port development.96 
 
The deadlocked bargain on the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s 
institution building and external relations was a manifestation of the broader 
contestation over the geopolitical definition of Eurasia. The shifting balance of 
economic power exacerbated the problem of trust that hindered China back from 
promoting the SCO’s identity and adaptation to a changing international environment 
after the global financial crisis. As 6.2.2 has shown, Russia’s mistrust of China and its 
leadership aspirations led Moscow to block Beijing’s of free trade initiative while 
accelerating its regionalist project. 
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China’s launch of the SREB intensified Sino-Russian leadership competition. 
In response, Russia “upgraded” the SES by concluding the Treaty on the EAEU with 
Kazakhstan and Belarus on 29th May 2014. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan acceded to the 
EAEU one day after the Treaty entered into force on 1st January 2015. According to 
Vorobyov, 
[t]he launch of EAEU is partially an attempt to limit the expansion of goods 
from China and to create an opportunity for post-Soviet countries to restart 
their own industrialization programs. That is why the Eurasian integration 
union is not being favorably disposed towards the idea of a full-scale free trade 
zone between EAEU and China, something that is widely supported by Beijing. 
There is another issue, as Moscow is in favor of a unified position of EAEU 
countries in terms of cooperation with China and is therefore encouraging them 
to act like a ‘single front.’ Beijing is subverting this ‘single front,’ aiming for 
bilateral cooperation with the countries of Central Asia.97 
Thus even though the SREB satisfies Russia’s demand for market access and capital, 
China’s hard selling, in Moscow’s view, threatens to marginalize the EAEU and 
prevent Russia from consolidating the geopolitical boundaries of the post-Soviet space. 
 
Moscow’s suspicion seemed to be warranted, as China signed cooperation 
agreements with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan to integrate the SREB with 
their national development strategies.98  Indeed, according to Gabuyev, Moscow’s 
“obstructionism” in financial cooperation already generated dissatisfaction among 
Central Asian countries.99 On the other hand, China’s increasing economic dominance 
has fueled the deep-seated, historical mistrust of the rising power among its neighbors. 
The dilemma is manifested most strongly in Kazakhstan. While Astana is the only 
ardent supporter of China’s proposal of a SCO free trade area, the prospect of 
“integrat[ing] with 1.5 billion people” raises concern with the nature of the bilateral 
relationship. 100  The Kazakh government’s proposal of land reforms, which was 
                                                          
97 Alexander Vorobyov, “China and Central Asia: Growing Friendship at Russian Borders,” Russian 
International Affairs Council, (11th July 2017), http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-
comments/analytics/china-and-central-asia-growing-friendship-at-russian-borders/  
98 Li, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” 33-4. 
99 Gabuyev, “Taming the Dragon.” 
100 Daly and Rojansky, “China’s Global Dreams Give its Neighbors Nightmares”; Andrey Kortunov, 
“SCO: The Cornerstone Rejected by the Builders of a New Eurasia?” Russia International Affairs 
263 
 
considered by many locals as opening the way for Chinese investors to buy up their 
country’s land, sparked off protests in 2016.101 
 
Although China and Russia both admitted that competition existed between 
the SREB and the EAEU, they managed to strike a bargain when they signed the “Joint 
Communiqué of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on the 
Integration and Cooperation between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian 
Economic Union” (“the Communiqué”) in May 2015. 102  While in practice there 
existed formidable difficulties in the integration of the two grand schemes, the 
Communiqué signified Russia’s recognition of, if not acquiescence to, China’s 
interests across Eurasia.103  
 
In this regard, the Communiqué was a “painful” decision for Russia, as some 
believed it would inevitably lead to Chinese economic dominance.104 On the other 
hand, the Communiqué prevented Beijing from marginalizing the EAEU and dictating 
the geopolitical definition of Eurasia on its own terms. By designating the SCO as a 
key platform for cooperation, it enabled Moscow to utilize its rules and procedures to 
preempt any “critical decisions” on institutional development that would undermine 
Russia’s interests.105  The signing of the Joint Declaration of Feasibility study on 
Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement between China and Russia in 2017 
represented the continuation of Moscow’s efforts to check Chinese influence and bind 
Beijing to its vision of “Great Eurasian Partnership.” 
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To reassure Russia and other member states, Xi Jinping expressed China’s 
hope at the 2015 Ufa Summit that the SREB and national development of the SCO’s 
participant states would be “complementary.”106 China would strive to accomplish 
strategic integration of the SREB with the EAEU and other member states’ national 
development strategies. 107 Beijing also supported the holding of dialogue between the 
SCO and the Eurasian Economic Commission in order to facilitate integration of the 
two regionalist projects. 108 
 
7.2.2.2 Finance 
As chapters four to six have shown, capital was China’s most powerful instrument of 
economic leadership. The global financial crisis, the shifting balance of power and 
member states’ capability deficit catapulted China to be the largest provider of 
economic public goods in Central Asia. Nevertheless, as I discussed in 6.2.2.2, 
Russia’s mistrust of China and its leadership aspirations prevented Beijing from 
making the “critical decisions” on the establishment of a development fund and a 
development bank. 
 
Although Beijing raised the idea at the SCO’s annual meetings every year, it 
failed to achieve any breakthrough. The lack of consensus was manifested in the 
organization’s declarations and statements. 109  In 2013, the heads of government 
concluded the Resolution on the Next Stage of Work in Establishing the SCO 
Development Bank and the SCO Development Fund (Special Account).110  In the 
following two years, the heads of state continued to reaffirm the “great importance” 
of studying their feasibility and “instructed [the relevant bodies] to complete the work 
as soon as possible.”111 Since then, however, member states had shifted their position. 
The Ufa Declaration only stated that exploratory work on establishing the bank and 
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the fund (special account) would continue.112  The Strategy, meanwhile, made no 
reference to the development bank as the objective of economic cooperation under the 
SCO.113 Later in the same year, the heads of government only directed the heads of 
ministries to study the issue in the meetings of treasury ministers and central bank 
governors in the following year.114 Afterwards, member states only reiterated their 
support for the continuation of consultation at working group level.115 
 
Member states did recognize the need to enhance cooperation and establish 
financing and underwriting institutions in order to facilitate project implementation, 
maintain the stability of regional financial markets, and promote economic 
development. 116 As consultation continued, they recommended strengthening of the 
role of the Business Council and the Interbank Consortium.117 The two civil bodies 
should enhance coordination, improve financing and underwriting mechanisms, as 
well as deepen their ties with business and financial communities in order to promote 
member states’ socio-economic development.118 The Heads of Government Council, 
meanwhile, called for expediting implementation of the Interbank Consortium’s Plan 
for Strengthening the Measures in Enhancing Financial cooperation and Regional 
Development as well as the consensus reached in the Business Council and the SCO 
Forum.119 Member states’ ministries should also strengthen investment cooperation 
with commercial enterprises.120 
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As China redefined collective purposes of the SCO with the SREB, it sought 
to exercise greater degree of control over task implementation through the 
establishment of alternative financing mechanisms including the AIIB, the Silk Road 
Fund and the China-Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund. Of particular relevance is 
the China-Eurasia Economic Cooperation Fund, which was established in 2013 with 
a start-up capital of one billion dollars.121 The first batch of projects financed by the 
Fund was launched two years after.122 Another major lending arm is the 40-billion Silk 
Road Fund, which, by the end of 2016, provided two million dollars of starting capital 
for the China-Kazakhstan Capacity Cooperation Fund and financed fifteen projects in 
infrastructure, energy and capacity cooperation totaling 6 billion dollars.123 Moreover, 
although unable to mobilize unanimous support for its proposals of a development 
fund and a development bank, China circumvented political and institutional 
constraints in the SCO with the establishment of the AIIB, which, ironically, all 
member states joined. By the end of 2017, the AIIB had funded two projects in 
Tajikistan. 124  China also promised to join and contribute starting capital to the 
Russian-led Renaissance Capital as well as expressed its willingness to establish sub-
funds with member states or provide financing support through the NDB.125 By 2015, 
China provided a total of 27.1 billion dollars of credit to member states.126 
 
Equally important in China’s quest to exercise institutional leadership and 
renegotiate the geoeconomic definition of Eurasia was expansion of settlement in local 
currencies, which was raised in every year’s meetings of the Heads of State and 
Government Councils. In 2014, China signed or renewed or currency swap agreements 
with Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.127 While supporting Kazakhstan’s proposal 
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to expand settlement and exchange in local currencies, China promised to provide a 
better proposal for cross border payment in order to promote local currency settlement. 
Beijing also encouraged the inclusion of more member states’ financial institutions in 
financial cooperation under the SCO. 128 By 2016, the aggregate amount of currency 




As chapter five has shown, domestic economic imperatives increased the pressure on 
China to facilitate regional industrial transfer and export of surplus production 
capacity. As was the case of APT, SCO member states’s capability deficit and their 
demand for regional public goods provided an opportunity for China to address its 
domestic economic challenges by seeking institutional leadership in infrastructure 
development. At the heart of cooperation was transportation, since underdeveloped 
transportation infrastructure in landlocked Central Asia posed a major impediment to 
the implementation of the SREB and member states’ national development strategies. 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of infrastructure development, the Hu Jintao 
administration’s second term, as the previous chapter has shown, saw little progress 
in cooperation. The launch of the SREB, the AIIB and other development financing 
mechanisms represented a significant expansion of China’s diplomatic and material 
investment. “Connectivity of transportation,” as Xi Jinping pointed out, remained the 
“priority and foundation of regional cooperation.”130 Two months after the President’s 
speech at Nazabayev University, member states agreed to strengthen multilateral 
cooperation in transportation, with priority given to the building of an international 
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transportation corridor. 131  While urging the conclusion of the Agreement on 
Facilitation of International Road Transportation among SCO Member States (“the 
Agreement”) the heads of government called for expediting implementation of the 
agreed cooperation projects, approving railway infrastructure projects, as well as 
utilizing and building logistics center.132 The Agreement was eventually signed in 
2014.133 
 
Every year Chinese leaders called for the signing of the Agreement and its 
implementation afterwards, so that the specified cross-border routes could be opened 
by 2020. To encourage active participation of member states in the building of the 
New Eurasian Land Bridge and the Chongqing-Xinjiang-Europe International 
Railway Corridor, Beijing offered to provide support in technology, equipment and 
financing.134 In addition to member states, observers and dialogue partners should be 
included into these schemes on a voluntary basis.135 To expedite the Agreement’s 
implementation, Beijing offered to prioritize implementation of road connectivity 
projects that had already been agreed, conduct financial feasibility studies and 
planning activities, and participate in project investment and financing. The aim would 
be to complete the construction of 4000 km of railway and over ten thousand km of 
road in order to achieve basic connectivity. 136 
 
The launch of the SREB redefined collective purposes and created parallel 
structures of cooperation on Chinese terms. The precedence of task over relationship 
and the nature of the tasks led Beijing to engage member states selectively and 
individually. As was the case in other areas of cooperation, member states’ capability 
deficit enabled China to deploy its advantageous capabilities in its pursuit of 
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institutional leadership. For instance, China provided over 6 billion dollars of loan for 
the construction of the Moscow-Kazan high speed rail.137 In Central Asia, the Export-
Import Bank of China provided a loan of 350 million dollars to Uzbekistan for the 
building of a tunnel which formed part of the Angren-Pap railway.138 Undertaken by 
the Chinese Railway Tunnel Group, construction of the 19.1km-long, technically 
challenging tunnel was completed in 2016. 139  Another Chinese-led project, the 
Taldykorgan Kalbatau Ust Kamenogorsk Highway in Kazakhstan, was completed  a 
year after. In addition to infrastructure construction, China offered to provide quality 
transit services to goods that were transported across Chinese border, and proposed 
the strengthening of cooperation in the development of a global positioning system.140 
 
The Xi Jinping administration also engaged in hard selling of multinational 
projects. In 2014, China concluded an agreement with Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan to build a “five nation railway corridor.”141 Nevertheless, with a higher 
level of task uncertainty and interdependence, these projects raised the concern of 
member states. One of the examples was the Chinese-Kyrgyz-Uzbek railway. 
Kyrgyzstan’s unease about China’s growing control over the country’s natural 
resources through the “resources for investment” scheme, together with Russia’s 
concern with the project’s security implications, generated enormous difficulties and 
prolonged the negotiations.142 
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China’s hard selling did not improve the effectiveness of cooperation. Indeed, 
in the assessment of officials, the country’s investment is likely to sustain high degrees 
of loss, from 30% in Central Asia to 80% in Pakistan.143 Moreover, the social and 
environmental impact of some of these projects further heightened anxiety about 
China’s growing economic presence in the region. For instance, the oil refinery built 
by the Chinese state-owned enterprise Zhongda China Petrol in Kara-Balta, 
Kyrgyzstan was able to operate at only 6% of its production capacity due to its inability 
to secure adequate supply of crude oil.144 This led Kyrgyz Vice-Prime Minister Valery 
Dil to criticize the project as “ridiculous”145 Worse still, environmental hazard from 
the refinery sparked off anti-China protests and consequently forced Bishkek to 
suspend its operation.146 
 
7.2.2.4 Social and Cultural Cooperation 
At was the case during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term, social and cultural 
cooperation was not only integral to the Xi Jinping administration’s attempt to 
promote capacity building of member states, but also crucial to the building of trust. 
As chapter four to six have shown, China was aware of the problem of trust that had 
prevented it from rallying member states behind its purpose and promoting the two 
regional institutions from fully adapting to a changing international environment. At 
a time when the shifting balance of power and China’s expansion of diplomatic 
investment heightened uncertainty and mistrust, cultural cooperation became more 
important than ever to promote mutual trust and understanding. Throughout the Xi 
Jinping administration’s first term, China stepped up its efforts in supporting and soft 
selling in social and cultural cooperation. 
 
Education was central to the Xi Jinping administration’s exercise of leadership 
through supporting. In 2013, the President promised in the heads of state summit to 
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implement China’s pledge of providing 30 thousand government scholarships to 
students from member states.147 One year after, he offered to invite 50 youth leaders 
from member states to study in China every year. 148 By 2015, China provided in total 
25000 scholarships. In the same year, Li Keqiang promised that from 2016 on China 
would provide training to 2000 personnel from member states for two years and 20 
thousand government scholarships annually for the next five years. 149 Apart from 
scholarships, China sought to promote cultural exchange by launching youth programs, 
organizing forums, and establishing a SCO Committee on Good Neighborliness and 
Friendliness and a SCO Activity Center. 150 These efforts, however, did not mitigate 
the deeply entrenched Sinophobia that prevented China from exercising full 
institutional leadership in the SCO.  
 
While China’s initiatives in education contributed to member states’ capacity 
building, they were not effective in mitigating mistrust among member states. Indeed, 
as I mentioned in 2.5.2 and 6.2.2, both the Chinese government and foreign policy 
elites were not unaware of the problem of trust in hampering the rising power’s quest 
for leadership. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, negative 
perception of China’s growing economic presence in Central Asia, lingering suspicion 
of its purpose and historical Sinophobia prevented China from mobilizing member 
states as a group behind its purpose and promoting the SCO’s adaptation to a changing 
international environment. The findings show that expanding material investment 
could not solve the problem of trust; indeed, low levels of trust meant that higher level 
of task behavior did not increase leadership effectiveness.  
 
7.2.4 Enlargement 
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The most significant “critical decision” on the SCO during the Xi Jinping 
administration’s first term was enlargement. The Heads of States Council agreed to 
start the procedures for India and Pakistan’s accession as full members at the 2015 Ufa 
Summit; 151  the process was completed at the Astana Summit two years after. 
Meanwhile, Iran and Afghanistan were next in line for accession. The Council also 
upgraded Belarus’s status to observer and conferred dialogue partner status on 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal. 
 
As the previous chapter has shown, the bargaining on the “critical decision” 
on the SCO’s membership was a manifestation of the contestation on the geopolitical 
definition of Central Asia. Disagreement among member states resulted in the 
imposition of a “moratorium” on enlargement during the Hu Jintao era. Although the 
Heads of State Council approved the “Regulations” and the “SCO Rules of Procedures” 
in the 2010 Tashkent Summit, establishment of rules and procedures governing 
membership was still underway during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. At 
the 2014 Dushanbe Summit, the Heads of State Council approved the amendments to 
the “Procedures (Rules) for Granting the Status of SCO Membership” and the 
“Template of the Duties of Applicant States to the SCO.”152 
 
Russia’s active push for India’s accession constituted an attempt to constrain 
Chinese institutional leadership in the SCO, balance its growing influence and prevent 
it from dictating the geopolitical definition of Central Asia. In Gabuev’s view, China’s 
approval of India’s accession, however reluctant it was, indicated that it was a decision 
Beijing “could live with.” 153  Enlargement would in theory increase the SCO’s 
geostrategic significance and its capacity to address the Afghan question. From the 
perspective of institutional leadership, however, it threatened to undermine the 
organization’s identity by further hindering its adaptation to a changing international 
environment. To begin with, enlargement entailed the need to review operational 
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issues including working language, budget and member states’ budget 
contributions.154 Second, India and Pakistan do not share the same political culture as 
China and the other five former communist countries, which, in the view of a senior 
Chinese scholar, has been crucial to the SCO’s “success.” Third, given the SCO’s 
institutional design, the expansion of the agenda and interstate rivalry threatened to 
dilute Chinese institutional leadership, undermine the organization’s collective 
purposes, and worsen its impasse. 
 
The accession of India and Pakistan, however, did not end the contestation on 
the SCO’s identity and the geopolitical organization of Eurasia, as Iran and 
Afghanistan were next in line for full membership. As I discussed in the previous 
chapter, Beijing’s attempt to maintain the SCO’s identity as “non-alliance, non-
confrontational and not targeted at third party,” and the stipulation of the Regulations 
that a state would not be eligible for full membership if it was under sanctions, 
prevented Iran’s accession during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. The 
prospect of Iran’s membership, however, increased with the conclusion of the nuclear 
deal and the lift of sanctions in 2015. At the Ufa Summit, the heads of states 
“positively recognized” Iran’s wish to become a full member of the organization, and 
hoped resolution of the nuclear issue would “create the conditions” for studying the 
possibility of the country’s accession in accordance with the regulations.155 
 
Notwithstanding the position adopted in the joint communique, member states’ 
attitude toward Iran’s membership varied. Given the political, social and economic 
ties between the two countries, Tajikistan had long been seen as supportive of Iran’s 
membership quest. Indeed, Tajik President Rahmon, as well as Kyrgyz President 
Almazbek Atambayev, were reported to have expressed support for Iran’s 
membership at the Ufa Summit.156 Although Kazakhstan had not clarified its position, 
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the country’s advocacy for regional integration and increasing ties with Tehran 
seemed to suggest that Astana would be equally supportive.157  Opposition would 
likely come from Uzbekistan, not only because of Tashkent’s tension with Dushanbe, 
but also because of the impact of Iran’s accession on its influence in as well as benefits 
from the organization.158 
 
The moratorium on enlargement did not stop the SCO from acquiring new 
observers and dialogue partners during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term; 
yet the speed of expansion accelerated during the Xi Jinping administration’s first term. 
One year after the conferral of dialogue partner status on Azerbaijan, Armenia, 
Cambodia and Nepal, the organization received another five new applications for 
dialogue partner status.159 While declining to name the applicant states, Secretary 
General Rashid Alimov revealed that one came from Eastern Europe, one from 
Southeast Asia each, and the remaining three from the Middle East. 160 According to 
a Russian expert, the five applicant states were Laos, Israel, Hungary, Egypt and 
Syria.161  
 
Under Xi Jinping, China actively promoted cooperation with observers and 
dialogue partners by soft selling. For instance, in the 2014 Dushanbe Summit, the 
President called for the strengthening the “6+5 [6 members plus 5 observers] 
cooperation mechanism.”162 To encourage participation of observers in the building 
of the Eurasian transportation corridors, China suggested that they should be included 
into multilateral transportation cooperation on voluntary basis.163 The China-Eurasian 
Economic Cooperation Fund, meanwhile, would provide financing support not only 
to member states but also to observers and dialogue partners.164  Ironically, while 
enlargement might undermine the SCO’s identity, the expansion in a network of 
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observers and dialogue partners represented the SCO’s adaptation and changing 
identity in line with China’s embarkation on the SREB and it attempt to renegotiate 
the geopolitical definition of Eurasia. In this process, Central Asia will be reorganized 
and reintegrated into an expanding, Sino-centric construct of periphery. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
In the view of Andrey Kortunov, Director-General of the Russian International Affairs 
Council, the SCO 
has obviously entered adulthood, but it has not yet emerged as a fully mature 
international institution. Furthermore, it runs the risk of becoming an ‘eternal 
teenager,’ with its numerous transition problems and frequent changes in 
hobbies and attachments, but without any particular occupation or specific 
purpose in life.165 
Leadership is central to the maintenance and promotion of an institution’s purpose. As 
this and the previous chapter have shown, although China demonstrated increasing 
capacity to provide the regional public goods that member states needed, it was unable 
to promote the SCO’s identity and its adaptation to a changing international 
environment. As was the case in APT, the interplay of external and internal 
developments generated enormous pressures on China to make a major strategic 
adjustment. The need to “march West” and break the impasse of cooperation led to a 
shift in the orientation of China’s leadership behavior from relationship to task. The 
launch of the BRI and other Chinese-led initiatives constituted the Xi Jinping 
administration’s attempt at hard selling by redefining collective purposes and initiating 
structures of cooperation on its own terms. 
 
Nevertheless, Chinese institutional leadership was restricted in very much the 
same way as it was during the Hu Jintao administration’s second term. While 
American withdrawal from Afghanistan compelled China to shoulder greater 
responsibilities for the rebuilding of the war-torn country than before, member states’ 
lingering mistrust of its purpose led Beijing to confine its activities in security 
cooperation to small-scale tasks. Low level of trust also meant that despite its 
expanding diplomatic and material investment in economic cooperation, China was 
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unable to unite member states behind its preferences in the “critical decisions” 
concerning the establishment of a free trade area, a development fund and a 
development bank. Chinese institutional leadership, as a result, remained confined to 
functional tasks in the economic domain with low uncertainty and interdependence. 
 
As chapters six and seven have shown, Russia’s attitude continued to be the 
key to China’s quest for institutional leadership and the SCO’s development. 
Moscow’s leadership aspirations and its anxiety about China’s growing influence led 
it to check Beijing’s influence on the “critical decisions” concerning the SCO’s 
membership, institution building and external relations. The Sino-Russian agreement 
on the integration of the SREB and the EAEU represented as much an attempt by 
Russia to prevent the marginalization of itself and the EAEU as its begrudging 
recognition of China’s legitimate economic interests in the post-Soviet space. The shift 
of the locus of activities to parallel mechanisms, together with the accession of India 
and Pakistan, threatened to undermine the collective purposes that held member states 
together. In this regard, China’s hard selling did not maintain the SCO’s identity but 
rather furthered its fragmentation. 
 
As was the case in East Asia, China’s leadership behavior signified a change 
in its approach toward the reconstruction of Central Asia. Whereas the Hu Jintao 
administration sought to consolidate the post-Soviet regional order in Central Asia by 
anchoring the region to the SCO, the launch of the SREB represented the Xi Jinping 






“This is a new era,” Xi Jinping declared at the start of his second term as party leader, 
“wherein China will move closer to the center of the world stage and make greater 
contributions to mankind.”1 While continuing to shun the term leadership, he pledged 
the country’s commitment to “participating actively in the reform and rebuilding of 
the global architecture” and “contributing more Chinese wisdom, Chinese proposals 
and Chinese energy to the world.”2 At a time when the United States under the Trump 
presidency is increasingly perceived as abdicating its global leadership, China’s high-
profile initiatives seem to indicate the rising power’s readiness to fill the global 
leadership vacuum. 
 
Nevertheless, China’s hard selling has heightened anxiety about its power and 
mistrust of its purpose. If the United States’ designation of China as a “revisionist 
power” in its 2017 National Security Strategy was more or less anticipated, the alarm 
raised by some BRI partner countries at the rising power’s “debt-trap diplomacy” 
should be of concern to the Chinese government and foreign policy elites. Three 
months after his election, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced 
the cancellation of the China-funded East Coast Rail Link project in his visit to Beijing. 
“We do not want,” he stated at the joint press conference with Li Keqiang, 
a situation where there is a new version of colonialism happening because poor 
countries are unable to compete with rich countries, therefore we need fair 
trade.3 
 
Mahathir was not the only new leader who reconsidered the BRI. Imran Khan, 
Pakistan’s cricketer-turned-prime minister, also expressed reservations about the 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor during his election campaign. Although Khan was 
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reported to reaffirm his country’s “all-weather strategic cooperative partnership” with 
China as the “cornerstone” of Islamabad’s foreign policy, his adviser questioned the 
“unfairness” of the bilateral economic relationship.4 Nevertheless, an escalating trade 
war with the United States and mounting domestic economic challenges only 
increased the pressure on Beijing to sell to the developing world. 
 
If we think about these recent developments in relation to China’s experience 
in APT and the SCO, they are nothing but manifestations of the same challenges to its 
quest for peaceful development, great power status and international leadership. The 
significance of the global financial crisis lies not only in the shifting balance of 
material capabilities but also in the shifting balance of bargaining power over the terms 
of China’s rise. Nevertheless, one of the themes throughtout this thesis is China’s 
continuing deficit in legitimacy, which is rooted in the perceptual gap between the 
rising power and the world over what its interests, rights, and responsibilities should 
be. If great power status is based on the recognition of others, China’s struggle to 
mobilize member states in APT and the SCO behind its purpose indicated its difficulty 
in gaining such recognition. Legitimacy deficit, in turn, constrained the rising power’s 
capacity to lead. By dissecting China’s leadership behavior in APT and the SCO, this 
thesis puts the “rise of China” into perspective by explaining how it has shaped the 
dynamics of order and change in the post-crisis era. 
 
This conclusion begins by reviewing the key findings of my research. I will 
then discuss this thesis’s contributions and explore future directions for research. 
 
Review of Research Questions 
 
How did China exercise leadership in APT and the SCO? 
China’s experience in APT and the SCO underscores the nature of leadership as 
contextual. The global financial crisis and the shifting balance of power, on the one 
hand, redefined the possibilities of Chinese international leadership. Regional states’ 
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capability deficit and their demand for public goods provided the rising power with an 
opportunity to lead by employing its instruments of economic leadership – production 
capacity, market, capital and innovation. APT and the SCO provided the platforms for 
China to engage its neighbors and enlist their support by initiating cooperation and 
providing regional public goods. On the other hand, structural, political and 
institutional constraints meant that Chinese institutional leadership remained primarily 
economic, functional and non-coercive. Given China’s economic preponderance, 
Beijing engaged in supporting and both forms of selling in order to develop member 
states’ capacity for cooperation or accomplish collective purposes. 
 
How did China’s leadership behavior change from the Hu Jintao to the Xi 
Jinping era? 
This thesis shows that leadership behavior is defined by the balance between 
relationship and task. As chapters four to seven have shown, the transition from the 
Hu Jintao to the Xi Jinping era was marked by a corresponding shift in the orientation 
of China’s leadership behavior from relationship to task. This was a response to the 
pressure for change from a worsening strategic environment, domestic economic 
challenges and the impasse of regionalism in East and Central Asia. Under Hu Jintao, 
China sought to lead by supporting and soft selling. To maintain APT and the SCO’s 
identities, Beijing attempted to mobilize support of member state behind original, 
collectively agreed purposes through the supply of public goods and other material 
inducements. Meanwhile, it proposed institution-building initiatives in order to 
promote APT and the SCO’s adaptation to a changing international environment. 
Notwithstanding the low level of multilateralism in both institutions, the precedence 
of relationship over task led China to engage member states more or less as a group 
and demonstrated its commitment to the collective purposes defined by others. 
 
China’s failure to break the impasse of cooperation and mounting pressure for 
change caused task to precede relationship in the rising power’s leadership behavior 
under Xi Jinping. The launch of the BRI and other initiatives represented China’s 
attempt to lead by hard selling. Chinese proposals of SREB, 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road, communities with a shared future and “2+7 cooperation framework” 
constituted Beijing’s attempt to redefine the collective purposes of APT and the SCO 
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on its own terms. Meanwhile, to exercise greater control over task implementation, it 
deployed its advantageous capabilities to initiate new structures of cooperation, from 
a multilateral development bank, minilateral cooperation mechainisms to new 
financing bodies. As the locus of its activities shifted from the thirteen-member, 
multilateral APT to “ASEAN Plus One” and other parallel platforms, China under Xi 
Jinping increasingly engaged member states selectively and individually. 
 
Why wasn’t China able to exercise effective leadership in the two regional 
institutions? 
Notwithstanding the shift in the regional balance of economic power, shortage of 
regional public goods and leadership deficit in both APT and the SCO, structural, 
political and institutional constraints continued to limit the domain, form and scale of 
Chinese institutional leadership. To begin with, the United States and Russia’s 
regional security presence restricted the security functions of not only the 
economically-oriented APT but also the security-oriented SCO. As a result, China’s 
leadership activities in security cooperation were confined largely to small-scale, 
functional tasks in non-traditional security. As I pointed out in chapters six and seven, 
the “tacit bargain” between China and Russia in Central Asia led Beijing to defer 
responsibilities for regional security leadership to Moscow. Indeed, the shifting 
regional balance of economic power should not lead one to overstate China’s influence. 
As chapters four and five have shown, even after China overtook Japan as East Asia’s 
largest economy, Beijing did not displace Tokyo’s role in the supply of regional 
financial public goods. 
 
If institutional leadership hinges on a leader’s ability to make “critical 
decisions” concerning membership, institutional development, member states’ 
capacity building and external relations, the institutional design of both APT and the 
SCO severely constrained the possibilities of institutional leadership. Consensus 
decision-making gave each member state de facto veto over China’s preferences. As 
chapter four showed, Japan blocked the China-backed proposal of EAFTA with 
CEPEA. By launching RCEP, ASEAN in effect removed the “critical decision” on 
regional free trade from APT to EAS. Likewise, chapters six and seven showed that 
Russia continued to constrain Chinese institutional leadership and the SCO’s 
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development by blocking Beijing’s proposals of a free trade area, a development fund 
and a development bank on the one hand, while pushing for India’s accession and 
expediting its own regionalist initiative on the other. Consequently, both APT and the 
SCO were unable to fully adapt to a changing international environment, as epitomized 
by CMIM’s idleness after the global financial crisis or the SCO’s inactivity during the 
Second Kyrgyz Revolution. 
 
Yet the biggest impediment to Chinese institutional leadership remained the 
problem of trust. China, as I have shown throughout this thesis, was not unaware of 
the problem. Not only did it repeatedly deny any intention to seek dominance and 
stress the need to strengthen mutual trust with other member states; it signaled self-
restraint by restricting its activities in security cooperation, adhering to a policy of 
non-interference and non-alliance, reaffirming its commitment to the status quo and 
making concessions to accommodate other member states’ interests. Meanwhile, 
Beijing continued to increase its investment in education and cultural exchange. 
Nevertheless, anxiety about China’s power, mistrust of its intentions, negative 
perception of its maritime behavior and economic presence, and historical Sinophobia 
prevented Beijing from mobilizing support for initiatives with high uncertainty and 
high interdependence, as exemplified by its failure to establish a free trade area in both 
East and Central Asia. The major achievements of Chinese institutional leadership – 
such as APTERR, CMIM, the AIIB and other financial bodies – remained largely 
functional tasks with relatively low uncertainty and interdependence. In short, while 
China was increasingly capable of providing the regional public goods others member 
states needed, low level of trust prevented it from mobilizing member states as a group 
behind its purpose. 
 
China’s launch of the BRI, AIIB and other initiatives under Xi Jinping 
intensified leadership competition within the two regional institutions. In East Asia, 
China and Japan sought to outsell each other in infrastructure finance. As the locus of 
activities shifted from the multilateral APT to “ASEAN Plus Ones” and other parallel 
platforms, China’s hard selling did not maintain the thirteen-member grouping’s 
identity but rather furthered its fragmentation. Similarly, in response to China’s SREB, 
Russia expedited its regionalist initiative of the EAEU. Despite Sino-Russian 
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agreement to cooperate in the implementation and integration of the two projects, the 
ongoing competition between the SCO and the Russian-led institutions, together with 
India and Pakistan’s accession, threatened to undermine the SCO’s identity and 
cohesiveness. 
 
Implications of Research Findings 
The findings raise important implications for rethinking China’s rise and international 
political change. To begin with, this thesis underscores the importance of the 
perceptual gap between China and the world. As chapters one and two have shown, 
while the international and the Chinese discourse are both marked by their diversity, 
their most significant difference lies in what the rising power’s legitimate interests, 
rights and responsibilities should be. Euro-American centrism and status quo bias have 
led many in the United States and the West to question not only China’s capacity but 
also its legitimacy to lead. The equation of the legitimacy with China’s fulfillment of 
what they define as its responsibilities toward the liberal international order explains 
their continuing mistrust of China’s purpose on the one hand, and the Beijing’s 
perception of injustice and threat on the other. 
 
Leadership, in this regard, is central to the rising power’s struggle for self-
determination and great power status by renegotiating the terms of its rise in a 
changing international order. Nevertheless, if leadership, as I have shown throughout 
this thesis, hinges on trust, legitimacy and shared purpose, China’s perceptual gap with 
its neighbors is central to understanding the challenges Beijing faced in converting the 
country’s capabilities to leadership. As chapters four to seven showed, while China 
demonstrated increasing capacity to provide regional public goods and other material 
inducements, mistrust of its purpose and negative perception of its growing influence 
prevented Beijing from uniting member states behind its purpose. 
 
On the other hand, perceptual gap explains why China has continued to seek 
to enlist followers through selling, even if its action has turned out to heighten 
mistrust.5 China’s leadership behavior reflected Beijing’s beliefs that the lack of trust 
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is primarily due to misunderstanding of some states and the “Cold War mindset” of 
others, and that development is the solution to all problems. These beliefs were 
manifested, for example, in the way China addressed the South China Sea dispute in 
APT. Nevertheless, as chapters four to seven showed, negative perception of China’s 
growing economic presence fueled Sinophobia in neighboring states. This explains 
why, notwithstanding member states’ demand for regional public goods, China’s 
selling failed to mobilize them behind its purpose. 
 
Second, China’s quest for institutional leadership underscores the indivisibility 
of domestic politics and international behavior. Domestic economic imperatives to 
sustain growth and expedite structural reform increased the pressure on Beijing to 
break the impasse of regional trade and investment liberalization. This explains the 
shift in the orientation of China’s leadership behavior from relationship to task. Hard 
selling, in this regard, was a foreign policy solution to the country’s domestic 
economic challenges. 
 
Third is the indivisibility of China’s leadership challenge and its struggle for 
“peaceful development.” China cannot safeguard its right to pursue “autonomous” 
development if it cannot secure what it considers the country’s “core interests.” 
Nevertheless, not only do many of its “core interests” now have an international 
dimension; the perceptual gap between China and the world over what its legitimate 
interests should be have heightened mistrust. On the other hand, success of China’s 
quest for great power status through peaceful means hinges on the support of others. 
The challenges China faced in its pursuit of institutional leadership in APT and the 
SCO, in this regard, were inseparable from the contradictions in its struggle for 
peaceful development. 
 
The BRI, from this perspective, should be understood as a compromise 
between relationship and task. While mounting pressure for change from external and 
internal challenges caused task to take precedence over relationship in China’s 
leadership behavior, the need to mitigate mistrust among neighboring states resulted 
in the BRI’s lack of an integrated institutional component. The Xi Jinping 
administration, meanwhile, continued to deny any intention to seek dominance, shun 
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the term leadership, emphasize the BRI’s collaborative nature and implements it via 
existing institutions. This, however, means that the BRI is likely to inherit the 
problems China faced in its attempt to promote regional economic cooperation under 
APT and the SCO.  
 
The findings of this thesis also raise questions about order and change in world 
politics. As chapters four to seven showed, China’s quest for institutional leadership 
in APT and the SCO was central to the renegotiation over the geopolitical definition 
of East and Central Asia. Under Hu Jintao, China’s pursuit of institutional leadership 
represented an attempt to anchor the two regions to the two institutions. In response, 
the United States, Japan, ASEAN and Russia sought to prevent the rising power from 
dictating the geopolitical definition of East and Central Asia by integrating them into 
the broader geopolitical constructs of ASEAN Plus Six, Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific or 
Eurasia. China’s launch of the BRI marked an important change in the rising power’s 
approach to the geopolitical reconstruction of East and Central Asia. The 
superimposing initiative represents an attempt to reintegrate the two regions into an 
expanding, Sino-centric construct of periphery.  
 
In this regard, research on leadership behavior has important implications for 
rethinking the nature of international political change. The accelerating shift and 
diffusion of power following the global financial crisis revived the debate on the power 
and political structure of world politics. With the exceptions of some such as Monteiro 
and Beckley, most, if not agreeing on what the configuration of world politics has or 
will become, at least conclude that unipolarity has ended.6 Kupchan, for instance, 
argues that “hegemonic transition” in an interdependent world will manifest itself in 
the complex dynamics between “multiple hegemonic zones.”7 The rise of China and 
other emerging powers, each with its distinct “path to modernity,” means that 
competition over norms and rules will play a more significant role than before.8 
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“Multipolarity and normative diversity,” he believes, herald “the onset of a more 
regionalized international system [my italics].”9 
 
The findings of this thesis, however, present a more complex picture of 
international political change. As chapters four to seven have shown, even if the global 
financial crisis and its repercussions did accelerate the regionalization of world politics, 
neither East nor Central Asia saw the emergence of any “hegemonic zone” or “parallel 
order.” Despite the shifting regional balance of power, China continued to face 
considerable constraints in converting power to leadership. The stalemate and 
fragmentation of APT and the SCO reflected the rising power’s inability to dictate the 
geopolitical definition of its peripheral regions. 
 
This might suggest that China’s initiatives amounted to change by addition 
instead of by replacement. The difference between the two is significant. Except a 
hegemonic war or the emergence of new issue-area such as cyberspace, change in a 
highly institutionalized order seldom takes place in a “clean slate.”10 As chapters four 
to seven showed, Beijing’s institution building, development financing or technology 
transfer initiatives were adequate to complement but not replace existing structures. 
Meanwhile, both the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping administrations continually reaffirmed 
China’s commitment to the status quo and emphasized the complementarity of its 
initiatives and the existing order. In short, the institutions led or backed by China are 
not so much parallel as “parasitical” to the existing order. 
 
Contributions 
This thesis contributes to the scholarship in four ways. First, the analytical framework 
of institutional leadership offers an alternative interpretation of China’s international 
behavior. Since the global financial crisis, China has significantly augmented its 
investment in multilateralism. Not only has Beijing played a more active role in the 
American-led global architecture; it has also launched or promoted a variety of new 
bodies, platforms and initiatives. Yet, notwithstanding the differences in the purpose, 
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structure and functions of these institutions and China’s role within them, the 
analytical framework of institutional leadership helps us understand the underlying 
logic of the rising power’s institutional behavior. China’s success in establishing the 
AIIB and its failure in negotiating a regional free trade agreement in both APT and the 
SCO, for instance, were not separate events but related dimensions of the same 
phenomenon. As chapters four to seven showed, despite China’s capability growth, 
low level of trust restricted Chinese institutional leadership to functional tasks in the 
economic domain with low uncertainty and interdependence. Nevertheless, mounting 
pressure for change and the shortage of regional public goods provided the incentives 
and opportunity for China to invest more and more of its resources in functional 
cooperation. The contrasting outcomes, in other words, marked the limits of Chinese 
institutional leadership. 
 
Second, the comparative study of APT and the SCO complements the 
scholarship on China’s multilateralism by shedding light on Beijing’s diplomatic 
activities in international institutions that exclude the United States and the West. As 
I mentioned in chapter one, Euro-American centrism and status quo bias means that 
the scholarship on China’s multilateralism has for a long time tended to see the rising 
power as a reactive actor either to be socialized or preoccupied with balancing against 
the United States. As a result, the focus has remained on institutions the United States 
and the West lead or support. If any claim to great power status begins with “regional 
preponderance,” studying the various institutions, mechanisms and initiatives situated 
at the margins of American hegemony will broaden our understanding of the ongoing 
renegotiation between China and the world on the terms of the international order and 
its role in it.11 This thesis also demonstrates the importance of examining not only the 
cases where China succeeded but also those where it failed. 
 
Third, this thesis provides a more nuanced interpretation of the BRI by putting 
it in the context of China’s regional diplomacy in East and Central Asia. While 
scholars continue to disagree on the causes and motivations of China’s grand project, 
we cannot understand the BRI without understanding China’s experience in APT and 
the SCO. As chapters four to seven showed, while the BRI and other initiatives mark 
                                                          
11 Bull, The Anarchical Society, 207-9. 
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a significant change in China’s leadership behavior and its approach toward the 
geopolitical construction of its periphery, they also represent the continuation of the 
country’s struggle to gain trust and legitimacy its quest for peaceful development and 
great power status. In this regard, the current form of these initiatives reflect China’s 
experience in its regional diplomacy in East and Central Asia. 
 
Fourth, the in-depth analysis of Chinese writings on international relations and 
foreign policy contributes to greater understanding in the English-speaking academia 
of China’s perspectives on international politics.12 As chapters one and two have 
shown, the perceptual gap between China and the world is crucial in shaping the future 
dynamics of order and change. As the discourse continues to change with international 
and domestic development, ongoing efforts will be required analyze China’s changing 
perception of the world and its role in it. 
 
Future Directions for Research 
The findings point to four future directions for research. First, as I have discussed 
above, this thesis demonstrates the need for and promise of further research on 
leadership. Indeed, IR has made less progress than behavioral sciences in the study of 
leadership. Given the contextual and multidimensional nature of leadership, I do not 
intend to overstate the applicability of the analytical framework of institutional 
leadership to other cases; indeed, what the framework demonstrates the most is the 
need for further efforts to conceptualize, typologize and theorize leadership behavior. 
Nevertheless, it provides a starting point for understanding the underlying logic of 
China’ institutional behavior and its implications for international change. 
 
China’s embarkation on multiple regionalist and institutional initiatives under 
Xi Jinping has shifted scholarly attention from Western-led institutions to these 
Chinese projects. The analytical framework of institutional leadership can be used to 
dissect China’s leadership behavior in institutions such as BRICS. Comprised of China, 
Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa, the grouping had its origins in the rising powers’ 
                                                          
12 In recent years there have been increasing efforts by scholars to analyse Chinese writings on 
international relations and foreign policy. See, for example, Jinghan Zeng and Shaun Breslin, 
“China’s ‘New Type of Great Power Relations’: a G2 with Chinese Characteristics?” International 
Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4, (1st July 2016), 773-94;  Lynch, China’s Future. 
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shared dissatisfaction with the global economic architecture. Like APT and the SCO, 
however, the potential geopolitical significance of BRICS has not been realized. The 
grouping is defined by low level of institutionalization and multilateralism; with the 
exception of the NDB, cooperation has remained mostly symbolic. 
 
The analytical framework enables us to dissect China’s leadership behavior 
into the tasks it accomplished, the way it accomplished them, and the influence it 
exercised over the “critical decisions” concerning the grouping’s development. Taking 
contextual variables including capability, institutional design, trust and task structure 
into consideration, the framework explains why, for instance, has China engaged 
primarily in relations-oriented behavior? Why was Beijing able to establish a 
development bank but unable to advance cooperation in other areas? Why did Russia 
support the NDB in BRICS but oppose the establishment of a multilateral development 
bank under the SCO? The analytical framework provides an alternative approach to 
evaluating Chinese institutional leadership and the successes and failures of BRICS. 
If China can only serve as a supplier of public goods without the ability to sell or 
broker a more comprehensive institutional bargain, it will not be able to transform the 
international order according to its vision for a considerable period of time. 
 
Second is China’s legitimation strategy. As I pointed out in the previous 
section, China’s quest for institutional leadership in APT and the SCO was a 
manifestation of its ongoing struggle for legitimacy as a rising power. Scholars have 
made significant contributions both to the study of legitimacy in IR theory and China’s 
struggle for legitimacy. 13  Nevertheless, as this thesis has shown, even if Beijing 
continued to deny any intention to seek hegemony, avoid the term leadership in its 
diplomatic lexicon and exercise different forms of self-restraint, it was unable to 
resolve the problem of trust, unite member states behind its purpose and steer 
institutional development in adaptation to a changing international environment. 
Certainly task is not the sole purpose of leadership, nor does it always take precedence 
over relationship. This raise questions about the China’s legitimation strategy. From 
                                                          
13 Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics,” International Organization, Vol. 53, 
No. 2, (Spring 1999), 379-408; Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Downs and Saunders. “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism”; Deng, 
China’s Struggle for Status.  
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the perspective of prospect theory, a rising state is by definition the biggest beneficiary 
of the status quo. 14  Given its capability advantage and the asymmetric 
interdependence created in its relations with neighboring states, China has the capacity 
to make strategic concessions at one moment and wait for leadership opportunities to 
arise in the future. Nevertheless, under what circumstances is China willing to make 
concessions? How does it balance the need to make concessions against the need for 
change? These questions can guide future research on China’s multilateral and 
minilateral diplomacy. 
 
Third is the relationship between multilateralism, minilateralism and 
bilateralism in Chinese foreign policy. The importance of this question has already 
been noted by some scholars.15 As chapters four to seven showed, Beijing’s repeated 
reaffirmation of the centrality of APT and the SCO to regional cooperation regardless 
of their ineffectiveness raises the question of the role of multilateralism in the rising 
power’s visions of world order. This is particularly important with regard to the 
question of leadership, since institutional design has significant influence on the 
constraints and possibilities of institutional leadership. The AIIB provides at best part 
of the answer to the question, as it is at most a functional body that performs tasks 
with high task certainty and low task interdependence. Does it suggest that 
international political life in a Chinese world order will be defined by functional 
organization without political and economic integration?16  
 
Fourth is the relationship between China’s rise and the nature of international 
political change. As I discussed in the section on my research findings’ implications, 
international change has been conceived primarily as replacement. The changing 
nature of the international system suggests that the politics of leadership should no 
longer be understood only in terms of cycles of transition. The simultaneous shift and 
diffusion of power mean that international leadership will be distributed differently in 
                                                          
14 Randall L. Schweller, “Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders,” Valdai 
Papers 16, (2015), http://valdaiclub.com/files/11391/  
15 William T. Tow and Brendan Taylor, Bilateralism, Multilateralism and Asia-Pacific Security, 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2013). 
16 Shaun Breslin, “Leadership and Followership in Post-Unipolar World: Towards Selective Global 




different issue-areas; in a “nonpolar,” “G-Zero” or “no one’s world,” solution to global 
challenges requires “collaborative leadership.”17 China, as in the case of the BRI and 
the AIIB, repeatedly emphasizes the complementarity of its initiatives and the existing 
architecture. Nevertheless, more often than not these parallel structures do not coexist 
as equals. Will the shift in the balance of power set off a competition that would result 
in the dominance of the Chinese-led structures, or will these parallel structures 
accumulate and, rather than replacing the existing order, simply increase its 
complexity? 
 
“Pure politics,” de Jouvenel argues, is fundamentally concerned with 
“aggregates of men.” 18  The driving force behind the formation and evolution of 
aggregates is vis politica, the “capacity to bring into being a stream of wills, the 
capacity to canalize the stream, and the capacity to regularize and institutionalize the 
resulting cooperation.” 19 As the global financial crisis severely weakened the stream, 
world politics has since entered into a period of upheavals. After four decades of 
“reform and opening-up,” China has become a center of gravity whose action has 
enormous impact on its neighbors and the world. Yet only when the rising power is 
capable and ready to lead will it be able to channel the drifting wills into a new course. 
  
                                                          
17 Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What will Follow U.S. Dominance,” Foreign Affairs 
87, No. 3, (May/June 2008), 44-56; Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-
Zero World, (New York: Penguin, 2012); Kupchan, No One’s World; Ole Wæver and Zhimin Chen, 
“Introduction: International Leadership in an Age of American Retreat, Chinese Return and Global 
Urgency,” Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 4, (December 2017), 445-51; Breslin, 
“Leadership and Followership in Post-Unipolar World.” 
18 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1957), 20. 
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